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ARTICLE 
INTERPRETING STATUTES IN 
THE REGULATORY STATE 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
Discussing the judge's role in interpreting statutes, Justice Holmes wrote 
that "if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."1 
Critics of the view of the courts as passive agents of the legislature claim 
that it understates the difficulty of interpretation, the indeterminacy of both 
the language and the will of the citizens, and the resulting discretion of the 
judge. Similarly, a vigorous debate continues over the proper role of the 
traditional sources of statutory interpretation — the text, the legislative 
history, the purpose of the enacting Congress, and the structure of the statute. 
Professor Sunstein suggests that both the conventional understandings of 
interpretation and the recent critiques are seriously flawed. Because inter-
pretation inevitably involves the application of "background norms" — often 
controversial, value-laden, and not found in any text — the traditional 
theories are incomplete. These theories, however, properly stress the demo-
cratic primacy of Congress. When congressional instructions are clear and 
do not create absurdity, courts should follow them. Often, however, the 
instructions are ambiguous, and judges must choose from a number of pos-
sible background norms. 
Suggesting that many disputes over statutory meaning are in fact dis-
agreements over appropriate background norms, Professor Sunstein contends 
that the debate should center on whether the proposed norms express a good 
understanding of constitutional values; are properly responsive to contem-
porary institutional arrangements involving the making, monitoring, and 
enforcement of law; and are sensitive to the aspirations and functions as 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political 
Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to many colleagues and friends for their help 
with this essay. Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Douglas Baird, Jack Beermann, Frank Buckley, 
Frank Easterbrook, Jon Elster, Richard Epstein, William Eskridge, Richard Fallon, Philip 
Frickey, Stephen Gilles, Don Herzog, Stephen Holmes, Donald Horowitz, Benjamin Kaplan, 
Larry Kramer, John Langbein, Howard Latin, Larry Lessig, Jon Macey, Geoffrey Miller, 
Martha Minow, Richard Posner, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frederick Schauer, Richard Stewart, 
Geoffrey Stone, David Strauss, Lloyd Weinreb, Robin West, James Boyd White, and John 
Wiley offered valuable comments on all or parts of the manuscript 1 am also grateful to 
participants in helpful workshops at the University of California at Los Angeles, Harvard 
University, the University of Michigan, New York University, Princeton University, Tulane 
University, and the University of Virginia. D. Gordon Smith, Gamhk Markarian, and Catherine 
O'Neill provided research assistance and useful comments. Finally, I am grateful to the Law 
and Government Program of the University of Chicago for generous support. 
Some of the material in this Article is also included, in different form, as parts of chapters 
4 and 5 in C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
AND THE REGULATORY STATE (forthcoming 1990). 
1
 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 249 (M. Howe ed. 1953) 
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well as the shortcomings of regulatory statutes Professor Sunstein concludes 
by outlining a series of norms — some based on current interpretive practices, 
others reflecting his own normative vision All the norms are designed to 
focus disputes over statutory meaning more sharply on the underlying issues 
and to deepen understanding of the regulatory state 
I INTRODUCTION 
A The Problem 
IN the early part of the twentieth century, courts often treated regulatory statutes as foreign substances 2 Starting from principles 
of laissez-faire, judges saw statutory protections of workers, consum-
ers, and others as unprincipled interest-group transfers supported by 
theories that were at best obscure and often disingenuous 3 By con-
trast, judge-made doctrines of property, contract, and tort seemed to 
create a system with integrity and coherence 
The role of the courts in this period was one of damage control 
The most important organizing principle for interpretation was that 
regulatory statutes should be construed narrowly — so as to harmonize 
as much as possible with principles of private markets and private 
rights 4 This approach grew out of the idea that courts should nar-
rowly construe statutes in derogation of the common law 5 
The New Deal period marked an enormous change in the size and 
character of the national government 6 The decade between 1930 and 
1
 See, e g , B CARDO/O, T H E PARADOXES OF LFGAL S C O N C E 9 (1928) ("The truth is that 
manv of us, bred in common law traditions, view statutes with a distrust which we may deplore, 
hut not deny ") 
* Ste, eg , United States v Mgin J & E Ry , 298 U S 492 (1936), FTC v Eastman 
Kodak Co , 274 U S 619 623-25 (1927), F TC \ American Iobacco Co , 264 U S 298, 305-
06 (1924), f* I C v Gratz, 253 U S 421, 427-28 (1920) 
4
 See, ( g , cases cited supra note 3, h FRANKFURTER & N G R U - N F , THF LABOR INJUNC 
TION 165-82 (1930) (explonng the federal courts' nullification of the Clayton Act), see also 
Found Common Lau and Legislation, 21 HARV L R F V 383, 387-88, 406-07 (1908) (criticizing 
use of interpretive principles that are out of touch with contemporary social and economic 
thought), Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM POL SCI REV 361, 374-75 (19M) (same) 
This principle of narrow construction, like man> others of the past and present, was not 
always invoked explicitly Often it operated invisibly or in the background When interpretive 
principles are not referred to expressly, their use is often reflected in the court's treatment of 
the statutory language See infra pp 437-41, see also infra pp 464-66 (discussing when 
controversial substantive and institutional norms should be applied) 
s
 See, e g , Shaw v Railroad Co , 101 U S 557, 565 (1879), Johnson v Southern Pac Co , 
117 F 462, 466 (8th Cir 1902), rev'd, 196 U S 1 (1904), see also Fordham & Leach, Interpre-
tation of Statutes in Deyogatwn of the Common Law, } \ AND L RLV 438, 450-51 & nn 73 -
74 (1950) (listing cases in which courts ignored statutes instructing them not to construe statutes 
narrowly) 
u
 On the pre New Deal developments, see S SKOWRONEK, Bun DING THF N F W AMERICAN 
STATE T H E EXPANSION OF N A I I O N A I ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920(1982) 
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1940 saw the creation of as many agencies — seventeen — as had 
been created in the entire period between the framing of the Consti-
tution and the close of the nineteenth century.7 During the "rights 
revolution" of the 1960's and 1970's, the national government sub-
stantially increased its regulatory responsibilities by moving to protect 
the interests of consumers, the national environment, and victims of 
discrimination 8 The emergence of the regulatory state represents a 
shift in both the substance of law and the institutions through which 
law is made and enforced,9 and the sheer volume of federal statutes 
and regulations has dramatically changed the business of the federal 
courts 10 In particular, the work of federal judges has increasingly 
involved the interpretation of federal enactments 
The demands of the modern administrative state ultimately made 
it impossible for courts to sustain a theory of interpretation rooted in 
nineteenth-century common law. As a result, interpretive practices 
have changed Courts have often repudiated private-law baselines for 
interpreting public law and have been less antagonistic to regulatory 
statutes n 
In many respects, however, the theory and practice of public law 
have not outgrown the understandings that underlay the initial period 
of judicial antagonism 12 That period is unmistakably recalled by 
7
 See F INAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE 7-11 (1941) 
8
 For comparisons between the New Deal and the rights revolution, see R HARRIS & S 
M I L K I S , T H E POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE 53-96 (1989), and Vogel The "New" Social 
Regulation in Historical and Comparative Perspective in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 155 (1 
McCraw ed 1981) 
g
 See generally Sunstein Constitutionalism ifter the I\ew Deal 101 HARV L REV 421 
437-46 (1987) (discussing substantive and institutional reform in the New Deal period) 
, u
 The proliferation of statutes in modern law has been widel> observed both on the bench 
see, eg R POSNFR, T H E I L W R A I COURTS S^ 8^-84 (1985), I raynor, Statutes Revolving in 
Common Law Orbits 17 ( ATH U L RFV 401, 402 (1968) (observing that cases "increasingly 
involve the meaning or applicability of a statute"), and in academia, see, e g , G GiLMORE, 
T H E AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) (describing an "orgy of statute making") Recent 
statistics confirm these intuitions In 1985, for example, nearly 20% of all civil filings involved 
four regulatory areas — social security, labor, tax, and civil rights See ADMINISTRATIVE 
O F F I C E OF THE U N I T E D STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS at a 16 
to a 17 (198=;) (table C 3) Moreover, because most commercial disputes have been absorbed 
into the regulatory arena through the Uniform Commercial Code, and because "contract cases" 
account for nearly 40% of all filings, see id , the federal courts probably hear many more 
statutory than common law claims 
11
 See, e g , Switchmen's Union v National Mediation Bd , 320 U S 297 (1943) (denying 
judicial review of agency decision) Gray v Powell, 314 U S 402 (1941) (deferring to agency 
interpretation of law) 
12
 Over 80 years ago, Roscoe Pound voiced similar complaints about the persistence of 
judicial adherence to common law principles See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra 
note 4, at 385-86, accord Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSA\S 
213, 213 (1954) 
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recent suggestions that courts should indulge a presumption in favor 
of private ordering and should interpret regulatory statutes so as to 
intrude minimally on the private market.13 The nineteenth-century 
view that regulatory statutes should be viewed against a background 
of common law property and contract rights and hence as naked 
wealth transfers also finds a modern home, in the increasingly prom-
inent idea that statutes should be seen as unprincipled "deals" among 
self-interested private actors.14 Similarly, those who emphasize the 
findings of public choice theory would treat statutes as lacking coher-
ent normative underpinnings.15 
The initial judicial skepticism about the legitimacy and coherence 
of statutory law is also recalled by both poles of the contemporary 
debate over the possibility of constrained or objective legal interpre-
tation. At one extreme, some courts and observers see the text or 
"plain meaning" of statutory language as the exclusive or principal 
guide to meaning.16 At the opposite extreme, other commentators 
claim that legal terms are quite generally indeterminate17 or have the 
meaning that those with authority choose to impose on them.18 De-
spite their differences, the two camps share a number of assumptions. 
Both treat regulatory statutes as an undifferentiated and unprincipled 
whole, without distinct and accessible purposes. Because members of 
both camps see no way to mediate the sharp ideological disagreements 
that sometimes underlie interpretive disputes, some are driven to the 
13
 See, e.g., J. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: H O W PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC 
POLICY (1989); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. C H I . L. REV. 533, 544-51 (1983). Many 
recent decisions appear to respond to a principle in favor of private ordering. See, e.g., 
Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989) (discussed below in 
note 305); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (discussed below at pp. 
484-85); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 
(1984); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981) (discussed 
below at pp. 500-02). 
14
 See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, IQ8} Term — Foreword: The Court and the Eco-
nomic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984). 
15
 For a discussion of public choice theory, see Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An 
Overview and Interpretation, in RATIONAL M A N AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY? 231 (B. Barry & 
R. Hardin eds. 1982). See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 
(1951); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, T H E CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962). The treatment in 
H. HART & A. SACKS, T H E LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958), runs into severe problems because 
of its failure to appreciate the difficulties raised by work of this sort. My ultimate goal, however, 
is to revive important elements of the treatment in The Legal Process, rather than to celebrate 
its demise or to emphasize its occasional naivete about politics and interpretation. 
16
 This view is currently enjoying a renaissance in the courts. See cases cited infra note 29; 
see also Easterbrook, supra note 13 (advocating a presumption against applying a statute unless 
it expressly addresses the issue in question). 
17
 See, e.g., R. U N G E R , KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 88-100 (1975). 
18
 See, e.g., S. F I S H , DOING W H A T COMES NATURALLY 87-102 (1989); S. F I S H , IS THERE 
A T E X T IN THIS CLASS?: T H E AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 338-55 (1980) 
[hereinafter S. F I S H , IS T H E R E A T E X T IN THIS CLASS?]. 
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pretense that words quite generally have "plain meanings," others to 
the uninformative view that meaning is a function of authority, others 
to the demonstrably false claim that statutes are usually indeterminate 
in meaning, and still others to the open-ended suggestion that statutes 
should be interpreted so as to be "reasonable" or "the best that they 
can be."19 In the face of contentions of this sort, debates about 
statutory interpretation, in and out of the judiciary, often dissolve 
into fruitless and unilluminating disputes about the constraints sup-
plied by language "itself" (as if such a thing could be imagined). 
B. Interpretive Principles 
My project is to develop a theory of statutory construction that 
not only sheds light on current practices but also might claim to be 
worthy of adoption. In carrying out that task, it is first necessary to 
set out the proper relationships among the traditional sources of in-
terpretation, including text, structure, purpose, intent, and history. A 
large part of the solution, however, lies in the identification and 
development of interpretive principles with which to approach regu-
latory statutes.20 The meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the 
precepts with which interpreters approach its text. Statutes do not 
have pre-interpretive meanings, and the process of interpretation re-
quires courts to draw on background principles. These principles are 
usually not "in" any authoritative enactment but instead are drawn 
from the particular context and, more generally, from the legal cul-
ture.21 Disagreements about meaning often turn not on statutory 
terms "themselves," but instead on the appropriate interpretive prin-
19
 See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 337-38 (1986) (arguing that judges should interpret 
statutes "in the best light overall"); Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 
(1950) (suggesting that courts interpret statutes to "make sense"). 
20
 It is important to emphasize that my approach is directed to regulatory statutes. I refer 
to other measures, including criminal law, largely by way of analogy. Much of the discussion, 
however, bears on statutory interpretation in general. 
21
 The illuminating treatment in Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989), presents a number of these background norms, including the idea that 
courts should defer to administrative interpretations of law if Congress has not clearly addressed 
the issue, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842 (1984); that criminal statutes should be construed in accordance with the "rule of lenity," 
see Eskridge, supra, at 1029; and that statutes and treaties should be construed favorably to 
Indian tribes, see id. at 1047. 
Eskridge's treatment is flawed, however, by the implicit assumption that the role of "public 
values" in interpretive disputes is to add to ordinary interpretation, or to bend the meaning of 
statutes in various directions. Sec id. at 1045-47. For reasons suggested below, see infra pp. 
416-25, ordinary interpretation is also pervaded by "public values"; the dichotomy between 
interpretation that rests on fidelity to text and interpretation that is based on extratextual values 
greatly oversimplifies the problem and is in important respects a false one. 
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ciples. Courts sometimes make the governing norms explicit, but 
frequently leave them unarticulated and latent. The principles are 
often misdirected or at least controversial. 
In these circumstances, it is important to identify the prevailing 
principles and to subject them to scrutiny. The ultimate task is to 
develop norms of statutory interpretation that grow out of, and do 
not collide with, the basic purposes of the constitutional framework, 
of contemporary institutional arrangements, and of modern social and 
economic regulation. Above all, it is important to develop principles 
that improve the performance of modern government, and that are 
not based on pre-New Deal understandings, which seem to have 
overstayed their welcome. 
To carry out this task, it will be necessary to develop distinctive 
understandings about both the nature of legal interpretation and the 
character of modern public law. Because interpretation is a function 
of background norms and cannot proceed without them, theories 
about statutory "meaning" cannot be separated from theories about 
how the modern regulatory state does and should operate. When 
interpretive norms are contested, and when neither the Constitution 
nor the Congress has specified the proper norms, there is no alternative 
but to base the inevitably value-laden choice among them on their 
role in improving or impairing governmental performance. 
In the course of the discussion, I reject a number of generally 
accepted understandings about statutory construction-
o courts must always adhere to the original meaning of the statute, 
or the original intent of the enacting legislature; 
o courts are or can be mere agents of the Congress; 
o statutory meaning remains constant over time; 
o statutory meaning is equivalent to legislative intent; 
o controversial views about public policy are never and should 
never be part of statutory construction; 
o canons of construction, or background interpretive norms, are 
an outmoded and unhelpful guide to the courts. 
All of these aspects of the conventional wisdom, I suggest, are incon-
sistent with actual judicial behavior. Moreover, they provide incom-
plete instructions and often produce perverse results. 
The discussion proceeds in three stages Part II rejects the usual 
understandings of how courts do and should construe statutes. It also 
suggests the proper uses of the traditional sources of interpretation: 
text, structure, purpose, congressional intent, and legislative history. 
The recent emphasis on the primacy of the text is a step in the right 
direction, but structure, purpose, intent, and history sometimes help 
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to clarify ambiguities or to prevent unnecessary or unintended irra-
tionality and injustice. I also suggest that the traditional sources offer 
incomplete guidance and that their incompleteness reveals the inevi-
table failure of the agency conception of the judicial role. At the same 
time, I reject the view that statutory disputes produce "indeterminacy" 
in most or all cases and the related idea that such disputes are resolved 
on the basis of conventions that are not subject to evaluation. Finally, 
I criticize, though on quite different grounds, the use of certain widely-
held extratextual norms to resolve statutory disputes: private auton-
omy, deference to agency interpretations, and conceptions of statutes 
as "deals." 
Part III attempts to understand statutory construction by means 
of a general defense of the much-maligned "canons" of construction, 
understood as background principles designed to help discern statutory 
meaning. I defend the use of such principles by disaggregating their 
various functions and by suggesting that the use of background norms 
is desirable and in any case inevitable. I also suggest that several 
current substantive norms can be supported through an understanding 
of the ways in which they incorporate constitutional principles, pro-
mote deliberation in government, and respond to New Deal reforms 
of the legal system. 
Part IV proposes a series of interpretive principles for judicial 
adoption in the regulatory state. I argue that many such principles, 
whether existing in current law or proposed here, can be defended by 
reference to constitutional norms; that others are based on assessments 
of the performance of various governmental institutions; and that still 
others are an effort to counteract some of the failings in regulatory 
systems. A general purpose of Part IV is to describe and defend 
principles that will serve the purposes of deliberative government and, 
in particular, will alleviate rather than aggravate the defects in modern 
regulatory programs. 
Although these suggestions are designed principally for reviewing 
courts in hard cases, their implications extend to administrative agen-
cies attempting to implement statutes, and to Congress in its efforts 
to design and reform social and economic regulation. Debates over 
statutory meaning are often disputes over interpretive principles; these 
debates reflect broader divisions over the nature and performance of 
the regulatory state and, indeed, about the character of American 
democracy and constitutionalism as a whole.22 
22
 The stud> of statutory construction is therefore one part of a more general effort to 
understand the performance of modern regulatory institutions — an effort that will ultimately 
make it necessary to focus more on Congress, the President, and the bureaucracy than on the 
courts For discussion in this vein, see J MASHAW & B HARFST, T H E FREEDOM MACHINE 
(forthcoming 1990), C SUNSTEIN, cited above in note *, and Rubin, Law and Legislation in 
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM L REV 369 (1989) 
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II. STANDARD APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
In the conventional account, the tools of statutory construction are 
language, structure, and history. The weight of each of these has 
been sharply contested, especially in recent years.23 Disputes over 
questions of this sort have produced a range of approaches to statutory 
construction, all with support in the case law. Each, however, is 
flawed. My purpose here is to explain how these approaches fail, 
both as positive accounts of how courts in fact approach statutes and 
as normative theories of interpretation. 
This Part is divided into three sections. The first deals with 
theories that see courts as agents of the legislature and that charge 
courts with the duty to implement legislative decisions. These theories 
fail because they ignore the inevitable use of interpretive principles in 
the process of construction. Arguing that it is possible to choose 
among interpretive principles, the second section rejects both conven-
tionalist accounts of meaning and the view that statutory interpreta-
tion produces "indeterminacy."24 The third section considers three 
prominent approaches that do invoke supplemental principles; it sug-
gests that these approaches also fail, largely because the relevant 
principles are difficult to defend. 
21
 Compare Hirsche> v Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 b 2d 1, 7-8 (D C Cir 
1985) (Scaha, J , concurring) (criticizing use of legislative history) and B ACKLRMAN & W 
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY A I R 108-09 (1981) (same) with Farber & frnckev, Legislative 
Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA L REV 423 (1988) (arguing in favor of attention to legislative 
history) 
24
 All interpretation involves the application of norms Some of these "norms" are not open 
to change or even to discussion There is a difference, at least in principle, between the sorts 
of understandings that make ordinary words intelligible and the sorts of interpretive principles 
that give meaning to statutory gaps or that resolve cases that are otherwise in equipoise — as, 
for example, in the norms in favor of state autonomy or judicial review Participation in the 
set of practices that make ordinarv words intelligible is probably best conceived of not as 
interpretation but as understanding See L W I T T G E N S T E I N , PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
§ 201, at 81 (G Anscombe trans 1972) (discussing a way "of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' 
in actual cases" (emphasis in original)) This point holds even though one's participation in 
those practices is conditional on a wide range of background understandings that are not "part" 
of words "themselves " 
The distinction is important because it is sufficient, for purposes of background understand-
ings of this sort, that there be a social consensus on their behalf Communication is possible 
only because of that consensus But with respect to interpretive principles that are part of 
interpretation — for example, the idea that silence on the question of federal preemption means 
that state law continues to exist — a consensus mav be inadequate if there are no good arguments 
on behalf of that consensus In these latter cases, interpretive principles are at least in theory 
subject to evaluation and to replacement bv alternatives A pervasive problem with conven-
tionalist accounts of meaning is that the> treat all interpretation as akin to the sorts of under-
standings that make ordinar> words intelligible See injra pp 442-43 (discussing convention-
alism) I am grateful to Thomas Nagel for help with this point 
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A. Courts As Agents 
According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts 
in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legis-
lature.25 On the agency view, courts should say what the statute 
means, relying on its language, structure, and history. Background 
norms, policy considerations, indeed all "outside sources," are imma-
terial. The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by 
others, most notably the legislature. 
The agency view is usually defended by a claim of judicial legiti-
macy.26 In a democratic system, with an electorally accountable leg-
islature and separated powers, it is said to be the appropriate and 
indeed constitutionally prescribed role of the courts to apply legislative 
commands; it is thus impermissible for them to invoke considerations 
that cannot be traced to an authoritative text. The claim of illegiti-
macy is buttressed by (and perhaps reducible to) a range of prudential 
considerations: the use of outside sources will tend to increase judicial 
discretion, decrease legislative attentiveness, produce uncertainty, and 
risk usurpation by judges of powers reserved for legislative and ex-
ecutive actors.27 Justice Holmes provided a particularly crisp expres-
sion of the agency view: after describing a regulatory statute as "fool-
ish," he added, "if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help 
them. It's my job."28 
The agency view appears in several competing forms, and much 
of the history of statutory construction consists of shifts and disputes 
among the various possible sources of the instructions of the courts' 
"principal," the legislature. I discuss several variations here 
j . Textualism. — It is sometimes suggested that statutory lan-
guage is the source of judicial power and the only legitimate object 
of judicial concern. Textualism appears to be enjoying a renaissance 
in a number of recent cases,29 and perhaps in the academy as 
25
 This conception has strong roots in the American legal tradition, see, e g , Schooner 
Paulina's Cargo v United States, 11 U S (7 Cranch) 52, 60 (1812) (Marshall, C J ) ("In 
construing these laws, it has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention 
of the legislature ") For more modern advocates of the agencv conception, see cases cited in 
note 29 below 
26
 See, eg, Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 5^4 n 2 ("If statutes' words do not convey 
meaning and bind judges, why should judges' words bind or even interest the rest of us?") 
27
 In this sense, the debate resembles the debate over formalism in constitutional law See 
generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B U L REV 204 
(1980) 
2 8
 1 HOLMES LASKI LETTERS, supra note 1, at 249 
29
 See, e g , Public Citizen v United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S Ct 2558, 2573-74 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J , concurring in the judgment), Mallard v United States Dist Court, 109 S Ct 
1814, 1818-19 (1989), Chan v Korean Airlines, 109 S Ct 1676, 1680-81 (1989), Pittiton Coal 
Group v Sebben, 109 S Ct 414, 419-21 (1988), McLaughlin v Richland Shoe Co , 108 S Ct 
1677, 1681-82 (1988), Immigration & Naturalization Serv v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U S 421, 
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well,30 partly because of dissatisfaction with alternative interpretive 
strategies, taken up below, which counsel courts to rely on "purpose" 
or to produce "reason" in regulatory regimes.31 
Several considerations argue in favor of textualist strategies. First, 
textualism contains an important and often overlooked truth. Statu-
tory terms are the enactment of the democratically elected legislature 
and represent the relevant "law." Statutory terms — not legislative 
history, not legislative purpose, not legislative "intent" — have gone 
through the constitutionally specified procedures for the enactment of 
law. Second, resort to the text promotes goals associated with the 
rule of law: citizens have access to the statutory words and can most 
readily order their affairs in response to those words. Third, the 
words of a statute, considered in light of widely shared conventions 
about how they should be understood, often have only one plausible 
interpretation, or at least sharply constrain the territory of legitimate 
disagreement. Finally, an emphasis on the primacy of the text serves 
as a salutary warning about the potential abuses of judicial use of 
statutory "purpose" and of legislative history.32 
Some textualists emphasize the "plain meaning" or dictionary def-
inition of statutory terms; others are more sensitive to the particular 
settings. In its purest form, however, the textualist approach is in-
adequate. The central problem is that the meaning of words (whether 
"plain" or not) depends on both culture and context. Statutory terms 
are not self-defining, and words have no meaning before or without 
interpretation.3? To say this is emphatically not to say that words 
452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J , concurring in the judgment) In Green v Bock Laundry Mach Co , 
109 S Ct 1981 (1989), however, all nine Justices refused to follow the dictionary meaning of 
the text because it would have produced an absurd result See id at 1984-85 id at 1994 
(Scaha, J , concurring), id at 1995 (Blackmun, J , dissenting), see also Public Citizen, 109 
S Ct at 2565-67 (1989) 
*
(J
 l o r example, once Professor and now Judge Easterbrook has defended Uxtuahsm with 
insight and vigor See, e g , Easttrbrook, supra note 13 
J1
 As we will see, strategies of that sort were suggested b> commentators who disregarded 
or downplayed the existence of controversy about what "reason" required or about the "purposes" 
of statutory regimes, and who failed to come to terms with the existence of sharp, ideologically 
based disagreements on such questions See infra pp 426-28, 435~36 Textualism relies on 
firm linguistic anchors to control ideological divisions It is here that there is a commonality 
between those who believe that legal interpretation is inevitabl> indeterminate — because of 
ideological strife — and those vvho, embracing textualism, do so for essentially the same reason 
32
 See infra pp 427-28 (purpose), 429-^1 (legislative histor>) 
3?
 Consider Learned Hand's view "Words arc not pebbles in alien juxtaposition, the\ have 
only a communal existence, and not onl\ does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but 
all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which thev are used " NLRB 
v Tederbush Co , 121 F 2d 954, 957 (2d Cir 1941), see also Shell Oil Co v Iowa Dep't of 
Revenue, 109 S Ct 278, 281 & n 6 (1989) (quoting Federbush) 
The dependence of meaning on culture and context is a conventional point in both Anglo-
American and Continental philosophy See, eg, L W I T T C L N S T M N , supm note 24 (Anglo-
American version), H GADAMLR, TRUTH AND M E T H O D (trans 2d ed 1975) (Continental 
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used in statutes or elsewhere can mean anything at all.34 But it is to 
say that statutory terms are indeterminate standing "by themselves," 
and, even more important, they never stand by themselves. The 
significance of congressional enactments necessarily depends on the 
context and on background understandings about how words should 
be understood. Moreover, reliance on ordinary or dictionary defini-
tion, without reference to context, will sometimes lead to interpretive 
blunders. *5 
Usually the context does not prevent reliance on ordinary meaning, 
and usually the background principles are so widely shared — for 
example, that Congress is speaking in English, that Congress is not 
joking or attempting to mislead, that statutes have purposes, or that 
judges should not decide cases simply according to their predilections 
— that they are invisible Even in easy cases, however, courts must 
resort to background principles. For example, the question whether 
the enactment of federal environmental statutes preempts all of state 
tort law is an easy one, not because of the statutory text "itself," but 
because of shared understandings about the limited preemptive effect 
of federal enactments.36 
version) For legal writing on the inadequacy of textualism, see R DICKERSON, T H E INTER-
PRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 217-27 (1975), S F I S H , Is T H E R E A T E X T IN THIS 
CLASS?, supra note 18, at 356-71 (discussing law as well as literature), H HART & A SACKS, 
supra note 15, at 1150-58, 9 J WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2470, at 234-38 (J Chadbourn ed 
1981), Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages Posner on Law and Literature, 97 YALE 
L J 777. 778-8o (1988), Frank, Words and Music Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 
47 COLUM L R t v 1259, 1263-64 (1947), Horack, The Disintegration oj Statutory Construction, 
24 IND L J 335, S3» (1949) 
54
 But see, e g , Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV L REV 781, 819 (1983) (arguing, unpersuasively, that a good 
lawyer can always find an argument for the result he wants) 
, s
 Courts hd\e conspicuously rejected literalism on man> occasions See Missouri v Jenkins, 
109 S Ct 246}, 2471 (1989) (holding that "attorney's fee" should be read to include award of 
paralegal fees), and Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 U S 424, 429 n 2, 433 (1983) (observing that 
under § 1988, which provides attorney's fees to the "prevailing party," prevailing plaintiffs may 
recover if they prevail on any significant issue, but defendants ma> recover onl> if the plaintiff's 
suit was groundless) (dictum), United States v Colon Ortiz, 866 F 2d 6, 11 (1st Cir 1989) 
(refusing to adhere to an obvious drafting error), In re House Bill No 1,291, 178 Mass 605, 
60 N E 129 (1901) (holding that a requirement in the Massachusetts Constitution of a "written 
vote" allows a voting machine involving no writing), Riggs v Palmer, 115 N Y 506, 22 N E 
188 (1889) (refusing to allow a testator's murderer to recover under the will), R DICKFRSON, 
supra note a, at 230 For other examples, see note 44 below 
3 6
 See R STEWART & J KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 440-41 (1978), see also 
Mansell v Mansell, 109 S Ct 2023, 2027-28 (1989) (observing that Congress must specifically 
preempt state law, especially in the area of domestic relations), Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer 
Affairs v Isla Petroleum Corp , 108 S Ct 1350, 1353 (1988) (requiring evidence of clear and 
manifest congressional purpose to preempt state law regarding gasoline price regulations), Hills-
borough County v Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U S 707, 715 (1985) (discussing the 
assumption that states' powers to regulate health and safety are not preempted by congressional 
acts) Similarly, a law that says nothing about whether administrative action is reviewable is 
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Those who accept textualist approaches might agree that the mean-
ing of words is partly a function of the context and of background 
norms about how texts should be approached. Indeed, we may define 
an easy case as one in which the context produces no dispute and 
there is a consensus about the governing norms.37 In many hard 
cases, however, the source of the difficulty is that the particular 
background norm and the nature of its application will be highly 
controversial. Textualism or "plain meaning" approaches can resolve 
these questions only by covertly introducing background principles, 
which are often controversial. 
Consider the question whether a statute creating a regulatory 
agency to police racial discrimination in employment implicitly au-
thorizes victims of discrimination to bring private suits against em-
ployers who allegedly have engaged in discrimination. If the statute 
and its history do not resolve the question, the introduction of back-
ground norms is necessary to discern the meaning of the statute. It 
should thus be unsurprising that judges skeptical about implied causes 
of action have relied not on statutory "text" but instead on a highly 
controversial background assumption, traceable to a particular, con-
testable understanding of separation of powers, that only the legisla-
ture may create such rights, and that statutory silence should be 
assumed not to do so.38 Without that assumption or a different one, 
statutory silence on the existence of an implied cause of action has no 
meaning. 
Background norms are ubiquitous in any legal system, and indeed 
in grammar itself; they are necessary to make reliance on "text" an 
intelligible concept. These considerations account for the pervasive 
difficulties with textualist approaches to statutory construction: am-
biguity or vagueness, overinclusiveness, underinclusiveness, delegation 
or gap-filling, and changed circumstances. 
(a) Ambiguity or Vagueness. — The most familiar problem with 
textualism is that statutory language is sometimes ambiguous or 
vague. To say that courts should rely on the words or on their 
unambiguous, not because of the text "itself," but because of the strong presumption, created 
by courts but now widely shared, in favor of judicial review of administrative behavior See 
infra pp 475-7° 
u Cf Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S CAL L REV 399, 413-14 (198s) (suggesting that eas> 
cases arise when the relationship between legal norms and human behavior is uncontroversial) 
38
 See Jett v Dallas Indep School Dist , 109 S Ct 2702, 2720-22 (1989), Karahalios v 
National K'd'n of Fed Employees, Local 1263, 109 S Ct 1282, 1286 (1989) (describing a 
"canon" of construction against implied causes of action), Thompson v Thompson, 108 S Ct 
513, 520-23 (1988) (Scalia, J , concurring), Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 U S 677, 
730-31 (1979) (Powell, J , dissenting) See generally P BATOR, D MELTZER, P M I S H K I N , D 
SHAPIRO, HART AND W E C H S I F R ' S T H E FFDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDFRAI SYSTEM 943-50 
(*d ed 1988) (recounting the changes in the Supreme Court's treatment of implied causes of 
ac tion) 
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ordinary meaning — the plain meaning approach — is unhelpful when 
statutory words have more than one dictionary definition, or when 
the context produces interpretive doubt. It is not clear, for example, 
whether the term "feasible" contemplates a cost-benefit analysis, or 
whether a prohibition of "discrimination" bars voluntary race-con-
scious measures designed to counteract the effects of past and present 
discrimination against blacks.39 In both of these cases, moreover, it 
is uncertain whether the language should be taken to refer to the 
original meaning of those words for the enacting legislature (assuming 
that idea can be made intelligible in light of the problems of aggre-
gating the views of numerous actors) or should instead take account 
of contemporary understandings of what the words mean. Indeed, it 
is not even clear what bearing the desires, or interpretive instructions, 
of the enacting legislature should have for judicial interpretation. By 
itself, textualism cannot answer these questions. Nor can the agency 
conception of the judicial role resolve such problems. 
(b) Overinclusiveness 40 — If textualism is taken, as it often is, to 
call for reliance on the literal41 language of statutory words — their 
dictionary definition or meaning in ordinary settings — it will some-
times suggest an outcome that makes little or no sense. For example, 
suppose that a state law says that no vehicles are permitted in public 
parks, and a city proposes to build in a park a monument consisting 
of tanks used in World War II.42 The literal language must yield, for 
the statute could not reasonably be taken to forbid a monument, which 
causes none of the harms the statute could be thought to prevent 
A passage from Wittgenstein indicates the basic difficulty "Some-
one says to me 'Shew the children a game ' I teach them gaming 
with dice, and the other says 'I didn't mean that sort of game ' Must 
the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind when 
he gave me the order?"43 The example shows that sometimes the best 
interpretation of a textual command is one that runs counter to its 
apparent literal meaning — even if the author did not have in mind 
the case at issue, or make a judgment about how that case should be 
resolved. 
39
 See, e g , Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Inst , 448 U S 607 
(1980) (plurality opinion) (interpreting "feasible"), United Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443 
U S 193, 201-02 (1979) (rejecting an interpretation of "discriminate" that would bar affirmative 
action) 
40
 "Overinclusiveness" and "undermclusi\eness," as used in the text refer to the fait that 
the best interpretation of a word, all things considered, sometimes calls for a restriction on or 
a departure from a word's dictionary meaning 
41
 The notion of "literal" meaning is a crude one It usually refers to the meaning of words 
in "most" contexts, but because meaning is a function of context, it is wrong to suggest, as the 
concept of "literal meaning" does, that words ha\e context independent meanings 
42
 This famous example comes from H L A HART, T H E C O N C E P I OF LAW 121 \i (1961) 
4< L WiTTGLNsruN, supra note 24, at 3? 
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Courts encounter the problem of overinclusiveness frequently.44 
The Supreme Court recently held that a statute exempting state and 
local public housing obligations "from all taxation . . . imposed by 
the United States" should not be interpreted to include an exemption 
from federal estate tax.4*5 The Court held that the exemption did not 
mean what it appeared to say in light of the contemporaneous under-
standing that an excise tax was not ordinarily comprehended within 
the category of "taxation "46 As another example, suppose that the 
legislature has said that an employer may discharge an employee "for 
any reason " Is the employer thereby authorized to fire workers who 
have refused to commit crimes on his behalf ? If a state law says that 
one spouse will inherit from another "in all circumstances," may a 
husband who has murdered his wife make a claim against the estate?47 
These are examples of what might be described as the overinclusive-
ness of a prominent version of textualism 48 the possibility that sta-
tutory language, read without sufficient regard to context or its in-
tended field of application, will reach situations that it could not 
reasonably cover 
(c) Underinclusiveness. — Although it arises less frequently, there 
is also a possibility that textualism will be underinclusive Justice 
Holmes warned that "[cjourts are apt to err by sticking too closely to 
the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes 
beyond them "49 A particular difficulty here is that a statute may be 
44
 See, e g Public Citizen v United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S Ct 2S58, 257 s—74 (1989), 
California Fed Sav & Loan Ass n v Guerra, 479 U S 272, 284 (1987), kell> v Robinson, 479 
U S 36, 43-44 (1986), O'Connor v United States, 479 U S 27, 31 (1986), Offshore Logistics, 
Inc v Tallentire, 477 U S 207, 220-21 (1986), United Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443 
U S 193, 201 (1979), United States v American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U S 5^4, 543 (1940), 
Armstrong Co v Nu Enamel Corp , 305 U S 315, m (1933), Church of the Holy Trinity v 
United States, 143 U S 457, 459 (1892), Perry v Strawbndge, 209 Mo 621, 108 S W 641 
(1908), see also Arizona v California, 373 U S 546, 568-75 (1963) (finding that despite the 
interstate compact's express inclusion of the "Colorado River System," Arizona could not be 
forced to give up water from a portion of that system entirely within its borders because 
legislative history shows Congress intended to include mainstream water only) 
45
 See United States v Wells Fargo Bank, 108 S Ct 1179, 1182, 1184 (1988) 
46
 See id at 1182 
47
 See Riggs v Palmer, 115 N Y 506, 22 N E 188 (1889), see also Htnsky v Eckerhart, 
\b\ U S 424, 429 n 2, 433 (1983) (discussed above in note 35) 
AH
 See, e g , Public Citiztn v United States Dep t of Justice, 109 S Ct 2558, 2573-74 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J , concurring in the judgment), Riggs, 115 N Y at 516 22 N I at 191 (Gray, J , 
dissenting) 
40
 Olmstead v United States, 277 U S 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J , dissenting) See, e g , 
Missouri v Jenkins, 109 S Ct 2463, 2471 (1989) (holding that 'attorney's fee" should be read 
to include award of paralegal fees) Pnednch v City of Chicago, 1989 U S App LEXIS 16693 
(No 88 3043, 7th Cir Oct 31, 1989) (Posner, J ) (holding that although § 1988 specified recovery 
for an "attorney's fee," a proper interpretation of Congress' instructions allows no distinction 
between paying for an attorney and paying for an expert witness) 
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"evaded" by private ingenuity. The literal language of the statute does 
not cover the situation, but because the private conduct causes all of 
the harms that the statute could be thought to prevent, courts some-
times hold a statute applicable notwithstanding its literal terms.50 The 
problem of evasion should not be an excuse for judicial stretching of 
statutes (to be sure, a most ill-defined concept in this setting), but the 
problem has elicited judicial responses in a number of areas, most 
notably taxation 51 
(d) Delegation, Gaps, and Implementing Rules — Thf iprnmplpjp. 
ness of textualism is most conspicuous when Congress has explicitly 
or implicitly delegated lawmaking power to the courts or when Con-
gress has simply left a gap In cases of delegated power or gap-filling, 
the problem is not that words are susceptible to more than one con-
struction, but instead that the words necessarily^ require courts to look 
to sources outside of the text 52 
The Sherman Act, for example, raises a serious gap-filling prob-
lem. The language of the Act does not answer the question of what 
practices amount to "conspiracies in restraint of trade " The legislative 
history is suggestive but unclear,53 and the courts have inevitably 
taken the Act as a delegation of policymaking power pursuant to quite 
open-eiided criteria 54 Similarly, section 198355 is silent on many im-
50
 See, e g , Helvering v Gregorv, 69 F 2d 809 (2d Cir 1934), aff'd, 293 U S 465 (1935) 
51
 See, e g , Commissioner v Court Holding Co , 324 U S ^ 1 (1945), Goldstein v Com 
missioner, ^64 F 2d 7^4 (2d Cir 1966), Helvering v Gregory, 69 Y 2d 809 Outside the area of 
taxation, there are many examples as well See, e g , cases cited supra note 49, Stoner v 
Hudgins, 568 S W 2d 898, 902-03 (Tex Civ App 1978) (holding that despite a narrow verbal 
construction, a statute providing for credit against damages for advance payments made to tort 
claimants should be read to mean that the credit should be applied after the damage award is 
reduced to account for comparative negligence) See generally Isenbergh Musings on Form and 
Substance in Taxation (Book Review), 49 U C H I L REV 859 (1982) Johnson v Southern 
Pac Co , 117 F 462 (8th Cir 1902), rev'd, 196 U S 1 (1904), which held that the term "cars" 
in a statute requiring cars on common carriers to be equipped with automatic couplers did not 
extend to locomotive engines, is persuasively criticized b> Hart and Sacks on the ground that 
the hteralist court interpreted the statute too narrowly See H HART & A SACKS, supra note 
15, at H73-74 
52
 The problems of delegation or gap filling must be distinguished from a "gap" that is best 
taken as a legislative decision not to prohibit conduct or not to change the status quo Here 
silence is a straightforward absence of law, and one that allows private conduct to go on as 
before This latter sort of gap — which is essentially an exclusion or exemption from a statute 
— is confused with the sort of gap that requires judicial elaboration of the law in Lasterbrook, 
cited abo\e in note 13, and O F F I C E OF LEGAL POLICY, U S DEP 'T OF J U S T I C E USING AND 
MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A R E EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 100-04 (1989) [hereinafter USING AND MISUSING LEGISIATIVE 
HISTORY] The confusion produces a version of the old idea that statutes in derogation of the 
common law must be narrowly construed 
5 3
 See 1 P AREEDA & D TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 106, at 14-16 (1978) 
54
 See, e g , National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v United States, 435 U S 679, 688 (1978) 
55
 42 U S C § 1983 (1982) 
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portant questions, including available defenses, burdens of pleading 
and persuasion, and exhaustion requirements. Because of the textual 
silence, judges must fill the gaps. To this extent, the statute delegates 
power to make common law.56 
Judicial implementation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964s7 can be understood in similar terms, though this example is 
more controversial. The basic prohibition of "discrimination" provides 
no guidance on the role of discriminatory effects, the appropriate 
burdens of proof and production, and the mechanisms for filtering out 
discriminatory treatment. Judicial answers to these questions some-
ttmes purport to be relatively mechanical responses to congressional 
Commands,58 but in fact they amount to judge-made implementing 
/devices that reflect the judges' own, inevitably value-laden views. In 
light of the existence of textual gaps on many questions, this approach 
is hardly an embarrassment or a usurpation, but instead an inevitable 
part of interpretation. Much of the law of title VII is an unavoidable, 
and therefore legitimate, norm-ridden exercise in developing gap-filling 
rules.59 In this respect, the Sherman Act and title VII are closely 
analogous 
When the language of a statute does not specify its implementing 
rules, textualism is incomplete: courts must look elsewheifc-^When 
Congress has delegated power or left a gap, the line between inter-
preting and creating federal common law60 becomes quite thin. 
(e) Changed Circumstances. — The discussion thus far has as-
sumed that circumstances have not changed significantly since the 
statute was enacted. Textualism becomes even more problematic 
56
 The Court has sometimes indicated that gaps should be filled by reference to the common 
law of the time See, e g , City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc , 453 U S 247, 258 (1981), 
Wood v Strickland, 420 U S 308, 318 (197<5) Frequently, however, it has filled gaps in 
accordance with its own views about how best to implement the statute — an approach that is 
probably consistent with the drafters' own understanding about how courts would act See 
Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section IQ8J with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 
STAN L REV 51 (1989), Kramer & Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 A Legal 
and Economic Analysts, 1987 SUP C T REV 249, 263-66 
57
 42 U S C *}*) 20ooe to 2oooe 17 (1982 & Supp V 1987) 
58
 Set, ( g , Kxas Dep't of C ommunitv Affairs v Burdme, 4S0 U S 248, 252 5$ (1981), 
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 U S 792, 800-01 (1973), Griggs v Duke Power Co , 
401 U S 424, 431 (1971) 
59
 See, t g , Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v Zipes, 109 S Ct 2732, 2737-38 
(1989) (deciding that, under title \ II, attorneys' fees may not be awarded against nontrivolous 
inter\enors, largely because of courts' perceptions about the social consequences of such a rule) 
60
 Federal common law is usually thought to involve judicial lawmaking when little or no 
guidance has been supplied b\ the legislature See friendly, In Praise of Eric — And of the 
i\(W Federal Common Law, 39 N Y U L RLV ^83, 410-11 (1964) Statutory interpretation, 
by contrast, is usually thought to involve a decision about the meaning of ambiguous enactments 
I or the reasons stated in the text, this distinction is far too simple 
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when time has affected the assumptions under which the statute was 
originally written. Changed circumstances may produce ambiguity or 
interpretive doubt in the text where neither existed before. 
Consider the Delaney Clause, which forbids the use as food ad-
ditives of substances that "induce" cancer.61 The Delaney Clause was 
enacted at a time when carcinogenic substances w p r p jjjffirilJ* to detect 
and all detectable carcinogens were extremely dangerous. These facts, 
however, no longer hold true, and under current conditions the De-
laney Clause^almost undoubtedly arqefeases health risks by keeping 
relatively safe suhgtanrpg off fhp marketahd by torcing consumers to 
resort either to noncarcinogenic substances that pose other risks OTJJQ 
substances that were approved by earlier administrators using the 
cruder technology of their day. Because the tactual premises^tmrter-N 
which the~enacting Congress operated are now demonstrably false, J 
might the word "induce" allow the government to exempt from-x^g^ 
ulation carcinogens that pose trivial risks?62 Similarly, would a "pub-
lic policy" exception to the charitable deduction in the Internal Rev-
enue Code require the government to/deny the deduction to schools, 
that engage in racial discrimination^even if those who enacted the\ 
Code many decades before believed ttoat such discrimination was \ 
perfectly consistent with public poli£fcijF In short, it is by no means \ 
obvious that the statutory text should be understood in accordance / 
with its "original meaning," even if that concept were unproblematic.y 
# # # / 
The discussion thus far suggests two principal poinis__JMrst, and 
most fundamentally, there j s no such thing as an a^anieo^jari^pxt" 
that can be used as the e\rh\<s\\i<> guide to interpretation In easy 
cases, interpretive norms — on which there is wide or universal 
consensus — and context both play a part in the process of ascertain-
ing statutory meaning. Because such norms are so widely shared, 
they are invisible and are not an object ofj^mji'pversy. Only in these 
cases can meaning ever be said to W-^V^J^^N\th th^cA-^^^Kftyp-
tions, textualism isg£neraUy_^awfWiidtcT' I n h a r d cases, however, 
Courts must rfcsorTToahighly visible £aidkaiHind norm,65 or a con-
61
 See 21 U S C *> 348(c)(3)(A) (1982) 
62
 See infra pp 496-97 
6J
 See infra note 100 (discussing Bob Jones University v United States, 461 U S 574 (1983)) 
64
 Indeed, I will be offering reasons to suggest that it should not be See infra pp 493-97, 
accord Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 M I C H L REV 20 (1988) 
65
 In hard cases, a claimed reliance on the text often disguises the actual basis for decision, 
which does not turn on text at all In these cases, discretion is inevitable For a powerful 
demonstration in the context of environmental law, see R MtLNicK, REGULATION AND THE 
COURTS T H E CA^L OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 371 (1983), which shows that the constant resort 
to statutory text in cases in which text is at best indeterminate can lead judges to act on the 
basis of unarticulated and uninformed policy considerations 
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testable one, or some gap-filling device in order to resolve an interpre-
tive dispute. In these settings, and in this sense, textualism is incom-
plete. 
Second, it is by no means obvious that courts should always rely 
solely on the text or on the "plain meaning" of its words even in cases 
in which such reliance^^ds—tQ—deterrrrtnate results. Although tex-
tualisrTTpropefly draws on **** ri^n^rpti^primQrAr
 Gf the legislature, 
legislative instructions are often unclear and the claim of a command 
j ^ An interpretive strategy that relies exclul^riy-TJlT'lhe 
ordinary meaning of words is precisely that — a strategy that reflects 
a choice among competing possibilities — and it will sometimes pro-
duce irrationality or injustice that the legislature did noU4g^end.66 
Textualism ot this sort is not incomplete but insteacKoernicious^ 
In cases of overinclusiveness, underinclusiveness, oTcrrrgcri^arcuin-
stances, or divergence between ordinary meaning and contextual or 
legislatively intended meaning, textualism — with its disregard of the 
irrational, unjust, and often unintended outcomes produced by liter-
alism in hard cases — is best defended as a/fighting faith, an inference 
from the system of separation of power*£-*ather than as a necessary 
understanding of statutory interpretation 0n this view, reliance on 
ordinary meaning and indifference to context, irrationality, and injus-
tice will discipline the judges, limit their discretion, hold them to 
Congress' actual words, and warn the lawmakers to be careful about 
statutory language 67 !t j^_hy nn means r l pa iY4mi ,7PX7f f^ r i^u^\gygt*>^ 
of textualism, so defended will lead to a superior system of law, and 
there is considerable reason to suspecL-fliharwise 68 Even the most 
attractive form of textualism, emphasizing not literalism but the mean-
ing of words read in context and against shared interpretive norms, 
is inadequate in light of the need to {Tse contestable norms^fri hard 
cases and the interpretive difficulties produced by unintended irra-
tionality and injustice 
2 Contextual Approaches — Sometimes those who rely on the 
agency theory stress not the statutory text alone, but text as under-
stood in the light of the context and background of the statute Con-
textual approaches provide at least partial responses to the problems 
with textualism, mostly by helping to resolve ambiguities or fill gaps. 
The traditional efforts to supplement text with context, however, have 
66
 Consider, for instance, the examples of overinclusiveness mentioned earlier a law allowing 
spousal inheritance "in all circumstances," invoked by someone who murdered his wife, or a 
law allowing employers to discharge employees "for any reason" invoked b> an employer who 
fired a worker for refusing to commit murder See supra p 420, see also cases cited supra notes 
IS & 44 
67
 See, e g , Public Citizen v United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S Ct 2SS8, ^S7 ? 80 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J , concurring) 
68
 .See infra pp 438-40 
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problems of their own. Sometimes they reproduce the failings of 
textualism, sometimes they operate at the expense of the text, and 
sometimes they depend on poor understandings of the legislative pro-
cess and the constitutional background. The most prominent efforts 
to adhere to the agency theory while venturing beyond the text of the 
provision at issue involve structure, purpose, intent, and legislative 
history 
(a) Structure. — Courts often respond to the various problems in 
textual approaches by reference ^ q^^ pfy^ ^ f-~u-»-'»&*t rr^i ™ , ^ 
importantly for our purposes, to (the structure of the statute. Q)i this 
view, an interpretation should be disfavored it it would make the 
disputed provisioning awkwardly with another provision or produce 
Internal redundancy 01 CUllTlEluTi. An interpretation that would make 
sense of the statute as a whole should he adopted Structural argu-
ment has proved helpfuMn many cases.69 
Structural approaches to statutory construction are entirely unob-
jectionable - ^ o n the contrary, they provide significant interpretive 
guidance, ^ u c h approaches promote fidelity to congressional instruc-
tions ancTat the same time help to make sense of Complex regulatory 
enactments. If an interpretation of one provision works against or 
makes meaningless another provision, there is good reason to reject 
that interpretation. 
Structural approaches, however, suffer from two problems. First, 
they depend on an assumption that statutes are in jac t internally 
consistent and ™h*^nf — ^ n assumption that recent theories of leg-
islation have questioned in light of the influence of interest groups, 
compromise, and irrationality 70 If that assumption is false, the court's 
treatment of statutes as internally consistent wholes cannot be justified 
6g
 Set, e g , Carlucti v Doe, 109 S Ct 407, 412-14 (1988), Milwaukee v Vcutter, 877 F 2d 
540, S44 (7th C ir 1989) Communit> for Creative Non Violence v Reid, 109 S Ct 2166 (1989) 
is an instructive example In Reid, the Supreme Court was asked to construe the "work-for-
hire" pro\ lsion of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U S C § 201(b) (1982) Section 201 entitles an 
artist to the copyright of her work unless the work was "made for hire " In § 101, work for 
hire is defined in two provisions under the first definition, it is "a work prepared by an employee 
within the scope of his or her employment", under the second definition, "a work specially 
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work" or under any of eight 
other enumerated categories See 17 U S C §101 (1982) 
The Court considered the claim that when the buyer retains the right to control the work, 
the artist is a common law employee under the first definition of work for hire The Court 
rejected this claim because it would make the exceptions to the second definition superfluous 
Congress could not have intended a right-to-control test for employment because that "would 
mean that many works that could satisfy § 101(2) would already have been deemed works for 
hire under § 101(1) " Reid, 109 S Ct at 2173 
70
 See, e g , Becker, 4 Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 
98 Q J ECON 371 (1983), Posner, The DeFunis Coje and the Constitutionality of Preferential 
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP C T REV I , 27-31, Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 B F L I J ECON & M G M T SCI 3 (197O 
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as an accurate way of implementing legislative instructions. If the 
concern with promoting rationality is to be supported, it must be on 
independent grounds.71 Second, structural approaches offer only par-
tial help. In many cases, an examination of structure will reveal 
ambiguities, silences, or delegations.72 In the hardest cases, the char-
acterization of structure depends largely, not on structure itself, but 
on a value-laden idea about what conception of the statute works 
best.73 To resolve these problems, it will be necessary to look else-
where. 
(b) Purpose, Intent, and History. — In addition to consulting 
statutory structure, a natural and time-honored response to the prob-
lems of textualism has been to look to the purpose, intent, and history 
of a statute. ^^_— 
(i) Purpose. — Resort to tK^purposej^bf the statute was especially 
popular among academic commentators in the 1950's and logo's. 
Steeped in legal realism, these commentators disparaged approaches 
— such as reliance on text alone — that substituted mechanical rules 
for more functional and purposive inquiries.74 Their resort to purpose 
was an effort to maintain the role of the courts as agents of the 
legislature while at the same time acknowledging the inadequiacy of 
textualism Thus, in the case of the war memorial in the park, the 
question whether the memorial is a "vehicle" within the meaning of 
the statute might be answered by asking whether the memorial creates 
harms (such as noise or pollution) that undermine the purposes for 
which the statute was enacted. Because the memorial does not, the 
case is an easy one, and the statutory proscription does not apply. 
In some cases, then, reliance on purpose will be a valuable way 
of providing a context within which to understand statutory terms. 
Purposive interpretation is, however, far from a complete solution to 
the problem of statutory construction, for it reproduces all of the 
problems of textualism in slightly different guise. For example, the 
purpose may be ambiguous or may reveal a gap or delegation. Are 
the antitrust laws designed to promote consumer welfare in the eco-
nomic sense or to protect small business? Is a statute forbidding racial 
71
 See infra pp 437-41 
72
 Cf United States v Southwestern Cable Co , 392 U S 157, 172-73 (1968) (holding that 
the FCC could regulate new technologies not on the list of regulated activities enumerated in 
the Communications Act of 1934) 
7
' The same mticism applies to the most well known justification of structural analysis, C 
H I A C K , SiRiKTURL AND Kt LAI 10NSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (19O9) Black's characteri-
zation of the Constitution's structural commitments generates a number of controversial conclu-
sions, many of them are not clearly supported by constitutional structure and rest instead on 
value laden assumptions of his own 
4
 See, t g , H HART & \ SACKS, supra note 15, at 1148-79, 1218-26, Fuller, Posttivtsm 
and bnielit\ to IMU — 4 Rtpl\ to Pwtessor Hart, 71 HAR\ L RLV 630, 661-69 (1958), see 
al\o infra pp 451-52 (discussing legal realism and statutory construction) 
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discrimination designed to proscribe all distinctions on the basis of 
race, or only those distinctions that burden members of minority 
groups?75 Often the legislature itself will not have anticipated such 
questions. The characterization of legislative purpose is an act of 
creation rather than discovery. 
All of these problems would be formidable even if the legislature 
consisted of one or a few persons. In the face of multimember insti-
tutions, the problem becomes even more troublesome. There will be 
not one but many purposes in any statute, those purposes will some-
times conflict with one another; legislators will have complex and 
conflicting views on purposes; the purposes could be described at 
different levels of generality; and purposes will have been compro-
mised and traded off in complex ways. A statute designed to protect 
workers might also be intended to help union at the expense of non-
union employment; a statute designed to protect the environment 
might also be intended to protect eastern coal producers 76 
Purposive interpretation may also suffer from overinclusiveness or 
underinclusiveness. By taking the purpose of a statute out of context, 
one might broadly read a provision to prevent behavior that under 
the most plausible reading the statute should not reach.77 Similarly, 
an unduly narrow categorization might prevent a statute from reach-
ing a situation that should fall within its scope.78 Advocates of pur-
posive interpretation sometimes disregard the fact that purposes are 
expressed through and have no life independent of statutory words. 
The words represent the law. 
When circumstances change, reliance on the statutory purpose 
becomes even trickier. Assume, for example, that Congress enacts a 
statute imposing significant procedural requirements on regulatory 
agencies engaging in adjudicative tasks but lenient requirements on 
agencies engaging in rulemaking, and that Congress thought almost 
all important administrative business would be done through adjudi-
cation But thirty years after enactment, those assumptions no longer 
75
 Cf United Steel workers of America v Weber, 443 U S 193, 200-08 (1979) (holding that 
title VII does not forbid voluntary affirmative action plans) 
76
 See B ACKERMAN & W HASSLER, supra note 2^, at 26-54 Those who emphasize the 
ambiguity and multiplicity of statutory purposes often stress as well the intractability of the 
ideological disputes that sometimes he beneath interpretive questions See Easterbrook, supra 
note n , at 544-51 Textualism thus provides a natural refuge from purposive approaches — 
even if the refuge itself is ultimately doomed 
77
 See, e g , United States v Iurkette, 452 U S 576, 588-9} (1981) (interpreting "enterprise" 
in RICO to encompass both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, even though legitimate 
enterprises were not within Congress' original contemplation) 
78
 See, e g , United States v Elgin, J & E Ry , 298 U S 492 (19*6) (finding no violation 
of the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act where a railroad company owned by 
a holding company transported the products of the holding company's subsidiary, even though 
the transportation caused all of the harms the statute was enacted to prevent) 
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hold, as agencies engage in extensive rulemaking and do most of their 
significant work in that way Is it so clear that judicial "bending" of 
ambiguous provisions in the statute to impose greater procedural re-
quirements in rulemaking is unfaithful to the purpose of the law?79 
Indeed, is it so clear that such an interpretation is bending at all? In 
view of the changed context, what would it mean for courts to be 
"faithful" to the original purpose?80 
The problem in these settings is that mechanical transplantation 
of statutory purposes to new settings is unlikely to produce sensible 
results even from the standpoint of the enacting legislature Nor is it 
sufficient to say that the legislature rather than the courts should 
respond to changed circumstances. Often it is unrealistic to expect a 
legislative response 81 More important, the issue for interpretation is 
the meaning of the statute in the new circumstances. Meaning does 
not remain static across changes in law, policy, and fact.82 Interpre-
tation that brings the legislature into the present will, however, in-
evitably involve a large measure of discretion and a corresponding 
danger of judicial abuse. 
Purposive interpretation, then, is far from a panacea Although it 
is frequently helpful in giving context to statutory terms, the effort to 
characterize legislative purpose often produces serious problems, 
whether or not circumstances have changed In some cases, the pur-
pose might be characterized in many ways, all of which are faithful 
to the original enactment. The act of characterization is therefore one 
of invention rather than discovery. 
(ii) Legislative Intent and Legislative History. — It is often sug-
gested that in hard cases, the meaning of the statute should be derived 
by ascertaining the intent of those who enacted it.8* This approach 
7<i
 See Scaha, Vermont Yankee The APA, the D C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 
SUP C T REV 345, 381-82 (arguing in favor of such judicial "bending") 
80
 Or suppose Congress enacted a statute regulating banking with the understanding that 
the banking and securities businesses could be quite discrete and that banks would face little 
competition — but the use of the money market fund forced bank* to compete in an integrated 
and competitive national market In such circumstances, how should the Court decide whether 
a bank holding company can provide securities brokerage services in the face of ambiguous 
restrictions on combining securities business with banking? See Langevoort, Statutory Obsoles-
cence and the Judicial Pioass The Rivisiomst Rolf of the Courts in tedetal Banking Regu-
lation, 85 M I C H L R tv 672 (1987) 
81
 See, e g , Merrill, FDA's Impltmtntation of tin Delanev Llaust Repudiation of Congres-
sional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J ON Rhc. 1 (1988) 
(noting Congress' failure to come to terms with the obsolescence of the Delaney Clause) 
82
 I his point is insufficiently emphasized bv Dean Calabresi, who suggests that the remedy 
for obsolete statutes is "overruling" them Set G CALABR*SI, \ COMMON LAW FOR T H F A G E 
OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982) In fact, "obsolescence" frequently involves just the opposite prob-
lem discerning the meaning of a statute in light of changed circumstances 
83
 See, e g , Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holvfield, 109 S Ct 1597. 1605 09 8 9h 
Train v Colorado Pub Interest Research Group, Inc , 426 U S 1, 23-25 (1976) 
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is similar to purposive interpretation, but here the goal is not to look 
at a general legislative aim or purpose, but instead to see more par-
ticularly how the enacting legislature would have resolved the ques-
tion, or how it intended that question to be resolved, if it had been 
presented For those who emphasize legislative intent, the legislative 
history is a central object of concern. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been divided about the 
significance of legislative intent and legislative history. The Court has 
suggested that the question for interpretation is in fact one of "congres-
sional intent,"84 and has generally treated legislative history as a key 
to the identification of "intent " Justice Scalia, however, has expressed 
considerable doubt about legislative intent in general and legislative 
history in particular.85 In Justice Scalia's view, the role of the courts 
is to ascertain statutory meaning rather than legislative "intent " 
Moreover, Justice Scalia suggests that legislative history is frequently 
written by well-organized private groups, and much of it, especially 
the floor debates, reflects little, if any, general congressional will.86 
Judicial reliance on legislative history thus increases the power of 
interest groups over the interpretive process at the expense of Congress 
84
 See, e g , Thompson v Thompson, 108 S Ct SM (1988), cases cited supra note 83 
85
 See, e g , Green v Bock Laundry Math Co , 109 S Ct 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J , 
concurring in the judgment), United States v Stuart, 109 S Ct 1183, " 9 3 - 9 7 (1989) (Scalia, 
J , concurring in the judgment), Blanchard v Bergeron, 109 S Ct 939, 946-47 (Scalia, J , 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), United States v Taylor, 108 S Ct 2413, 
2423-24 (1988) (Scaha, J , concurring in part), Thompson, 108 S Ct at 522-23 (Scalia, J, 
concurring in the judgment) Consider also the critical discussion of legislative intent in 
MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L J 754 (1966), and Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 
43 HARV L REV 863, 866 (1930) 
Justice Scalia's hostility to the use of legislative history derives in part from his characteristic 
but quite extraordinary antagonism to approaches that increase complexity in the law A reliance 
on the text seems to have the comparative virtue of simplicity For illustrations of Justice 
Scalia's hostility to complexity in a range of areas, see Mistretta v United States, 109 S Ct 
647» 675 (1989) (Scalia, J , dissenting) (criticizing the Court in part because of the complex 
character of the balancing test it adopts), Morrison v Olson, 108 S Ct 2597, 2622-41 (1988) 
(Scalia, J , dissenting) (same), Thompson, 108 S Ct at 522-23 (Scalia, J , concurring in the 
judgment) (calling for a bright line rule against implied causes of action), and Agency Holding 
Corp v Malley Duff & Assocs , 48} U S 14^, 170 (1987) (Scalia, J , concurring in the judgment) 
(calling for the use of the state statute of limitations or no limitations period at all when the 
federal statute lacks an explicit limitations period) 
86
 As a self conscious example, consider these words 
Mr Speaker, having received unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RLCORD, 
I would like to indicate that I am not reallv speaking thesi words As a matter of 
fatt, I am back in my office typing this out on my own hot little tvpewnter Such 
is the pretense of the House that it would have been easy to just quietly include these 
remarks in the RECORD, issue a brave press release, and convince thousands of cheering 
constituents that I was in there lighting every step of the way, influencing the course of 
history in the heat of debate 
117 CONG REC 36506 (1971) (statement of Rep Heckler) 
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itself. Above all, Justice Scalia argues, the legislative history was 
never enacted and is therefore not law.87 
Concerns of this sort are both legitimate and well-taken Although 
it is proper to look at a statute's background in the form of actually 
enacted and repealed provisions, the legislative history, which was 
never enacted, should rarely be permitted to supplant the statutory 
words as they are ordinarily understood.88 This is so because attention 
to the language promotes the rule of law and because of democratic 
and constitutional considerations — the words rather than the intent 
survived the procedures of article I Moreover, such an approach 
might both discipline Congress, by forcing it to attend to its words, 
and minimize judicial discretion by barring judges from relying on 
policies and principles of their own. But Justice Scalia somewhat 
overstates the point.89 The legislative history will sometimes reveal 
what some or many members of the Congress thought about the 
meaning of an ambiguous term, and that understanding is relevant 
It is unlikely that the history will only reflect the views of self-
interested private groups.90 Moreover, legislative history provides a 
sense of the context and purpose of a statutory enactment, which, as 
we have seen, can provide important interpretive help. 
Finally, and most fundamentally, it is not clear where judges are 
to look if they refuse to consider the legislative history. Without 
reference to the history, interpretation sometimes becomes far less 
bounded,91 and it is no surprise that those who reject intent and 
history tend to be textualists92 — a strategy that in hard cases will 
87
 See, e g , Bock, 109 S Ct at 1994 (Scalia, J , concurring in the judgment), Stuart, 109 
S Ct at 1193-97 (Scalia, J , concurring in the judgment), Blanchard, 109 S Ct at 946-47 
(Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), Taylor, 108 S Ct at 2423-24 
(Scalia, J , concurring in part) 
88
 See, e g , In ri Sinclair, 870 F 2d 1340 (7th Cir 1989) 
89
 Cf Farber & Frukty, supra note 23, at 423-25, 437-61 (criticizing Justice Scalia's rejection 
of the use of intent and legislative history), The Role of Legislative History in Judicial Inter-
pretation A Discussion Between Judge Kenneth W Starr and Judge Abner J Mikva, 1987 
DUKE L J 367, 381-86 (Judge Mikva) (arguing that the use of legislative histor> is compelled 
b> inherent ambiguities in many statutes) 
90
 Set Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 445-46 (suggesting that legislative history is more 
likely to reflect the views of congressional staff members than those of private interest groups) 
It is also possible to create a hierarchy within the sources of legislative history I hus, for 
example, floor debates, which are often conducted before few legislators and sometimes are 
added after the fact, are entitled to less weight than a committee report See Eskridge, The 
New Textualism, 37 U C L A L REV (forthcoming 1990) 
91
 The combination of textualism, disregard of legislative history, and the Chevron principle, 
see infra pp 444-46, would produce a dramatic increase in the executives power to make law 
When the language is ambiguous, the executive's interpretation will control, even if the legislative 
history argues in the other direction Consider in this regard Justice Scalia's general enthusiasm 
for executive power See Mistretta v United States, 109 S Ct 647, 680-83 (1989) (Scalia, J , 
dissenting), Morrison v Olson, 108 S Ct 2597, 2622-41 (1988) (Scalia, J , dissenting) 
92
 As Justice Scalia often is See sources cited supia note 23 (debating the merits of using 
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leave large gaps or produce mistakes. One might say all this without 
denying that Justice Scalia is saying something correct and important 
in cautioning courts not to accord weight to legislative history at the 
expense of statutory language, and in recognizing the risk that parts 
of the history may have been composed by one side or the other. In 
short, courts should approach legislative history cautiously.93 Except 
in rare cases of unintended irrationality or injustice,94 courts should 
not permit history to overcome statutory language; but they should 
also not ignore it, especially when the text is unclear 
For present purposes, the more fundamental point is that judicial 
reliance on legislative intent, whether or not derived on the basis of 
legislative history, suffers from three basic difficulties. The first is 
that Congress enacts statutes rather than its own views about what 
those statutes mean; those views, while relevant, are not controlling 
unless they are in the statute. The words, not the "intent," represent 
the law. The enactment, not the legislature's unenacted views, binds 
the public and the judges 95 
To say this is not to deny that the intentions of a group or majority 
of lawmakers will be pertinent and helpful. Legislative history has 
in fact provided a valuable sense of context in a number of recent 
cases.96 If the legislators understood a statutory word as a term of 
legislative history), Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L J 511 (acknowledging his textualism while detailing the necessity of deferring to an 
agency's greater expertise and accountability) Justice Scalia has, notabl>, endorsed some canons 
of construction See, eg , Green v Bock Laundry Mach Co , 109 S Ct 1981, 1994 (1989) 
(Scalia, J , concurring in the judgment) (advocating an interpretation "most compatible with the 
surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated — a compatibility which, 
by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind"), Chan v Korean Air Lines, 109 
S Ct 1676, 1683-84 & n 5 (1989) (invoking the expressto unius canon), Coit Independence 
Joint Venture v FSLIC, 109 S Ct 1361, 1^77 (1989) (Scalia, J , concurring in the judgment) 
(advocating a presumption against preemption of state law), Pierce v Underwood, 108 S Ct 
2541, 2547-49 (1988) (arguing that lower court interpretations should be presumed valid), 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv v Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U S 421, 453-54 (1987) (Scalia, 
J , concurring in the judgment) (arguing for deference to agency interpretations of law) 
93
 For a vivid illustration of why courts ought to do this, see B ACKERMAN & W HASSLER, 
cited above in note 23, at 48-54, 108-109 (revealing the power of the eastern coal lobby to 
obtain legislative history, but not statutory text, in its favor) 
94
 See, e g , Bock, 109 S Ct 1981 (discussed below in note 96), cases cited supra note 44 
95
 "We do not inquire what the legislature meant, we ask only what the statute means " 
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV L REV 417, 419 (1899), see also 
Thompson v Thompson, 108 S Ct 513, 522-23 (1988) (Scalia, J , concurring) (arguing that 
the Court should refuse to infer federal private rights of action in the absence of express 
legislation) 
96
 The Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy vigorously argues in favor of actual 
rather than intended meaning, see USING AND MISUSING LEGISIATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
52, at 21-26 The argument, however, understates the usefulness of intended meaning in clearing 
up ambiguities, correcting unintended absurdities, and avoiding irrationality 
In Bock, 109 S Ct 1981 for example, all the members of the Court refused to read the 
relevant text literally, and all agreed that the legislative history helped to reveal that literalism 
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art, that understanding should prevail; courts should attend to the 
intended meaning rather than the usual meaning of the words if the 
former is clear and the latter would produce absurdity. Moreover, an 
undisputed congressional intent should ordinarily be followed in the 
event of linguistic ambiguity 97 But the subjective intentions, even if 
ascertainable, are not controlling unless enacted 98 
would lead to inadvertent absurditv The case involved the meaning of rule 609(a)(1) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows the introduction of prior crimes of a witness, for 
purposes of attacking credibility, when "the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the defendant " F E D R EVID 609(a)(1) All nine members of the Court 
agreed that rule 609 could not plausibly mean that evidence would be automatically introduced 
against civil plaintiffs, but not against civil defendants The legislative history revealed that 
such an interpretation was unintended — for no one, at any point in the background and 
history of the rules, ever proposed or assumed a distinction between the rights of civil plaintiffs 
and those of civil defendants Indeed, even Justice Scalia acknowledged the usefulness of history 
here "I think it entirel> appropriate to consult all public materials, including the legislative 
history to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition was indeed unthought 
of, and thus to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of the word 'defendant' in the 
Rule " Bo(k, 109 S Ct at 1994 (St aha, J , concurring in the judgment) 
Legislative history can also help tht courts to avoid irrationality while vindicating congres-
sional will in the face of ambiguity In Public Citizen v United States I)« partment of Justice, 
109 S Ct 2558 (1989), the Court faced the question whether the Federal \dvisor> Committee 
Act, 5 U S C App *}*) 1 15 (1982 & Supp V), which imposes detailed req 111 re merits for openness, 
publicity, and balance in membership of federal advisory committees, applied to the consultations 
of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary That committee 
consults with the President regarding potential nominees for federal judgeships The Court 
acknowledged that the Act's language, which defined an advisory committee as one "utilized 
by" the Executive, appeared to appl> to the ABA committee But use of a dictionary definition 
of "utilize" would be absurd because it would make the Act apply even to presidential decisions 
to consult with his own political party before selecting his Cabinet The Court instead examined 
the legislative history, which strongly suggested that the ABA committee — a private group not 
established by the federal government and not receiving federal funds — did not fall within the 
category of advisory entities that Congress wanted to control See Publn Citizen 109 S Ct 
at 2567-73 See also Immigration & Naturalization Serv v Cardoza Ionseca, 480 U S 421, 
432-43 (1987) (finding that asylum could be granted to aliens reasonably fearing persecution, in 
part because the legislative history demonstiated that Congress did not intend a more demanding 
standard) 
97
 The intent should also control in the event of inadvertent error For an example, see the 
inadvertent insertion of the word "not' in a bill revising the boundaries of the Olympic Park 
and the Olympic National Forest The statute says that the Secretary of Agriculture must 
design and construct a forest logging road, but also provides that the Secretary "shall not 
construct the road as close as practically possible to the park boundary but not more than five 
hundred feet east of the d iv ide" Pub L No 99635, ^ 2(A), 100 Stat 3527 3528 (1986) 
(emphasis added) 
98
 See R DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 313-54 Dworkin rejects the use of subjective 
intention to resolve ambiguities in favor of a principle that uould call on eourts to use "the best 
principle" that justifies "what the legislature has clone " This position is discussed in more detail 
at p 436 below For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that Dworkin almost entirely 
ignores the risks of judicial error, venality, or confusion in generating 'the best principle", in 
light of those risks, presumptive reliance on subjective intentions in the face of ambiguity or 
irrationality seems desirable from the standpoint of democratic theory 
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The second set of problems is that legislative intent, like legislative 
purpose, is largely a fiction in hard cases — a problem aggravated by 
the extraordinary difficulties of aggregating the "intentions" of a mul-
timember body. With or without these problems, there are risks of 
ambiguity, overinclusiveness, and underinclusiveness in relying on 
legislative intent, just as there are in relying on text and purpose 
The third problem is that Congress may have enacted a concept 
capable of change over time Those who emphasize legislative intent 
sometimes say that interpreters should attempt to "go back" to the 
beliefs and hopes of the enacting legislature to see how it would decide 
the question had it been presented " It is unclear that this "imagi-
native reconstruction" approach is either consistent with Congress' 
interpretive instructions or a sensible way of ascertaining the meaning 
of statutory terms. In the face of changed circumstances, perhaps the 
better route would be to imagine that the enacting legislature could 
be "brought forward" into the present and then to ask how it would 
decide the question in light of new developments of law, fact, and 
policy. 10° 
99
 This was Learned Hand's view Sti Borrella v Borden Co , 14s F 2d 6}, 64 (2d O r 
1944), aff'dy ^25 U S 679 (1945), L HAND, HOW bar Is aJudgt Fret in Rendtring a Dtciswnt 
in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 106-09 (I LUlhard }d ed i960) Judge Posner recently suggested 
"The judge's job is not to keep a statute up to date in the sense of making it reflect contemporary 
values, but to imagine as best he can how the legislators who enacted the statute would have 
wanted it applied to situations they did not foresee " R POSNER supra note 10, at 287, see 
generally id at 286-93 
This approach suffers from three difficulties in addition to those identified in the text FVst, 
in hard cases, this advice is open ended, and perhaps contradictor The legislature may have 
intended that the statute not contradict contemporary values when applied to unforeseen situ 
ations Second an entirely backward looking approach of this sort may lead to a less sensible 
system of law than would alternative approaches, because it would perpetuate anachronistic 
views Finally, background norms of interpretation play an inevitable part in the process and 
those norms cannot readily be captured in the notion of imaginative reconstruction 
100
 As Justice Flolmes commented 
[WJhen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution 
of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the devel 
opment of which could not have been foreseen completely bv the most gifted of its 
begetters The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience, 
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago 
Missouri v Flolland, 252 U S 416, 433 (1920) 
There is a significant difference between backward looking and forward looking interpreta 
tion Consider, for example, Bob Jones University v United States, 461 U S 574 (198^), in 
which the Court was asked to decide whether a public policy exception to the charitable 
deduction required the Internal Revenue Service to deny tax deductions to schools that discnm 
mated on the basis of race There is no doubt that if that question had been put to the Congress 
that initially enacted the relevant provision of the Code, it would have answered that there was 
no such requirement But if the enacting Congress were brought forward to the present — to 
be sure, a difficult conceptual exercise — it would probably have concluded that the deduction 
was impermissible in light of its inconsistency with recent law and policy proscribing and 
penalizing private racial discrimination 
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When circumstances have changed, backward-looking interpreta-
tion may produce absurd results, and often it is fully plausible to 
think that members of the enacting legislature intended the meaning 
of the statute not to be controlled by its original understanding. In 
such cases — signaled most obviously by open-ended terms capable 
of change over time — it should be relatively uncontroversial for 
courts to depart from original meaning; here meaning obviously shifts 
with circumstances. More generally, the legislature will often have 
had no considered view on the question of backward-looking or for-
ward-looking interpretation In these circumstances, reliance on intent 
will lead to intractable problems. Something other than intent must 
be the basis for decision.101 
For all of these reasons, the notion of legislative intent is at best 
an incomplete guide to statutory construction. If the legislative intent 
is ascertainable, it should be used to resolve otherwise doubtful ques-
tions about statutory meaning. Nevertheless, difficult questions will 
often remain. 
* * * 
In sum, the traditional contextual approaches can help remedy 
some of the problems with reliance on text "alone." But sometimes 
structure, purpose, intent, and history will leave gaps or ambiguities, 
and reliance on purpose, intent, and history may lead to interpretive 
mistakes. Although it would be foolish to dispense with these tools, 
they cannot generate a workable approach to interpretation without 
considerable supplementation. 
3 Legal Process — Some of those who stress the importance of 
background and context acknowledge that in some cases, a reliance 
on these sources will be inadequate. Thus the celebrated treatment 
by Hart and Sacks in The Legal Process102 suggests that to solve hard 
cases, the court "should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably 
appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pur-
suing reasonable purposes reasonably."10^ In a similar vein, Karl 
Llewellyn counseled courts to "strive to make sense as a whole out of 
our law as a whole.1'104 
Legal process approaches stand poised somewhere between agency 
theories of the judicial role and understandings of an altogether dif-
101 $ee supra note 100, s(e also Aleinikoff, supra note 6 j (advocating interpretation that 
departs from original meaning in tin fate oi (hanged (lrcumstanies) 
102
 H H A R T & A SACKS, supra note 15 
w Id at 1415 
104
 Llewellyn, sup)a note 19, at 399 (emphasis in original) Man> of the most astute writers 
on statutory interpretation spoke very much in these terms See, e g , Freund, supra note 44, 
at 2U, Radin, supra note 85, at 884 
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ferent sort. On the one hand, some such approaches (particularly that 
of Hart and Sacks) are designed to implement legislative commands 
by counseling courts to replicate the judgment the legislature would 
have made.105 On the other hand, some such approaches are designed 
to produce "reason" or "rationality" in statutes, quite apart from any 
actual or hypothetical judgment by the legislature.106 In either case, 
the legal process reference to "reasonableness" or "sense" points to the 
context of the statute's application rather than to its background and 
development. 
For those who endorse the agency model, the first problem with 
such approaches is that they appear to be based on poor understand-
ings of the actual nature of the legislative process 107 Hart and Sacks, 
for example, dealt inadequately with the role of interest groups in 
determining the content of statutes — an unsurprising omission in 
light of the fact that most of the relevant literature has emerged in 
the last generation. The view that courts should treat statutes as if 
they promoted reasonable purposes in a reasonable way is an attrac-
tive one — indeed, it plays a central role in this Article. But this 
claim is normative, not descriptive The task of imposing reason on 
regulatory legislation is sometimes inconsistent with the legislation 
itself, and it takes courts far from the role of faithful agents of the 
legislature. 
More fundamentally, the suggestion that courts should attempt to 
"make sense" of regulatory statutes or to treat them as would "reason-
able people acting reasonably" is a conspicuous outgrowth of IQSO'S 
jurisprudence, when the "end of ideology" thesis played such a large 
role in political science and the study of law lc)8 Advice of this sort 
is useful only when there is a consensus or a defense of particularized 
judgments about what approach "makes sense" or is "reasonable " In 
many interpretive disputes, however, such guidance is too open-ended 
to be helpful Without much more, a reference to "sense" cannot 
determine whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
requires the agency to undertake cost-benefit analyses, or whether the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws race-conscious programs designed to 
increase the representation of blacks. A recognition of this point has 
10s $ee H HART & A SACKS, supra note 15, at 1414 
106
 This is true of Llewellyn, who calls for an active, s>nthetK role for the courts, it is also 
true of Freund and Radin See sources cited supra note 104 
107
 See sources cited supra note 70 (discussing the public choice anahsis ol the congressional 
process), ste also pp 446-47 
1 0 8
 See generally D BLI L, T H E E N D OF IDEOLOGY O N THE EXHAI STION CH POLITICAI 
IDEAS IN THE F I F T I E S (i960) (describing the "end of ideology" in America as a result of political 
and social changes), Fosner, Tht Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962 icjS7, I O ° 
HARV L REV 761, 765-66 (1987) (associating the decline of the autonom> and authont> of 
purel> legal inquiry with the demise of the political consensus of the 1950's) 
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led many to return to the text — an understandable but unsuccessful 
strategy. 
The same problems underlie Ronald Dworkin's influential treat-
ment of this subject.109 Dworkin argues that courts should interpret 
statutes in accordance with the best principle that can be brought 
forward in support of what the legislature "has done " In Dworkin's 
view, the judge should see himself as "a partner continuing to develop, 
in what he believes is the best way, the statutory scheme Congress 
began."110 The judge should ask "what coherent system of political 
convictions would best justify what [the legislature] has done,"111 and 
should find and apply to disputed issues of interpretation "the best 
justification . . of a past legislative event "112 
This position is a clear heir to the legal process position — above 
all, in its emphasis on the use of judicial interpretation to produce 
reasonable results, to guard against arbitrariness, and to produce 
coherence in the legal system. As did its legal process predecessors, 
Dworkin's approach sees the courts partly as agents (hence the em-
phasis on "what the legislature has done") and partly as creative actors 
relying on normative theories of their own. In a number of respects, 
Dworkin's approach fits congenially with what I suggest here: it, too, 
insists on judicial efforts to promote a principled rather than ad hoc 
set of legal requirements and to foster what Dworkin calls "integrity," 
sometimes in the face of legislative "intent" or the actual character of 
the legislative process.113 
Dworkin's approach is marred, however, by the open-ended char-
acter of its guiding interpretive principle — a failing that provides 
the final link between Dworkin's effort and that of the legal process 
school. The dangers of judicial discretion in searching for and giving 
content to "the best principle" are largely unaddressed. Dworkin fails 
to explore the institutional background, or the substantive functions 
and failures of statutory regimes. The characteristics of the modern 
regulatory state are entirely invisible in Dworkin's treatment. Dwor-
kin's account draws far too sharp a dichotomy between "the best 
principle" — found through tools external (to what extent?) to the 
disputed provision or the prevailing legal culture — and "what the 
legislature has done," with the latter sometimes treated as if it were 
a kind of brute fact.114 
109
 See R DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 313-54 
1 . 0
 Id at 313 
1 .1
 Id at 335 
112
 Id at 338 
, H
 Indeed, the notion of "integrity" bears some resemblance to the goals of statutory con-
struction described in Part IV 
1 ,4
 By contrast, the approach of this Article charges the judge neither with invoking an 
external "best principle" nor with assessing, as if it were a datum, something the legislature "has 
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For this reason — and this is the central problem — Dworkin's 
effort to find the principle that best justifies what the legislature has 
done is largely untethered An emphasis on text, history, or intention 
seems a most appealing refuge from a general inquiry of that sort. In 
particular, reliance on the text seems to have a far better democratic 
pedigree and to hold far more promise for limiting judicial discretion 
4. The Proper Role of Traditional Sources of Meaning and the 
Failure of the Agency View. — The discussion thus far suggests several 
conclusions about the use of traditional tools of statutory construction 
The text, understood in its context and in concert with shared back-
ground norms, is usually sufficient to resolve interpretive disputes. 
Sometimes, however, the text is ambiguous or reveals a delegation or 
gap. Moreover, the ordinary meaning of the text should not be de-
cisive when the statutory structure or purpose (if subject to an uncon-
troversial characterization) suggests an alternative meaning, and when 
a literal interpretation would produce a patently unjust or irrational 
application that was not clearly sought by the legislature. Similarly, 
the legislative "intent" — as reflected in the legislative history — is 
admissible to resolve ambiguities, but it usually should not be per-
mitted to overcome the ordinary meaning of the statutory words if 
that meaning is otherwise clear. The only exception is when the 
history supports the conclusion that literalism would produce unin-
tended irrationality or injustice.115 In some cases, however, all of 
these sources of statutory meaning will leave serious gaps or uncer-
tainties, and sometimes interpretive principles are properly invoked 
to press language in particular directions. 
As complete theories of statutory construction, then, the most 
prominent examples of the agency view of the judicial role appear to 
fail; it is time to consider the implications of that failure 116 The 
agency view starts from the important truth that it would be improper 
for judges to construe statutes to mean whatever the judges think 
best; the lawmaking primacy of the legislature, with its superior dem-
ocratic pedigree,117 prohibits such a conception of statutory "interpre-
tation." It follows from this understanding that where there is neither 
interpretive doubt nor constitutional objection, the judgment of the 
electorally accountable branch should prevail. 
done " The interpreter's understanding of what the legislature has done and the interpreter's 
own principles are a product of background norms, the two cannot be separated 
1 .5
 See, e g , Green v Bock Laundry Mach Co , 109 S Ct 1981 (1989) 
1 . 6
 In fact, it is doubtful that any judge subscribes to the view that the agenc> theory is a 
complete one The theory operates largel> as a rhetorical device or a rall>ing cry, and as such, 
it is useful in disciplining judges but also highl> misleading 
117
 Both disparities in political influence and the difficulties described by Arrow, see K 
ARROW, supra note 15, make it necessary to be cautious about this point See gene) ally infra 
note 148 (describing difficulties with attributing purpose to multimember legislative bodies) 
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The agency theory requires that judges exercise minimal discretion 
and avoid inquiries into the constitutional backdrop, appropriate in-
stitutional arrangements, statutory function, or larger social goals. 
Instead, the judge must be largely a functionary performing a me-
chanical process. This is, at bottom, a formalist position — formalist 
because it sees the process as entirely autonomous and free from value-
laden inquiries. Formalism and the agency view are entirely unob-
jectionable insofar as they recognize an important distinction — itself 
value-laden to be sure — between the relatively constrained operation 
of adjudicating statutory questions ("interpretation") and the relatively 
open-ended process of legislating. But like all formalist positions, the 
agency view of statutory interpretation is subject to two sorts of 
objections. 
First, the agency conception of "meaning" is too crude. As we 
have seen, language is not self-interpreting, and sometimes legislators 
delegate, self-consciously or otherwise, gap-filling power to the courts. 
Moreover, the instructions of the principal are unintelligible without 
background norms that interpreters alone can supply Usually such 
norms are uncontested within the legal culture, and therefore it is 
sufficient to rely on the generally accepted meanings of words. In 
such cases, the incompleteness of formalism is not troublesome for 
interpretive practice, and the uncontested meanings should ordinarily 
be given their full scope In other cases, courts must resort to con-
testable or conspicuous interpretive principles, or gap-filling devices, 
in order to decide the question of meaning. It is important to em-
phasize that this is a conceptual or logical claim, not a proposition 
about the appropriate distribution of powers among administrative 
agencies, courts, and legislatures It depends not at all on a belief in 
the wisdom and decency of the judges. To recognize the need for 
interpretive norms when Congress has not enacted them is not to 
confer on courts power that they do not already, and necessarily, 
have. 
Second, the broad legitimacy claims of the agency theory rely on 
question-begging and probably indefensible premises For such claims 
to be persuasive, those who invoke the agency theory118 must claim 
that a formalist approach to construction — again, to the (limited) 
extent that it is possible — is constitutionally compelled, or (what 
may amount to much the same thing) will lead on balance to the best 
or most sensible system of law ,,(> This latter claim must be under-
"* See sources uted supia notes 25 & 29 
11
 * For examples of such claims, see Public Citizen v United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S 
Ct 2S58, 2573-74 (1989) (Kenned>, J , concurring in the judgment), Green v Bock Laundry 
Math Co , 109 S Ct 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J , concurring in the judgment), and Easter-
brook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV J L & PUB POL'Y 59 
(1988) 
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stood as a belief that the ordinary or original meaning of statutory 
words must control, even if it would lead to absurd or unjust results. 
But it is far more likely that the occasional introduction of other 
considerations will lead to a superior system. 
For example, assume that statutory language, while ambiguous, is 
most naturally read to lead in a direction that is, by consensus, 
irrational, that a statute might be understood as giving open-ended 
authority to a bureaucracy; that the most obvious reading of a statute 
provides bizarre or unjust results in light of changes in the fifty years 
since its enactment. We will encounter many such cases below In 
all of these settings, courts that act as more than mere agents and 
that invoke contestable background norms will produce a more sen-
sible system of law. Indeed, sometimes such a role will be consistent 
with the best reading of Congress' interpretive instructions, or will be 
the best understanding to attribute to Congress when it has made no 
considered judgment on the point. For this reason, courts should be 
authorized to depart from the ordinary or original meaning and to 
press ambiguous words in particular directions if the context suggests 
that this would lead to superior outcomes.120 
Of course, there are risks in admitting power of this sort, largely 
in the form of increased judicial discretion. For this reason, invoca-
tion of controversial background norms should be modest. Although 
no decisive argument is available to demonstrate why and to what 
extent the recognition of such authority will make matters better rather 
than worse, it is possible to point to institutional characteristics of the 
judiciary that occasionally justify what might seem an aggressive role 
in interpretation 
First, the focus on the particular circumstances enables judges to 
deal with applications that no legislature, no matter how farsighted, 
could conceivably have foreseen. Under changed or unforeseen cir-
cumstances, mechanical application of statutory terms is unlikely to 
produce sound results, even from the standpoint of the enacting leg-
islature. By contrast, judicial resolution of individual cases, allowing 
an emphasis on particular settings with which a lawmaker could not 
be familiar, contains significant advantages for interpretation.121 
uo
 In civil law s\st<ms, this point is conventional, and a judicial role of this sort is fullv 
consistent with legal practice throughout this country's histor>, even before nationhood See 
Zweigart & Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation — Civilian Style, 44 T U L L REV 704, 707-
08 (1970), infra note 124 Something like it was suggested by Alexander Hamilton himself See 
infra note 123 It is one thing to say that courts must defer to the lawmaking primacy of the 
legislature, it is quite another thing to say that this principle implies a theorv barring courts 
from interpreting statutes with the aid of sometimes controversial background norms In light 
of the relevant history, the view that the Constitution carries with it this quite novel theory of 
interpretation is hard to sustain 
121
 Consider Wittgenstein's game with dice, discussed above at p 419, consider also the cases 
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Second, because of their independence and their deliberative ca-
pacities, courts have significant advantages over a legislature that may 
be influenced by parochial interests and is frequently responsive to 
momentary demands I22 Considerations of this sort were emphasized 
in The Federalist, quite outside of the context of constitutional re-
view.123 Those considerations support a relatively aggressive role for 
the courts in statutory interpretation, one that sees judges as some-
thing other than agents. That position is consistent as well with 
historical practice 124 
It would of course be possible to use contestable principles mod-
estly or quite aggressively, and courts have occasionally used interpre-
tive norms to construe statutes in ways that are plainly inconsistent 
with the outcome that would be reached through reliance on text, 
structure, purpose, and ordinary understandings of linguistic com-
mands.125 As a general rule, however, courts should use controversial 
background norms sparingly, in deference to the basic principle of 
democratic primacy. But in some situations — for example, when 
conventional interpretation would produce absurdity or gross injustice, 
when changed circumstances call for creativity, when constitutional 
considerations counsel courts to interpret statutes in one direction — 
involving interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Delaney Clause 
See infra pp 489-93. 49&~97 
122
 Public choice theor> shows that legislation imperfecta reflects the desires of the "public" 
and indeed that the concept of a public will is a confused one See, e g , K ARROW, supra 
note i s , see also sources cited infra note 148 (discussing the economic theory of legislation) 
1 2
' In Tht Federalist No 78, Hamilton wrote 
But it is not with a view to infractions of the constitution onl> that the independence of 
the judges ma> be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in 
the society These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights 
of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws Here also the firmness of 
the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity, and confining the 
operation of such laws It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those 
which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in 
passing them, who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are 
to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very 
motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts 
T H E F E D F R A I I S T NO 78, at 528 (A Hamilton) (J Cooke ed 1961), cf R POSNER, SOME 
PROBLEMS IN JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming 1990) (discussing how interpretation "civilizes" stat-
utes) 
124
 Consider, for example, the central role that canons of construction have played in sta-
tutory interpretation throughout the history of Anglo-American law See 1 W BLACKSTONE, 
C O M M F N T A R I F S ON T H F LAWS OF E N G L A N D *87-*92 (discussing statutor> interpretation in a 
nonformalist way, with principles of construction), E BLAI , CARDINAL RULES OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION (A Randall ed 1924) (same), T M C L E O D , PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY I N -
TERPRETATION (1984) (same), Eskndge, supra note 21, at 1010-11 (same), Landis, supra note 
12, at 222-23 (same), Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra note 4, at 385-86 (same), see 
also T P I U C K N E T T , STATUri-s AND T H E I R INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST H A L F OF THE 
louRTH-Nni CFNTURV (1922) (discussing various interpretive principles of the fourteenth cen 
tury) 
12,;
 See infia p 465 
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courts should be more aggressive in statutory interpretation. In the 
abstract, these observations make it difficult to decide to what extent 
departures from the agency model are appropriate. The discussion in 
Part IV is designed to provide a more concrete understanding of the 
problem 
B Indeterminacy? Conventionalism? 
The problems with textualism and with the agency view lead some 
to conclude that statutory interpretation produces unpredictability and 
indeterminacy in most or all cases.126 Noting that interpretation is 
possible only within the context of interpretive conventions,127 others 
argue that it is not possible to change, debate, or even theorize about 
interpretation One just does it. 
Those who accept conventionalism differ from those who believe 
that statutory meaning produces indeterminacy For conventionalists, 
meaning is hardly open-ended But the two camps have much in 
common. Both reject the possibility of criteria with which to distin-
guish between good and bad interpretations, or to mediate disputes 
over meaning In both accounts, words have the meanings that they 
do simply because people in positions of authority so interpret them 
On this point, both accounts are inadequate 
/ Indeterminacy — It is not always clear whether the claims of 
indeterminacy are meant to be normative or positive. According to 
the normative version, there are no correct answers to questions of 
statutory interpretation, but instead merely subjective (and perhaps 
arbitrary) opinions ,28 In contrast, the positive version has it that 
judicial decisions cannot be predicted in advance, even if there are 
criteria by which reasonable people might mediate among interpretive 
disputes 
Whether normative or positive, the claim that statutory meaning 
is "indeterminate" is wildly overstated Claims about the inevitable 
indeterminacy of interpretation usually suffer from a failure to take 
account of the contextual character of linguistic commands. Com-
munication is possible only because of agreement over the governing 
126
 See J PRANK, LAW AND THE MODFRN M I N D 190-92 (1930), see also R UNGER, supra 
note 17, at 94-98 (arguing that a coherent theorv of legal adjudication is not possible on the 
premises of liberal thought) 
1 2 7
 See S F I S H , DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 18, at 357-58, S FISH, IS 
T H E R E A T E X T IN THIS CLASS?, supra note 18, at 13-15, 331-32 Compare the conventionalist 
position with Holmes' claim that law consists of "what the courts will do in fact, and nothing 
more," Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV L REV 457, 461 (1897) — a claim that is 
unhelpful for a judge t rung to decide what to "do in fact " 
1 2 8
 But tj S F I S H , Is 'I HERE A T E X T IN THIS CLASS?, supra note 18, at 268 (arguing that, 
in interpretation, there are obvious and inescapable meanings resulting from shared interpretive 
assumptions) 
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rules; these rules enable people to understand each other, and they 
sharply limit the number of possible interpretations.129 When taken 
in their setting — in their context and culture — statutes are usually 
susceptible to only one plausible meaning. Judicial interpretation of 
statutes is therefore quite predictable, largely because background 
norms are uncontested among the judges. Even where background 
norms are in conflict, it is often possible to know how the case will 
come out, or at least to limit the number of possible outcomes, because 
one can predict which norms will govern in the circumstances. For 
this reason, the claim of indeterminacy, if taken as a positive one, is 
implausible. 
It is possible to show as well that some interpretations are cor-
rect. 13° This is most obviously true in easy cases, in which there is 
no controversy over the meaning of text in light of background norms; 
but it is true in hard cases as well — a point to which I return below. 
To make the unsurprising point that the choice among interpretive 
strategies or background norms implicates a value judgment is hardly 
to say that the choice is arbitrary. The existence of judgments of 
value leads to a conclusion of arbitrariness only for the most incorri-
gible of positivists. Moreover, the fact that someone might argue that 
a statute does not mean what it appears to say, or might characterize 
the legislative purpose in a counterintuitive way, does not mean that 
such arguments are convincing or even plausible. Nor does the ex-
istence of some hard cases mean that all cases are hard. The ultimate 
task is to develop criteria by which to mediate among conflicting value 
judgments in concrete cases, including hard ones — a task taken up 
in Part IV. 
2. Conventionalism. — These points help to identify the flaws in 
conventionalist accounts of legal interpretation. It is correct and sal-
utary to emphasize, as conventionalists do, that interpretive assump-
tions are always in force, and that texts do not have "inherent" or 
"necessary" meanings in the strong sense that those meanings remain 
constant across different contexts and cultures. Moreover, some words 
simply mean what they mean; they are not a subject of reflection and 
criticism to someone who speaks the language.131 But these claims 
— attacks on implausible versions of textualism or formalism — 
provide little help in the descriptive or normative tasks of interpre-
129
 See Easterbrook, supra note n , at <m n 2 (discussing Wittgenstein's contention that 
"meaning" is supplied by the community) 
l M ) T h e criteria for correctness here are intended to be pragmatic in character See R 
POSNER, supia note 123, Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L J 1539, i554~ 
55 (1988) In so saying, I do not mean to take a side in the debate between realists and skeptics 
about foundations for right answers in the law or speculate on the possibility that a resort to 
interpretation will make that debate unnecessary See generally Moore, The Interpretive Turn 
in Modem Theory A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN L REV 871 (1989) 
m
 Compare S FISH, DOING W H A T COMES NATURALLY, supra note 18, at 358-59 ^tth note 
24, supra 
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tation. They do not explain how conflicts within a group of inter-
preters should be, or in fact are, resolved. Above all, they do not 
suggest that participants in the legal culture should rest content with 
existing interpretive strategies, or that it is impossible to evaluate those 
strategies or proposed alternatives. Interpreters in fact choose among 
strategies on the basis of the reasons offered on their behalf. To claim 
that meaning is only a function of culture is to give up on the impor-
tant questions altogether. 
Moreover, the conventionalist suggestion that interpretive norms 
themselves need interpretation132 hardly suggests that there are no 
criteria for assessing particular norms, or that people are unable to 
explain why some such norms would make things worse rather than 
better.133 In short, the conventionalist account is both too crude and 
too flat. It treats interpreters as always the objects or recipients, and 
never the subjects or creators, of interpretive practice. It fails to 
account for the related phenomena of choice among interpretive strat-
egies and of change over time. 
C. Extratextual Norms 
In recent years, courts and commentators have proposed three 
theories of statutory construction that rely on extratextual norms. The 
first involves a background rule in favor of private ordering; the 
second calls for a rule of deference to regulatory agencies; the third 
refers to the difficulties in aggregating diverse legislative views and 
the notion that statutes represent "deals" among self-interested actors. 
Each of these approaches suffers from significant flaws. 
/. Private Ordering. — On one view, the constitutional system 
leaves citizens free to conduct their affairs without governmental in-
terference, and that basic principle requires courts to interpret statutes 
to extend only as far as their explicit language and history require.134 
For example, courts should not recognize implied causes of action, 
since statutes ought not be taken to intrude on private autonomy 
except to the extent that they do so unambiguously.1315 An interpretive 
principle of this sort would have enormous consequences for statutory 
interpretation; it would limit statutes in all areas of social and eco-
nomic regulation, from discrimination law to pollution control to se-
curities fraud. In short, the private ordering norm requires that stat-
utes with gaps or ambiguities be interpreted unfavorably towards their 
intended beneficiaries. 
1 , 2
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The presumption in favor of private ordering is merely the most 
recent incarnation of the view, set out in the early twentieth century 
and before, that statutes in derogation of the common law should be 
read against a laissez-faire baseline and narrowly construed.136 In 
some legal systems, and in some contexts, such a presumption would 
be desirable; and the presumption is always sound insofar as it rec-
ognizes that where Congress has neither legislated nor left a gap for 
interpreters to fill, no law constrains private behavior. In the wake 
of the New Deal, however, a broad interpretive norm in favor of 
private ordering can no longer be sustained. This is so partly because 
the post-New Deal system is generally superior to its common law 
predecessor insofar as it recognizes that private autonomy is a product 
of legal controls and that modern regulation often promotes both 
economic welfare and distributive justice.137 The more fundamental 
problem with the broad presumption in favor of private autonomy is 
its inconsistency with the values that underlie modern government. 
Such a presumption would invoke understandings repudiated by the 
democratic branches of government in order, ironically, to discern the 
reach of statutes enacted and administered by those very branches. 
It would be highly undemocratic, and indeed presumptuous, for courts 
to invoke laissez-faire principles in support of such a judicial role. 
Gaps should not be filled in, and ambiguities should not be resolved, 
by reference to norms that run counter to those of the enacting Con-
gress in particular and the modern regulatory state in general 
2. Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law n 8 — Another view, 
finding considerable support in recent cases, maintains that courts 
should defer to agency interpretations of law whenever the statute is 
ambiguous Because of their superior accountability, expertise, and 
ability to coordinate complex enactments, agencies should be given 
the benefit of every doubt Unlike the private ordering principle, this 
view has roots in the New Deal period, with that era's endorsement 
of administrative autonomy; and it places a strong emphasis on the 
136
 See supra pp 407-08 This basic approach to regulatory statutes operated as the statutory 
analogue to the constitutional principle in Lochner v New York, 198 U S 4s (1905), in which 
the Court treated certain statutory measures as impermissible deviations from the "neutral" 
principles reflected in the common law Both principles were properl> rejected I hey used a 
highly controversial set of regulatory ideas, embodied in nineteenth century common law, as the 
baseline against which to decide the scope of innovations developed by the democratic branches 
in a conscious rejection of the common law I he legal realists — important forces behind the 
New Deal reformation argued that governmental power lay behind common law rules, which 
could not, therefore, be treated as merely facihtative ot private desires, they played a constitutive 
role as well See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, n C O R N F I L L Q 8 (1927), Hale, Coercion 
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL Sci Q 470 (1923) 
1,7
 See C S U N S T U N , supra note *, chs 1-2 
H 8
 The discussion in the following paragraphs draws from Sunstein, supra note 9, at 437-
46 
1989] INTERPRETING STATUTES 445 
displacement of judicial lawmaking represented by the creation of 
regulatory schemes. Thus, in the exceptionally important Chevron 
case,139 the Supreme Court said that courts should defer to agency 
interpretations of law unless "Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue."140 
Even if read for all that it is worth, the Chevron position would 
not resolve every disputed statutory question. Threshold interpretive 
questions must be asked and answered even under Chevron. For 
example, courts have to rely on some methodology that is independent 
of the rule of deference to decide when statutes are ambiguous. The 
rule of deference would, however, have significant consequences, be-
cause it would remit all uncertain cases to regulatory agencies for 
administrative resolution. Moreover, such a rule is quite appealing,141 
especially when Congress has delegated law-interpreting power to the 
agency or when the question involves the agency's specialized fact-
finding and policymaking competence, as do "mixed" issues of law 
and fact. 
For several reasons, however, a general rule of judicial deference 
to all agency interpretations of law would be unsound. The case for 
deference depends in the first instance on congressional instructions.142 
If Congress has told courts to defer to agency interpretations, courts 
must do so. But many regulatory statutes were born out of legislative 
distrust for agency discretion; they represent an effort to limit admin-
istrative authority through clear legislative specifications 143 A rule of 
deference in the face of ambiguity would be inconsistent with under-
standings, endorsed by Congress, of the considerable risks posed by 
administrative discretion.144 An ambiguity is simply not a delegation 
of law-interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two 
139
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Second, the notion that administrators may interpret statutes that 
they administer is inconsistent with separation of powers principles 
that date back to the early days of the American republic14<; and that 
retain considerable vitality today I46 The basic case for judicial review 
depends on the proposition that foxes should not guard henhouses. It 
would be most peculiar, for example, to argue that courts should defer 
to congressional or state interpretations of constitutional provisions 
whenever there is ambiguity in the constitutional text. Those who 
are limited by a legal restriction should not be permitted to determine 
the nature of the limitation, or to decide its scope. The relationship 
of the Constitution to Congress parallels the relationship of governing 
statutes to agencies. In both contexts, an independent arbiter should 
determine the nature of the limitation 
This basic principle assumes special importance in light of the 
awkward constitutional position of the administrative agency Broad 
delegations of power to regulatory agencies have been allowed largely 
on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency 
fidelity to whatever statutory directives have been issued 147 If agen-
cies are able to decide on the meaning of ambiguities in these direc-
tives, the nondelegation problem grows dramatically. A firm judicial 
hand in the interpretation of statutes is thus desirable 
The point can be made more vivid by imagining cases involving 
such questions as whether agency action is reviewable, whether agen-
cies may issue fines; whether agency jurisdiction extends to new or 
unforeseen areas In all of these cases, it would be peculiar to say 
that the agency is permitted to decide the meaning of a law whose 
scope is so directly relevant to agency self-interest. In short, a general 
rule of deference to agency interpretations of law would be inconsistent 
with the best reading of Congress' interpretive instructions, with the 
constitutional backdrop, and with the goal of promoting sound regu-
latory policy 
j Public Choice Theory and "Deals " — A number of commen-
tators have recently attempted to find guidance for statutory interpre-
tation in welfare economics and public choice theory Two claims are 
crucial here — the first descriptive, the second normative The first 
claim is that the concept of legislative purpose is incoherent 148 Seeing 
PROC FSS AND AMERICAN G O V I R N M F N T (1978), Stewart, Tin Rtjormation of imtrican Admin-
istrative Law, 88 HARV L RLV 1667, 1676-88 (1975) 
145
 See, e g , T H E FEDERALIST N O 78, at 523 (A Hamilton) (J Cooke ed IQ6I ) ("'There 
is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers '" 
(quoting MONTESQUIEU, T H E SPIRIT OF LAWS bk xi, ch 6, para 4, at 151-52 (T Nugent 
trans rev ed 1949))) 
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 See t a n n a , Statutory Intt>pretation and the BaUinu oj Poutr in tin Administrative 
Slate, 89 COLUM L REV 452, 488-99 (1989) 
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politics not as an effort to carry out coherent or public-regarding 
purposes but as a battle for scarce resources among self-interested 
private groups, these commentators maintain that the legislative pro-
cess is a series of interest-group struggles They also emphasize the 
difficulties in aggregating the preferences and beliefs of numerous 
legislators. From this they conclude that statutes reflect unprincipled 
"deals" and not intelligible collective "purposes " Some of those who 
urge this view claim that it has foundations in the thought of the 
framers of the Constitution.149 
The second claim is that courts charged with interpreting statutes 
should not rely on unitary or public-regarding purposes, but instead 
should enforce the statute according to its terms, which reveal the 
relevant "deal." Courts should not see legislators as "reasonable people 
acting reasonably " Instead, statutes are often unprincipled outcomes 
of multiple pressures imposed on multiple actors. The contrast with 
the legal process school in particular could not be sharper.150 
Consider, for example, how an advocate of the deals approach 
would analyze the question whether a federal statute regulating pol-
lution implicitly authorizes victims of pollution to bring suits against 
polluters If the statute does not expressly provide for such suits, the 
victims have not obtained that right as part of the statutory "deal," 
and the right should be denied. By contrast, a court that saw the 
legislature as "reasonable people acting reasonably," or that treated 
a multimember body First, efforts to aggregate multiple points of view through legislation will 
not yield an intelligible preference of the collectivity Even if legislators vote according to their 
actual preferences, the outcome may not reflect a coherent aggregation of preferences because 
the outcome eventually chosen depends on the order in which different proposals were considered 
rather than on a collective preference for that outcome See K ARROW supra note 15, at 46-
60 (describing the Impossibility Theorem) 
Second, legislators may engage in strategic behavior, espttialK if there are three or more 
alternatives up for a vote t o r example, a legislator might decide to misrepresent her preferences 
by voting for proposition x instead of proposition y because the defeat of y will increase the 
likelihood that proposition 2, which our sample legislator prefers, will pass See Gibbard, 
Manipulation of Voting Schemes A General Result, in RATIONAL M A N AND IRRATIONAL SO 
CIETY?, supra note 15, at 3S8 Legislators also trade votes or 'logroll " See B BARRY & R 
H A R D I N , Introduction to Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules, in RATIONAL 
M A N AND IRRATIONAI SOCIETY?, supra note is , at 541-42 These difficulties make it hard to 
discern a unitar> purpose behind legislative enactments, other than the purpose to do what the 
legislature has done 
Third, the legislative outcome may reflect organizational difficulties faced b> diffuse, poorly 
organized groups, and it is unclear how the complex interactions between the well organized 
and the poorly organized should enter into the depiction of "purpose " See, e g , R HARDIN, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) 
149
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legislation as public-spirited, might well recognize private suits as a 
way of enforcing the statutory mandate. 
Advocates of the "deals" approach correctly emphasize legislative 
compromise, and they have also performed a valuable role in sug-
gesting that legislative purposes are often multiple and even conflict-
ing. As a theory of statutory interpretation, however, the "deals" 
approach suffers from many of the failings of textualism. The first 
problem is indeterminacy In many cases, the terms of any deal will 
be hopelessly unclear in the absence of background norms that a 
system of interpretation — one that has nothing to do with deals — 
alone can supply. For example, an approach that sees statutes as 
deals is in fact unhelpful in cases involving implied causes of action. 
If a statute is treated as a deal between industries seeking protection 
against too much regulation on the one hand, and environmental 
groups attempting to prevent pollution on the other, what result is 
appropriate? The answer would be obvious if there were a back-
ground norm to the effect that regulatory statutes generally create 
private rights of action In that case, the failure of industry to obtain 
a prohibition on such rights would suggest that the deal authorized 
them. The result would also be clear if the background norm forbade 
private rights without explicit legislative authorization the deal did 
not include them. The central question is what the relevant norm 
should be. The claim that statutes should be understood as deals 
provides no help in deciding on the background against which deals 
must be read In the end, advocates of the "deals" approach — like 
most formalists — rely in fact on a substantive background norm;151 
it is that norm, on whii h the "deals" approach is utterly unhelpful 
and indeed silent, that is the true basis for decision 
Even if the problem of indeterminacy could be overcome, the 
question would remain whether courts should treat statutes as un-
principled deals The argument in favor of that system would have 
to claim that it is constitutionally required, or that the legal system 
that would emerge would be preferable to the alternatives Some 
have stressed the dangers of judicial discretion, the fact that statutes 
are in fact deals, the likelihood that a system of deals will be respon-
sive to constituents' demands for law, and the value of obtaining deals 
in the first place 152 
1SI
 See, eg , Easterbrook, supra note u , at S49~SO (Rising on the background norm of 
private autonomy) Consider also Justice Scaha's enthusiastic resort to the principle in favor of 
judicial deference to agencv interpretations of law Sie Immigration & Naturalization Serv v 
C ardo/a Fonseca, 480 U b 421 45} ss (1987) (Scalia, J , concurring) 
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1989J INTERPRETING STATUTES 
449 
Often, however, efforts to understand statutes as deals depend on 
highly artificial premises. The empirical work points in both direc-
tions. There is evidence that public officials often respond to their 
own conception of the public interest.15s Numerous people, moreover, 
help to produce statutes, and it is not easy to see how the multiple 
forces can meaningfully be thought to produce a deal. The problems 
of aggregating multiple desires do not always prevent the ascription 
of "purpose" to legislation. The claim of realism is therefore over-
stated. 
Even if statutes were deals, the argument that courts should al-
ways treat them as such is hardly self-evident Indeed, the "deals" 
approach tends to break down if conceptions of politics rooted in 
interest-group pluralism cannot be defended on normative grounds 
Far from having a good constitutional pedigree, the pluralist under-
standing runs afoul of the fundamental constitutional norm against 
naked interest-group transfers.154 That norm proscribes legislative 
efforts to transfer resources from one group to another simply because 
of the political power of the latter. The norm has firm roots in both 
Madisonian republicanism — designed to ensure a measure of delib-
eration in government — and in current law under a number of 
constitutional provisions, including the equal protection, due process, 
eminent domain, and contract clauses.155 An effort to treat statutes 
as mere deals is thus inconsistent with the bai>ic constitutional back-
ground 
Moreover, interest-group pluralism cannot be defended as a 
method for ensuring accurate aggregation of citizen preferences Pub-
lic choice theory itself reveals that pluralist systems reflect collective 
154
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(1984) 
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action problems, strategic behavior, cycling problems, the power of 
various groups over the agenda, and a host of other difficulties.156 
Here descriptive work in the public choice tradition157 helps to supply 
a strong normative argument against a theory of statutory construction 
that is inspired by public choice theory. Courts that treat statutes as 
deals will tend to produce incoherence and irrationality in the law. 
Even if accurate preference-aggregation could be achieved through 
politics, it is far from clear that the system would warrant support. 
Politics performs a number of functions that cannot be captured in 
the notion of aggregation of private preferences. Collective aspirations 
about social justice; democratic preferences for others, including future 
generations; and social subordination, which has consequences for the 
preferences of both the advantaged and the disadvantaged — all these 
have called forth statutory regimes promoting a range of values that 
a pluralist system cannot sufficiently protect.158 
A system of interpretation that treats statutes as interest-group 
deals or as incoherent compromises therefore would suffer from a 
wide range of problems. By contrast, a regime in which courts treat 
statutes as purposive, rational, and public-regarding would be more 
likely to push statutes in purposive, rational, and public-regarding 
directions. Of course, a court should respect a deal if it is unambig-
uously reflected in law. But an interpretive approach that is alert to 
the risks of deals and that attempts to make sense of statutory enact-
ments will produce a superior system of law.159 
4. Criteria. — It will be useful to conclude this section by seeing 
whether the discussion of extratextual norms suggests some general 
criteria by which to evaluate such norms. We have seen that a broad 
private autonomy principle may well be objectionable as a theory of 
the appropriate role of the state160 and that it lacks fit with the modern 
regulatory structure and its underlying values. Unlike the autonomy 
principle, the principle of agency deference has the advantage of 
attempting to respond to the real-world operation of the regulatory 
state. It is, however, inconsistent with likely congressional desires and 
with the constitutional backdrop, and if adopted, it would impair the 
performance of regulatory institutions. The "deals" approach properly 
brings to bear a realistic understanding of legislative processes. The 
156
 See K. ARROW, supra note 15; J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 15; see also 
supra note 148 (discussing the problems faced by multimember representative bodies). 
157
 See sources cited supra notes 148 & 156. 
158
 See Stewart, supra note 152, at 1566-81; Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private 
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L RKV. 112'), 1152-58 (1986). 
|S<> See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: 
An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. I.. REV 223 (1986). 
160
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for regulation). 
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understanding is, however, only a partial one. The "deals" approach 
would ultimately engraft onto interpretation a conception of politics 
that would increase regulatory irrationality and injustice and that 
would in any case be in severe tension with the constitutional frame-
work. 
If these points provide persuasive grounds for rejecting these in-
terpretive norms, they suggest that in order to be acceptable, interpre-
tive norms must be consistent with the constitutional structure and 
the fabric of modern public law; must improve rather than impair the 
performance of governmental institutions; and must reflect a concep-
tion of politics that is likely, if adopted, to help combat defects in 
regulatory practice. Criteria of this sort are highly value-laden; but 
they suggest that it is possible both to criticize conventions and to 
mediate among different interpretive norms.161 
III. T H E ROLE OF INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES 
A. Karl Llewellyn and the Canons of Construction 
The discussion thus far has suggested that the agency view is 
inadequate and that interpretive norms play an indispensable role in 
statutory construction. The relative silence about the role of such 
norms therefore presents something of a puzzle. 
Some help in this regard might be found in the fate in academic 
circles of the "canons" of construction. Although courts have always 
used something like "canons" as background principles for interpre-
tation, the canons were criticized and indeed virtually discredited by 
the legal realist movement. The most conspicuous example is Karl 
Llewellyn's celebrated effort to demonstrate that for each canon there 
is an equal canon pointing in the opposite direction.162 An inspection 
of the decisions revealed that the canons of construction did not help 
to decide cases; instead they operated as mechanical, after-the-fact 
recitations disguising the reasons for decision. 
161
 To say this is not to suggest that criteria can ever be entirely external to "conventions," 
at least if these are defined broadly enough. The inquiry here is pragmatic in character, see 
supra note 130; it is sufficient to suggest that some norms can be shown, for good reasons, to 
be preferable to others. See also infra pp. 460-62 (discussing freedom and constraint in devel-
oping interpretive norms). 
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 See Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 401-06. For example, the canon calling for adherence 
to the "plain meaning" of the text is countered by the principle that courts should vindicate the 
spirit of the law, the notion that statutes in derogation of the common law should be narrowh 
construed meets the principle that remedial statutes should be broadl> construed, and the idea 
that every word and clause should be given effect is countered by the principle that words and 
clauses may be rejected as surplusage when they were inadvertently inserted or repugnant to 
the rest of the statute. See id. at 404. 
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The realists argued that the canons substituted unhelpful, mislead-
ing, and mechanical rules for a more pragmatic and functional inquiry 
into statutory purposes and structure.163 This view has deeply pen-
etrated modern legal culture. Almost no one has had a favorable 
word to say about the canons in many years.164 For the most part, 
the canons are treated as anachronisms. 
Llewellyn's demonstration was persuasive insofar as it character-
ized the use of canons as a crude version of formalism. In fact, 
however, his claim of indeterminacy and mutual contradiction was 
greatly overstated; some of the canons actually influenced judicial 
behavior insofar as they reflected background norms that helped to 
give meaning to statutory words or to resolve hard cases. The notion 
that courts should narrowly construe statutes in derogation of the 
common law is the most prominent example. As we have seen, 
Llewellyn's abandonment of the canons left him with the hopelessly 
banal claim that decisions depended on "the sense of the situation as 
seen by the court"165 and that "a court must strive to make sense as 
a whole out of our law as a whole."166 Llewellyn did not unpack the 
notion of "sense" and its possible relationship to canons of construc-
tion. Indeed, he did not recognize that quite particular — and defen-
sible — conceptions of "sense," often forming the judge's initial, in-
tuitive, or even considered response to a statutory dispute, might 
themselves be reflected in canons of construction. Llewellyn, like 
many of the realists, attempted to liberate legal thought from flawed 
structures by denying the need for structures altogether, but structures 
are inevitably present. 
The canons of construction continue to be a prominent feature in 
the federal and state courts. The use of general guides to construction 
163
 See Posner, Statutory Interpretation — In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U 
C H I L REV 800, 805 (1983) 
164
 See id There are notable exceptions, including H H A R T & A SACKS, cited above in 
note 15, at 1221-41, Eskndge, cited above in note 21, at i o n , Macey, cited above in note 159, 
at 264-66 An especially useful treatment can be found in W ESKRIDGE & P F RICKEY, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 639-95 
(1988) 
Consider also the suggestion in Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 
17 Coi UM L RLV 527 (1947) 
|C|anons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact a delicate 
judgment, concluding a complicated process of balancing subtle and elusive 
elements So far as valid, they are what Mr Justice Holmes called them, axioms 
of experience Insofar as canons of construction are generalizations of experience, 
they all ha \e worth 
Id at 544 
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 Llewellyn, supra note 19, at ^97 (emphasis in original) 
lf)
*' Id at $99 (emphasis in original) See also Radin, supra note 8s, at 884 (advising judges 
to ask "Will the inclusion of this particular determinate in the statutory determinable lead to a 
desirable results What is desirable will be what is just, what is proper, what satisfies the social 
emotions of the judge, what fits into the ideal scheme of societ) which he entertains ") 
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— in the form of "clear-statement" principles and background under-
standings — can be found in every area of modern law. 
An analogy may be helpful here. The law of contracts is pervaded 
by — indeed, it consists largely of — a set of principles filling con-
tractual gaps when the parties have been silent, or when the meaning 
of their words is unclear.167 Imagine, for example, that the parties 
have been silent on the time of performance, damages in the event of 
breach, or the consequences of dramatically changed circumstances 
and partial default. The use of implied terms, or "off-the-rack" pro-
visions, is a familiar part of the law of contract; and it would be most 
peculiar to say that they are an illegitimate incursion into the usual 
process of "interpreting" the parties' intent. Without implied terms of 
some sort, contracts simply would not be susceptible to construction. 
Implied terms also provide the background against which people enter 
into agreements. 
To a large degree, interpretive principles — including the tradi-
tional "canons"168 — serve the same function in public law. They too 
help judges to construe both statements and silences; they too should 
not be seen as the intrusion of controversial judgments into "ordinary" 
interpretation. There are, however, differences as well as similarities 
In the law of contracts, it is often said that implied terms should 
attempt to "mimic the market" by doing what the parties would do if 
they had made provision on the subject.169 In this respect, contract 
law is pervaded by a background norm in favor of party autonomy 
and the market. In statutory construction, by contrast, the notion of 
"mimicking the market" is unavailable, and the idea that one should 
do what Congress would have done is far from a complete guide. As 
we have seen, how Congress would have resolved the question is 
sometimes unclear; sometimes the resolution of the enacting Congress 
would produce difficulties as a result of changed circumstances;170 
sometimes courts properly call into play principles — many of them 
167
 See generally Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choue An Analysis of the Inter-
actions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 C A L I F L REV 261, 264-89 (1985) 
(discussing the courts' role in creating implied contract terms) 
168
 I use the term "interpretive principles" to encompass both the "canons" and the full range 
of norms that are used in statutory construction The notion of "canons" has an unduly 
mechanistic connotation, and it is a misleading description of the norms I am proposing insofar 
as it suggests that those norms operate as rules 
169
 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 167, at 266 There is not universal agreement on this 
point First, it is sometimes impossible to "mimic the market" because the market is itself the 
function of the governing legal rule See Sunstein, supra note 158, at 1145-52 Second, even 
when possible to do so, one might prefer terms that serve redistnbutive functions, see Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 M D L REV 563 (1982), or that transform 
preferences, see Sunstein, supra note 158, at 1158-66 
170
 See infra pp 493-97 
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constitutionally inspired — that push statutes in directions that diverge 
from the conclusion that Congress would have reached if it had re-
solved the matter. Despite these differences, the critical point is that, 
as in contract law, the interpretation of a text requires courts to refer 
to background norms in interpreting terms. 
B The Functions of Interpretive Principles: 
A Catalogue 
Part of the problem in coming to terms with the canons is that 
they have served different functions, as do the interpretive principles 
courts generally employ. Some of these functions are nearly invisible: 
the norms are so widely shared, and so central to the very process of 
communicating in English, that they seem to be part of the words 
rather than part of the interpreter's tools. Some such "norms" are 
simply part of meaning and not open to discussion; others are also 
invisible but value-laden and potentially subject to evaluation.171 Still 
other norms look to values that more visibly serve substantive or 
institutional goals and are applicable principally in the context of 
interpreting statutes: these norms — here referred to as background 
norms — often seem extratextual. It is useful to distinguish between 
the invisible norms and background norms because usually only the 
latter are controversial and constitute the subject of interpretive dis-
putes The distinction, however, is imprecise, for interpretive norms 
often serve multiple functions simultaneously, and substantive and 
institutional functions are served by invisible norms as well. 
/. Orientation to Meaning. — Interpretive principles may be de-
signed to orient judicial readers to the text in order to help them to 
ascertain its meaning in the particular case This is the most uncon-
troversial function of interpretive principles. Most of these "principles" 
are so internalized that they are invisible and serve as an ordinary 
part of communication itself They operate as rules of syntax or 
grammar. 
Some of these syntactic norms have been explicitly identified as 
guides to interpretation. Consider, for example, the idea that the 
language of a particular provision will be taken in the context of the 
statute as a whole and will not be interpreted so as to do violence to 
the statutory structure 172 As we have seen with structural approaches 
to interpretation, this idea is helpful in ascertaining the meaning of a 
term that, if understood in a different context, would be ambiguous 
or indeed would have a "literal" meaning contrary to that indicated 
by the particular setting Even apparently unambiguous statutory 
terms might have a counterintuitive meaning if other provisions of 
171
 See supra note 24 
172
 See, e g , O'Connor v United States, 479 U S 27, 32 (1986) 
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the statute so indicate.173 The same considerations support the prin-
ciple that statutory provisions should be read so as not to create 
internal inconsistency or conflict with other enactments,174 and the 
idea that, where theie is a potential conflict, specific provisions should 
prevail over general terms in the same statute.175 
Many of the infamous Latin-phrased canons serve similarly mun-
dane functions. For example, the principle of ejusdem generis — 
where general words follow a specific enumeration, the general words 
should be limited to persons or things similar to those enumerated176 
— derives from an understanding that the general words are probably 
not meant to include matters entirely far afield from the specific 
enumeration. If understood to be truly general, the general words 
would make the specific enumeration redundant. 
A more controversial example is the principle expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius: to include one thing is to exclude another. Courts 
sometimes use this principle when Congress has specified a list of 
actors entitled to something — say, the people authorized to obtain 
review of federal administrative action, or to obtain welfare benefits 
— in order to support the conclusion that those not specified are not 
entitled to the good in question.177 The assumption is that by ex-
pressly singling out those people to whom it wanted to grant the good, 
Congress implicitly decided to deny all others the good. The expressio 
unius canon should not be used mechanically. The failure to refer 
explicitly to the group in question may reflect inadvertence, inability 
to reach consensus, or a decision to delegate the decision to the courts, 
rather than an implicit negative legislative decision on the subject. 
Moreover, Congress could have explicitly solved the problem by spec-
ifying that the group in question may not receive the benefit, and the 
availability of that option weakens the inference that silence resolves 
i n
 See, e g , Shell Oil Co v Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 109 S Ct 278, 282 (1988) Suppose, 
for example, that the question is whether the term "feasible" requires an agency to weigh costs 
and benefits, or instead tells the agency to act unless the industry would be seriously jeopardized 
by the regulation If the word "feasible" is used in the same sentence or provision as the term 
"cost-benefit analysis," then it is reasonable to assume that the word "feasible" itself does not 
call for cost-benefit balancing — otherwise the statute would be redundant or incoherent 
174
 See, e g , Louisiana Pub berv Comm'n v FCC, 476 U S 35 s, 570 (1986), Washington 
Mkt Co v Hoffman, 101 U S 112, 116(1879) 
175
 See, e g , Jett v Dallas Indep School Dist , 109 S Ct 2702, 2722 (1989), id at 2724 
(Scaiia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), Northern Border Pipeline Co 
v Jackson County, 512 h Supp 1261, 1264 (D Minn 1981) 
i76 $ee 2 A c SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47 17, 
at 166 (N Singer rev 4th ed 1984) fhereinafter SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION] 
177
 See, e g , Block v Community Nutrition Inst , 467 U S 340 (1984), National R R 
Passenger Corp v National Ass'n of R R Passengers, 414 U S 453, 458 (1974), see also United 
Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443 U S 193, 205-06 (1979) (suggesting that title VII's 
express disclaimer of a requirement of affirmative action supports the view that it does not 
prohibit voluntary plans) 
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the issue against the group. Sometimes, however, the principle is a 
helpful way of discovering statutory meaning in a particular case.178 
When it is plausible to assume that Congress has considered all the 
alternatives, the legislative failure to grant authority to one person 
suggests that it intended to deny the relevant authority to that person. 
Although particular interpretive principles of this type will be 
controversial, many of them serve the time-honored function of help-
ing to discern the meaning of the statute in the particular case 
2 Interpretive Instructions — Interpretive principles may also 
serve as guides to what might be called the interpretive instructions 
of the legislature. The goal is to capture an actual or hypothetical 
legislative judgment about how statutes should be construed.179 The 
easiest cases involve explicit legislative instructions about interpreta-
tion The first sections of the United States Code thus set out such 
instructions,180 as do the codes of other countries 181 Such statutes 
may attempt to provide substantive guidance 182 
Some interpretive principles, however, are a product of an under-
standing of implicit rather than explicit legislative interpretive instruc-
tions For example, a familiar and often quite important principle is 
that appropriations measures should not lightly be taken to amend 
substantive statutes.183 That principle does not of course indicate 
Congress' specific instructions on every bill. Appropriations measures 
are often designed to amend substantive statutes. As a general matter, 
however, this norm tracks an understanding about how Congress 
would want courts to interpret appropriations measures, the rules of 
178
 Consider, for example, United Steelworkers v Weber, in which the Court was asked to 
decide whether Congress had outlawed voluntary affirmative action by prohibiting racial dis-
crimination See 443 U b at 197 In concluding that Congress had not done so, the Court 
relied on the fact that Congress enacted a provision saying that it did not intend to 'require" 
race conscious decisions, an enactment that would be most puzzling if the basic antidiscrimi-
nation principle already invalidated affirmative action See id at 205-06 
179
 As noted, Congress may intend that the courts fill gaps or that general terms be construed 
in accordance with contemporary understandings See supra pp 421-22 
180
 See 1 U S C **§ 1-6 (1988), see also R DICKERSON, supra note 33, at 262-81 (discussing 
the Uniform Statutory Construction Act), I A SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176, 
*} 27 03, at 463-64 (discussing state interpretation acts) 
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 See, e g , DAS A L L G E M E I N E BURGERLICHE GLSETZBUCH ^ 7 (Aus ) (instructing judges 
that when interpreting an ambiguous code provision, they should look to the purpose of the 
statute, to analogous cases, and finally to general legal principles), C C D F art 9 (Mex ) 
(presuming that previous laws are not repealed unless a statute expressly does so or its provisions 
are incompatible with the previous laws), ZGB, Cc, Cc art 1(2) (Switz ) (instructing a judge 
when faced with a gap in the code to apply the customary law and, if that does not resolve the 
case, to place himself in the role of a legislator and decide accordingly) 
182
 See, e g , CAL CIV PROC CODE § 1866 (West 1983) (instructing judges in cases of 
ambiguity to interpret provisions in favor of "natural right") 
185
 See, e g , United States \ Will, 449 U S 200, 221-22 (1980), Tennessee Valley Auth v 
Hill, 437 U S 153. 190-91 (1978) 
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the House and Senate prohibit substantive lawmaking through appro-
priations. 184 
Consider, as another example, the idea that statutes should be 
construed to avoid constitutional invalidity.18S Although this principle 
does not attempt to discern statutory meaning in the particular case, 
it might be justified as an accurate reflection of Congress' likely pref-
erence for validation rather than invalidation 186 
j Improving Lawmaking: Institutional Considerations — A third 
function of interpretive principles is to promote better lawmaking. 
Some principles, for example, minimize judicial or administrative dis-
cretion, or push legislative processes in desirable directions. The effort 
is to improve lawmaking processes and the deliberation and account-
ability that are supposed to accompany them In this respect, some 
interpretive principles fulfill goals associated with the separation of 
powers and with plausible assessments of comparative institutional 
competence. 
The "plain meaning" principle, for example, might be an effort 
not to discover what Congress meant in the particular case, but 
instead to tell Congress to be careful with statutory language. The 
principle warns Congress that courts will not guess about the meaning 
of statutes or supply remedies for language that leads to absurd re-
sults.187 The hope — probably a false one — is that the principle 
will lead Congress to express itself clearly in the future The principle 
also helps to discipline the judiciary by warning courts not to imple-
ment policies of their own choosing 
Some principles designed to fulfill institutional goals require a 
"clear statement" before courts will interpret a statute to disrupt time-
honored or constitutionally grounded understandings about proper 
1 8 4
 Sie HOUSF oh REPRESENTATIVES, RUI ES OF THE HOUSE OF RFPRESENTATIVES, H R 
Doc No 279, 99th Cong , 2d Sess 573-74 (1987) (rule XXI(2)) (prohibiting provisions or 
amendments in general appropriations bills that change existing law), COMMITTEE ON RULES 
& A D M I N , U N I T E D STATES SENATE, STANDING RULES OF THE U N I T E D STATES SENATE 18 
(Comm Print 1972) (rule 16 4) (same), see also Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies 
Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L J 456, 458 (favoring these limitations) 
185
 See, e g , Communications Workers of America v Beck, 108 S Ct 2641, 2657 (1988), 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v Schor, 478 U S 833, 841 (1986), NLRB v Catholic 
Bishop, 440 U S 490, 507 (1979), American Airways Charters, Inc v Regan, 746 F 2d 865, 
867 (D C Cir 1984) 
186
 This norm also serves other purposes See infra p 459 
187
 See, e g , Amoco Prod Co v Village of Gambell, 480 U S 531, 546-48 (1987) (refusing 
to find that the outer continental shelf is in Alaska for purposes of the Alaskan National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act), Garcia v United States, 469 U S 70, 74 (1984) (relying on plain 
language and arguing that it would be absurd to give a statute a construction that would result 
in "a federal robbery statute without jurisdiction"). Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 U S 303, 308 
(1980) (holding that genetically engineered bacteria can be patented because of plain meaning 
of statutory language), Tennessee Valley Auth v Hill, 437 U S 153, 173 (1978) (refusing to 
exempt federal projects from the Endangered Species Act) 
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governmental arrangements. Clear-statement principles force Con-
gress expressly to deliberate on an issue and unambiguously to set 
forth its will; they commonly appear in statutory interpretation as a 
subset of the category of interpretive norms. Presumptions in favor 
of state autonomy,188 of noninterference with executive power in for-
eign affairs,189 and of continued judicial power to balance the equi-
ties,190 all preserve traditional institutional roles. All of these princi-
ples are designed to require a clear statement before courts will find 
congressional displacement of the usual allocation of institutional au-
thority. 
The principle that appropriations measures should not be con-
strued to amend substantive statutes also has an institutional function. 
This principle is designed in part to promote responsible lawmaking 
by ensuring that casual, ill-considered, or interest-driven measures do 
not overcome ordinary statutes.191 The narrow construction of ap-
propriations measures promotes the primacy of ordinary lawmaking, 
in which the constellation of interests is quite different and the like-
lihood of deliberation higher. 
Similar goals are served by the idea that when there is doubt, 
statutes should be construed to limit the discretion of regulatory agen-
cies.192 The principle in favor of narrowing discretion works against 
regulatory pathologies produced by factional power or self-interested 
behavior of bureaucrats.193 Also in this category are the notions that 
statutes regulating the same subject should be construed 
harmoniously194 and that courts should defer to interpretations of the 
law by regulatory agencies.195 As noted above, this latter idea, prom-
inent in recent cases,196 is often defended by reference to a judicial 
belief that when statutes have ambiguities or leave gaps, discretionary 
188
 See sources cited supra note 36 
189
 See, e g , Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 U S 654, 682 (1981), Haig v Agee, 453 U S 
280, 301 & n 50 (1981), Zemel v Rusk, 381 U S 1, 12 (1965) 
190
 See Weinberger v Romero-Barcelo, 456 U S 305, 319 (1982) 
191
 See Devins, supra note 184, at 481-99, cf R KATZMAN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY 
(1986) (criticizing special interest groups' role in halting the federal government's effort to ensure 
handicapped access to public transportation), Macey, supra note 159 (advocating the use of 
traditional statutory interpretation to regulate interest groups' effect on lawmaking) 
192
 See, e g , Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Inst , 448 U S 607, 
640 n 45 (1980) (plurality opinion), Kent v Dulles, 357 U S 116, 128 (1958) 
193
 To say this is not to den> that congressional specificity has risks of its own See Mashaw, 
Prodelegation Why Admimstiators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J L , ECON & ORGA-
NIZATION 81, 83 (1985) 
194
 See, eg, Jett v Dallas Indep School Dist , 109 S Ct 2702, 2724 (1989) (Scalia, J , 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
195
 See, e g , Gray v Powell, 314 U S 402, 413 (1941) 
196
 See, e g , NLRB v United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No 23, 108 S 
Ct 413, 421 (1987), Chevron U S A , Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc , 467 
U S 837, 842-43 (1984) 
1989] INTERPRETING STATUTES 
459 
judgments should be made by the relatively more accountable agency 
rather than by courts. That substantive value judgment cannot be 
traced to Congress. It is a judicial construction designed to promote 
electoral accountability and to reduce the policymaking discretion of 
judges.197 
4. Substantive Purposes — Finally, interpretive principles may 
serve substantive purposes wholly apart from statutory meaning, in-
terpretive instructions, or the lawmaking process. These functions are 
usually the most visible and the most controversial. Substantive prin-
ciples may reflect an objectionable judicial value judgment, but they 
might result instead from policies that derive from the Constitution 
or are otherwise easy to defend 
Interpretive principles are often a product of constitutional 
norms.198 The idea that when a statute might be interpreted to be 
constitutionally valid or invalid, courts should construe it so that it 
survives challenge, vindicates constitutionally grounded substantive 
values; it also reflects probable interpretive instructions and promotes 
superior lawmaking.199 A somewhat broader version of this idea 
would suggest that where statutes might be thought to raise a consti-
tutional question, they should be construed so as to steer clear of 
constitutional doubt.200 The Constitution provides the background 
against which statutory terms are read.201 
197
 See Chevron, 467 U S at 865-66, see also Monaghan, supra note 142 (discussing admin-
istrative accountability) 
198
 Some of the substantive interpretive principles may be treated as a form of "constitutional 
common law," in which courts, responding to policies having a kind of constitutional status, 
press statutes in particular directions See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 19J4 Term — 
Foreword Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV L REV I (1975) 
199
 See, e g , Kent v Dulles, 357 U S 116, 129 (1958), Crowell v Benson, 285 U S 22, 46 (1932) 
200
 See, eg, NLRB v Catholic Bishop, 440 U S 490, 507 (1979), Church of the Holy 
Trinity v United States, 143 U S 457, 461, 472 (1892) 
201
 Interpretive principles rooted in constitutional provisions help account for a large number 
of other decisions Consider, for example, the rule of lenity in criminal law, which counsels 
courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly See, e g , United States v Campos-
Serrano, 404 U S 293, 297 (1971) (requiring clear and definite language before choosing the 
harsher of alternative readings) The principle is rooted in due process notions, which require 
clear notice before the imposition of criminal liability Another example is the principle that 
congressional statutes should not lightly be taken to preempt state law See, e g , Puerto Rico 
Dep't of Consumer Affairs v Isla Petroleum Corp , 108 S Ct 1350, 1355 (1988), Ray v Atlantic 
Richfield Co , 435 U S 151, 157 (1978), see also Frankfurter, supra note 164, at 539-40 
(defending the anti preemption canon) Also rooted 111 due process is the principle that disfavors 
the retroactive application of statutes See Bowen v Georgetown Univ Hosp , 109 S Ct 468, 
47i (1988) 
The frequently invoked idea that "remedial statutes should be broadly construed," see, e g , 
3 SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176, <* 6001 , at 55-56, however, is largely 
useless All statutes are in a sense remedial, and it would be odd to suggest that all statutes 
should be broadly construed The principle is best defended as a necessary corrective to the 
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Another substantive principle, one without constitutional founda-
tions but easily defended, holds that statutes and treaties should, in 
the face of ambiguity, be construed favorably to Indian tribes.202 
There is no reason to think that this notion will tend accurately to 
describe congressional intent in particular cases It is instead a judge-
made rule responding to obvious disparities in bargaining power and 
to inequitable treatment of Native Americans by the nation in the 
past. Other substantive norms counsel courts not to infer private 
causes of action from regulatory statutes,20* to assume that legislation 
of Congress applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States,204 not to imply exemptions from taxation,205 to assume 
that criminal statutes require mens rea,206 to avoid irrationality,207 to 
counteract obsolescence,208 and to protect common law rights in the 
absence of a clear statement from Congress.209 
C An Alternative Method: 
The Agency Theory of the Judicial Role Reconsidered 
The functions played by background norms suggest an alternative 
to the conventional understandings of statutory interpretation, an al-
ternative that explains both the substantial areas of agreement and 
the nature of interpretive disputes. On this account, the statutory 
text is the starting point, but it becomes intelligible only because 
interpretive norms give it content. In most cases, the text, together 
with widely shared background norms, will be unambiguous In other 
cases, the text alone will produce doubt, but a careful consideration 
of the context, structure, purpose, and legislative history of a statute 
will lead to a single conclusion. In the remaining cases, the history 
will itself be ambiguous or will reflect the work of an unrepresentative, 
self-interested group; the "purpose" of a multimember body will be 
impossible to characterize, and other contextual considerations will be 
unhelpful. In these hard cases, faced with the familiar problems of 
ambiguity, overinclusiveness, underinclusiveness, and gaps, courts 
must resort to more conspicuous background norms. 
canon calling for narrow construction of statutes in derogation of the common law The legal 
system would be better off without either canon 
202
 See, e g , Montana v Blackfcet Tribe of Indians, 471 U S 759, 764-66 (1985), Three 
Affiliated Tribes v Wold Eng'g, 467 U S 138, 149 (1984), cf California v Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 480 U S 202 216 (1987) (invoking the federal interest in Native American 
sovereignty to preempt a contrary state law) 
203
 See sources cited supra note }8 
204
 See, e g , Folev Bros v Filardo, ^36 U S 281 (1949) 
2()S
 See, e g , United States v Wells Fargo Bank, 108 S Ct 1179 (1988) 
206 $ee ^ S U T H F R L A N D O N CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176, § 59 04 , a t 26 nn 8 & 9 
207
 See infra pp 482-83 
208
 See infra pp 49^-97 
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 See 3 SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176, *> 61 02, at 87 
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Many of these cases will involve norms that are visible but not 
controversial; others will involve the application of norms that are 
both. Such norms serve the full range of interpretive functions In 
the most controversial cases, they are intended to improve lawmaking 
or to further substantive policies. Sometimes the goals motivating 
these norms are disputable — consider the protection of federalism, 
the rule of lenity, the protection of Native Americans — and some-
times it is unclear how well the particular principle serves those goals. 
In hard cases, however, the dispute is over the background principles, 
not the dictionary meaning of the words. Although it is tempting to 
see the use of such principles as a controversial intrusion of "value 
judgments" or "policy concerns" into the process of legal interpretation, 
this view misconceives the nature of statutory construction. As we 
have seen, norms of this sort are an indispensable part of the process 
of deriving meaning from text. 
The challenge is, first, to identify norms on which participants in 
the legal culture do or might agree and, second, to generate principles 
under which conflicting norms can be reconciled Inevitably that task 
will be highly value-laden. It is impossible to select interpretive norms 
without assessing their role in improving or impairing the operation 
of statutory law.210 The choice of norms will call for judgments of 
value and policy precisely to the considerable extent that formalist 
approaches to statutory construction are incomplete or unacceptable. 
It follows that the interpretive norms will be defensible only to the 
extent that good substantive and institutional arguments can be ad-
vanced on their behalf. 
Undertaken properly, however, the task of developing interpretive 
norms will not amount to an unanchored or entirely open-ended in-
quiry into the best outcomes in particular cases Even when the 
traditional sources of interpretation leave gaps, courts should not 
resolve cases merely by deciding what result would in their view be 
best, all things considered Instead, the legal culture should be taken 
to impose a degree of constraint on the selection of the governing 
principles For example, we have seen that a broad private autonomy 
norm is unacceptable largely because of its inconsistency with the 
fabric of the modern regulatory state, the same would be true for a 
norm in favor of, say, communism or fascism Moreover, some in-
terpretive principles — for example, the idea that statutes should be 
interpreted favorably to the Indian tribes or so as not to override state 
law — are so well-established that they have the status of precedent 
Of course, the decision to follow such constraints must itself be jus-
tified on normative grounds But there are good institutional reasons 
210
 As we have seen, even the most formalist approaches must resort to such norms, but 
often at a high level of abstraction and without acknowledgment See supra pp 416-24 
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to require courts to use principles that are consistent both with the 
modern regulatory state and with existing interpretive norms — at 
least if the existing norms are not anachronistic211 and if the state and 
the norms are not themselves conspicuously irrational or unjust. 
We are left, then, with the task of generating interpretive principles 
— a task that does not amount to an open-ended search for the right 
results in particular cases, that faces some serious constraints, but 
that has a significant normative or evaluative dimension. If properly 
executed, that task will significantly increase the candor and clarity 
of interpretation, by making the relevant norms explicit and well-
ordered rather than invisible and ad hoc. The resulting system will 
also make it easier to understand the actual dynamics of the interpre-
tive process; provide a clear and structured background against which 
Congress, administrators, and courts can do their work; and increase 
the likelihood of legislative or public correction of outmoded or un-
justified norms. Finally, in hard cases, such an approach will give 
rationality and justice the benefit of the doubt, while furnishing rel-
atively concrete guidance for unpacking those concepts 
IV. INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES FOR THE REGULATORY STATE 
Background norms vary from one country to another; they also 
vary from one period to another within any particular country. In 
the United States, for example, the principles of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries reflected a belief in common law ordering 
that was largely repudiated in the logo's.212 In the Warren Court 
period, the background norms differed from those that prevailed in 
the Burger Court era and those that operate today.213 
211
 See infra p 480 (calling for judicial consideration of systemic effects to promote rationality 
in regulation), infra pp 480-81 (calling for abandonment of private law principles when they 
are inconsistent with public law goals) 
212
 See supra p 408 
213
 See generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law Statutory Interpre-
tation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV L REV 892 (1982) Consider, for example, the 
dramatically shifting reaction to implied causes of action Compare J I Case Co v Borak, 377 
U S 426 (1964) (wilhnglv creating such actions) with Touche Ross & Co v Rcdington, 442 
II S s&o (1979) (requiring affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to creak implied causes 
of action) Consider also the Court's increasing reluctance to find federal preemption of state 
law, see Note, The Preemption Doctrine Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger 
Court, 75 COLUM L REV 623 (1975), and the mcreastngl> narrow interpretation of statutes 
protecting disadvantaged groups, compare Griggs v Duke Power Co , 410 U S 424 (1971) 
(interpreting title VII to require onlv proof of disparate impact) with Wards Cove Packing Co 
v Atonio, 109 S Ct 21 is (1989) (limiting use of statistical evidence and placing the burden of 
proof on plaintiff at all times) In all of these areas, the source of the disagreement is not the 
" t e x t " — although that is frequently the articulated basis of argument — but instead a dispute 
over which interpretive norms should be applied when the traditional sources of statutory 
construction leave gaps or ambiguities 
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Despite the shift in the New Deal period, courts have continued 
to use institutional and substantive norms that are a legacy of common 
law understandings. Those norms seem to have taken on a life of 
their own; indeed they appear invisible to those who rely on them. 
Sometimes, however, these norms conflict with the values that under-
lie the modern regulatory state, or they otherwise impair governmental 
performance.214 A task for the future is to design background norms 
that are well-adapted to contemporary conceptions of the relationship 
between the citizen and the state and that are rooted in a solid 
understanding of the purposes and pathologies of regulation. 
Outside of law, and to some extent within the legal academy, it 
has become fashionable to suggest that interpretive disputes are re-
solved on the basis of agreements within a community of interpret-
ers.215 It should be clear by now that the central tasks here — 
description and prescription — require far more, especially in light of 
the fact that the community will frequently be divided. In these 
circumstances, the task is to locate the sources of interpretive princi-
ples and to identify those that deserve general respect.216 
In this Part, I attempt to carry out that task by outlining a series 
of institutional and substantive principles designed to promote consti-
tutional purposes and to improve the operation of deliberative gov-
ernment in the post-New Deal period All of the principles have at 
least some basis in current law, with some more firmly rooted than 
others. My goal, however, is not solely descriptive. All of the prin-
ciples described here have justifications deriving from the constitu-
tional backdrop, the promotion of sound institutional arrangements, 
2 . 4
 See infra pp 480-81 A similar problem arises from the use of principles that reflect a 
poor understanding of the operation of regulatory law, including above all misconceptions of 
the probabilistic character of regulatory injuries and of the complex systemic effects of regulation 
See infra p 480 
2 . 5
 See S F I S H , DOING W H A T COMES NATURALLY, supra note 18, S F I S H , Is T H E R E A 
T E X T IN THIS CLASS?, supra note 18, Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S CAL L REV 177 (1985), 
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN L REV 739, 745 (1982) The disagreement 
between Fish and Fiss — involving the degree of "constraint" imposed by rules of interpretation 
— should not disguise the substantial overlap in their positions, both advert to convention as 
the basic source of interpretation and argue that those who undertake or evaluate interpretive 
practices must be content with invoking agreed upon background principles 
216
 The development of defensible background norms, and of criteria of this sort, would 
furnish a decisive response to those who view legal texts as inevitably indeterminate or who 
refuse to engage in the process of evaluating competing conceptions of meaning See supra pp 
441-42 
"Deconstruction" within the law — which attempts to draw on the work of Dernda, see, 
eg,} DERRIDA, O F GRAMMATOLOGV (G Spivak trans 1976), but usually amounts in practice 
to quite ordinary efforts at undermining a particular line of reasoning — is inadequate in large 
part because it fails to account for interpretive norms and criteria In law and elsewhere, texts 
have relatively fixed meanings because of shared interpretive principles Even where meaning 
is contested, standards for mediating among conflicting views can be discussed and evaluated 
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and the prevention of statutory irrationality and injustice. I outline 
the relevant justifications while discussing the norms. 
In general, these principles are not designed to allow courts to 
depart from the approach prescribed by the agency conception of the 
judicial role where that approach leaves no ambiguity. In easy cases, 
the agency conception leads — with the inevitable aid of generally 
shared interpretive principles — to a clear result. The principles 
discussed in this Part are intended both as guides to statutory meaning 
and to fill gaps. Politically contestable background principles do not 
provide a license for courts to ignore the otherwise clear meaning of 
the statute. Sometimes, however, these principles will call for a more 
aggressive judicial role — requiring a clear legislative statement, for 
example, before interpreting congressional action to have violated 
constitutional norms or to have produced irrationality.217 
A. Sources and Scope of Interpretive Principles 
1. The Domain of Institutional and Substantive Norms. — Because 
this Part considers cases in which the traditional sources of meaning 
do not yield a single answer, I focus on norms that read legislative 
instructions in light of institutional or substantive concerns. Norms 
that perform the other two functions — orientation to meaning or 
capturing interpretive instructions — are not considered, except to the 
extent that norms serving institutional or substantive functions also 
serve those functions. In focusing on institutional and substantive 
norms, an initial question arises: when should they be applied? 
In easy cases, substantive and institutional norms often seem un-
necessary, and norms serving syntactic functions — mostly those so 
widely shared that they need not be identified — appear sufficient to 
resolve the case. But substantive and institutional norms are ubiq-
uitous. Consider a federal environmental statute that allegedly 
preempts all of state tort law. The reason that it does not do so is 
not syntax alone, but syntax along with, and indeed inseparable from, 
a wide range of agreed-upon substantive and institutional understand-
ings about, among other things, the limited preemptive effect of fed-
eral enactments and the appropriate role of the judiciary. 
217
 My discussion of background norms is directed in particular to courts seeking to discern 
statutory meaning Its implications do, however, extend to other institutions, including regu-
latory agencies and Congress itself In the first instance, agencies are charged with interpreting 
and enforcing their statutory mandates, and administrative practice inevitably involves inter-
pretation, with all the necessary reliance upon background norms Moreover, ideas about the 
constitutional backdrop, the institutional practice, and statutory function and failure influence 
legislative drafting Ultimately, a system of interpretive norms aims to describe the nature of 
modern social and economic regulation, and to suggest the ways in which national institutions 
might improve its performance — a goal that reaches far beyond the topic of statutory inter-
pretation 
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For these reasons, no cases can be resolved without reference to 
norms having substantive and institutional functions. But sometimes 
syntax or interpretive instructions, accompanied by other norms on 
which there is a wide consensus, are so clear that it would be wrong 
or unnecessary to introduce controversial substantive or institutional 
norms. This is a more precise formulation of the usually correct claim 
that substantive norms should not be permitted to override "the text." 
Young v. Community Nutrition Institute219, provides an instructive 
example. Congress has instructed the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) that when dangerous substances are required in the preparation 
of food, "the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quan-
tity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the 
protection of public health, and any quantity exceeding the limits so 
fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe."219 In Young, the FDA was 
asked to regulate the quantity of aflatoxin, a carcinogenic substance. 
Because "to such extent as he finds necessary" follows "thereon" rather 
than "regulations," the syntax of the provision suggests that when 
dangerous substances are required in the production of food, the 
Secretary must promulgate regulations setting a tolerance level. Under 
this reading, the words "to such extent as he finds necessary" allow 
the Secretary discretion to decide on the tolerance level but do not 
confer on him discretion not to promulgate regulations at all.220 Al-
though perhaps not compelled by the text, this reading is strongly 
supported by the fact that an interpretation conferring on the Secretary 
discretion not to issue regulations would make the entire provision 
unnecessary. The discretion to promulgate or not already belonged to 
him. 
The Supreme Court, however, invoked the principle of deference 
to agency interpretations of law in order to uphold the FDA's view 
that the statute allows the Secretary not to promulgate regulations 221 
This decision may be taken as an example of a case wrongly invoking 
a contestable institutional norm — deference to agency interpretations 
— in a context in which syntax and structure alone, accompanied by 
agreed-upon background norms, led to a single answer 
In other settings, however, norms that go to syntax or to interpre-
tive instructions, even accompanied by generally held institutional and 
substantive understandings, will lead to uncertainty, to irrationality, 
or to an intrusion on constitutionally grounded arrangements. Con-
spicuous or contestable norms should be invoked only in narrowly 
defined settings: to "break ties"; to require a clear statement before 
2 , 8
 476 U S 974 (1986) 
219
 21 U S C *} 346 (198-2) (emphasis added) 
220
 See Young, 476 U S at 984-88 (Stevens, J , dissenting) 
221
 See Young, 476 U S at 980 (following Chevron U S A , Inc v Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc , 467 U S 8i? f m ^ n 
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reaching an outcome that would be absurd or would intrude upon 
constitutionally grounded arrangements; to fill a gap or respond to a 
delegation of lawmaking power; or to help decide what to do in the 
face of changed circumstances or the apparently irrational results of 
literalism.222 
2. Sources: In General. — Institutional and substantive norms are 
of course value-laden, and the choice among them is a subject of 
disagreement. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify sources of values, 
and values themselves, that are or deserve to be widely shared. The 
first and most straightforward source is the Constitution Understand-
ings about constitutional arrangements provide a significant amount 
of the background against which statutory construction occurs. To 
be sure, constitutional meaning is frequently uncertain, and statutory 
disputes are sometimes, in part, a function of a broader dispute about 
the best way to characterize the constitutional backdrop. Often, how-
ever, there is sufficient consensus about the meaning of the Consti-
tution to ground a large part of interpretation. When no such con-
sensus exists, the position one takes will be a function of a more 
narrowly held account of what the Constitution requires. Whether 
the position is persuasive depends on the reasons that can be mar-
shaled on behalf of that account. 
The second source of interpretive norms — also straightforward 
— consists of understandings about how statutory interpretation will 
improve or impair the performance of governmental institutions. 
Some such understandings are a firmly rooted and probably unavoid-
able part of interpretation. One might, for example, conclude that 
legislative history, produced by private groups and never enacted, is 
entitled to little weight; or that appropriations statutes, written hastily 
and without deliberation, should be narrowly construed. If one were 
simply describing statutory construction as it is currently practiced, 
one would find a number of background norms traceable to under-
standings of precisely this sort. 
The third and final source of background norms is more complex; 
it emerges from the intended functions of regulatory statutes and the 
ways in which such statutes fail in practice. An understanding of 
statutory function and failure — curiously neglected topics — is in-
dispensable not only to an appreciation of modern law, but also to an 
understanding of statutory construction In hard cases, the familiar 
notion that statutes should be construed so as not to produce absurd 
222
 See Public Citizen v United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S Ct 2558, 2573-74 (1989) 
(refusing to attribute to Congress the intent to dictate absurd results), Green v Bock Laundry 
Mach Co , 109 S Ct 1981, 1984 (1989) (same) See generally T M C L E O D , supra note 124, 
1M 1-14 to -17 (describing the idea that statutes should be construed to avoid absurdity as "the 
Golden Rule") 
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or irrational results is too abstract to be helpful; one needs a partic-
ularized understanding of regulatory statutes. A detailed discussion 
of these points would be well beyond the scope of this Article,223 but 
a brief outline will be useful. 
The goals of statutory regimes span a wide range. Some statutes 
are designed to promote economic efficiency, others to redistribute 
resources in public-regarding ways, to protect future generations from 
irreversible losses, to reflect nonmarket values or aspirations, to coun-
teract the social subordination of disadvantaged groups, or to enforce 
the terms of pure interest-group deals. Moreover, statutes fail for a 
number of different reasons.224 Some are flawed in conception as a 
result of interest-group power, collective action problems,225 the ab-
sence of political accountability or political deliberation, changed cir-
cumstances or obsolescence, or lack of coordination with other stat-
utes. Other statutes fail because of implementation problems. For 
example, a regulation may be based on a poor understanding of the 
way that the market can nullify its intended effects.226 Legislation 
apparently intended to protect consumers, workers, or tenants may 
have undesirable and unintended consequences.227 Finally, statutes 
designed to reduce or eliminate the social subordination of disadvan-
taged groups, or to promote public values like environmental quality 
and the protection of endangered species, frequently encounter in the 
implementation process the same obstacles — collective action prob-
223
 For a more complete discussion, see C SUNSTEIN, cited above in note *, chs 1-3 
224
 If it were possible, it would be extremely valuable to establish a tight connection between 
identifiable statutory functions and particular forms of statutory failure Any such enterprise 
faces serious obstacles The empirical work on the consequences of social and economic regu-
lation remains primitive For a review, see C SUNSTEIN, cited above in note *, ch 3 For 
helpful work in this area, see SENATE COMM ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS , 96TH CONG , 2D 
SESS , B E N E F I T S OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION (Comm Print 
1980), R CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (1983), R CRANDALL, H GRUEN-
SPECHT, I K E E L E R & L LAVE, R E G U I A T I N G THE AUTOMOBILE (1986), K M E I E R , REGULA-
TION POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND ECONOMICS (1985), J M E N D E L O F F , T H E DILEMMA OF 
TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION (1988), W ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POL-
ICY (1985), D VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION (1986), and Graham & Vaupel, Value 
of a Life What Difference Does It Make?, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 89 (1981) In any case, an 
assessment of those consequences cannot depend on empirical work alone, it must also rest on 
some ideas, normative in character, about what a well functioning regulatory system would look 
like 
225
 See supra note 148 
226
 Thus, for example, the minimum wage has increased unemployment See F W E L C H , 
M I N I M U M WAGES ISSUES AND EVIDENCE (1978) 
227
 Rent control legislation and implied warranties of habitabilit> have not merely protected 
tenants, but have also decreased the supply of housing and had at least some harmful effects 
on poor people See, e g , Hirsch, Hirsch & Margohs, Regression Analysis of the Effects of 
Habitability Laws upon Rent, 63 C A L I F L REV 1098, 1130-31 (1975) (discussing warranties 
of habitability) 
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lems, the unrepresented character of future generations, and other 
disparities in political influence — that make such statutes necessary 
in the first place.228 Government failure mimics market failure. 
Although conclusions of this sort are principally of interest to 
officials in the legislative and executive branches, they are relevant to 
the judiciary as well. Judicial conceptions of the likely function and 
potential failure of regulatory statutes inevitably shape legal interpre-
tation. Moreover, such understandings will likely improve interpre-
tation, for a sensitivity to regulatory failure can aid courts in pro-
moting legislative goals in the face of textual ambiguities. Recognizing 
that conflicts among the principles will exist in some settings, I discuss 
rules of priority and harmonization below 
B. The Principles 
1. Constitutional Norms — Many constitutional norms deserve a 
prominent place in statutory interpretation. Some of them have been 
mentioned in Part III. The central point is that the Constitution 
provides the backdrop against which statutes are written and inter-
preted, and it furnishes the basic assumptions of interpretation. 
Federal courts underenforce many constitutional norms, and for 
good reasons. Institutional constraints — most notably, limited fact-
finding capability and attenuated electoral accountability — make 
courts reluctant to vindicate constitutional principles with the vigor 
appropriate to governmental bodies with a better democratic and 
policymaking pedigree. As a result, there is a gap between what the 
Constitution actually requires and what constitutional courts are will-
ing to require the political branches of government to do. In this 
context, courts should recognize that some statutes respond to Con-
gress' constitutional responsibilities even if courts would not, for in-
stitutional reasons, require Congress to carry out those responsibilities 
in the first instance Relatively aggressive statutory construction — 
pushing statutes away from constitutionally troublesome ground — 
provides a way for courts to vindicate constitutionally based norms 
and does so in a way that is less intrusive than constitutional adju-
dication.229 
(a) Avoiding Constitutional Invalidity and Constitutional Doubts. 
— The principle that statutes should be construed so as to survive 
2 2 8
 See, e g , K B U M I L L E R , T H E CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY (1988) (discussing barriers to 
enforcement of civil rights laws), Wood, Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?, 34 
AM J POL SCI (forthcoming 1990) (arguing that politics does make a difference in the 
enforcement of civil rights) 
229
 Cf Sager, supra note 15s (arguing that Congress and state courts should be allowed to 
enforce constitutional norms to their fullest extent) One might accept this general point while 
acknowledging the highl> contro\crsial nature of particular views about which constitutional 
norms are underenforced 
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constitutional challenge serves a number of functions: it is a natural 
outgrowth of the system of separation of powers; it minimizes inter-
branch conflict; it responds to Congress' probable preference for val-
idation over invalidation ("implicit interpretive instructions"); and it 
strengthens judicially underenforced constitutional norms The mild 
statutory "bending" that sometimes occurs is legitimate, for courts are 
not mere agents of the enacting legislature but have an obligation to 
the citizenry and the legal system as a whole. 
This basic idea supports the broader principle, reflected in many 
cases, that courts should construe statutes to avoid not only consti-
tutional invalidity but also constitutional doubts.230 This latter prin-
ciple calls for a far more aggressive judicial posture in statutory 
construction, one that allows judicial "bending" of a greater range of 
statutes. Judge Posner criticizes this principle on the ground that it 
furnishes a kind of "judge-made 'penumbra'" around the Constitu-
tion,231 by allowing courts to press statutes in particular directions 
even though they would ultimately be found not to offend the Con-
stitution. 
Judge Posner's objection becomes less forceful, however, in light 
of the fact that constitutional norms are often underenforced. As we 
have seen, there is a difference between what the Constitution requires 
and what the Supreme Court, interpreting the Constitution, is willing 
to compel. The aggressive construction of questionable but not invalid 
statutes — removing them from the terrain of constitutional uncer-
tainty — is a less intrusive way of vindicating norms that do in fact 
have constitutional status 
(b) Federalism — In the system of American public law, the basic 
assumption is that states have authority to regulate their own citizens 
and territory This assumption justifies an interpretive principle re-
quiring a clear statement before judges will find federal preemption 
of state law 232 Although no substitute for an inquiry into the rela-
tionship between state and federal law in the particular context, this 
principle will frequently aid interpretation in disputed cases 
(c) Political Accountability; Checks and Balances; the Nondele-
gation Principle. — Some interpretive norms represent constitutionally 
inspired efforts to promote a sound allocation of institutional respon-
sibility Courts hesitate to interpret statutes as intruding on the Pres-
ident's power in foreign affairs,233 or as interfering with judicial power 
to "balance the equities" in cases involving possible injunctive relief.234 
230
 See, e g , NLRB v Catholic Bishop, 440 U S 490 (1979) 
231
 See R POSNER, supra note 10, at 285 
232
 See, e g , Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v Isla Petroleum Corp , 108 S Ct 
1350, 1355 (1988), Ray v Atlantic Richfield Co , 435 U S 151, 157 (1978) 
233
 See cases cited supra note 189 
234
 See Weinberger v Romero-Barcelo, 456 U S 305, 319 (1982) This idea, however, is 
vulnerable in the post-New Deal era See infra pp 480-81 
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Other interpretive strategies can be similarly understood. For ex-
ample, courts have, since the New Deal, permitted Congress to del-
egate exceptionally broad policymaking authority to regulatory agen-
cies. Such broad delegations were at one time thought to offend article 
I of the Constitution, which vests legislative power in Congress.235 
In recent years, courts have been reluctant to enforce the nondelega-
tion doctrine. This reluctance is partly attributable to the difficulty 
of developing standards for distinguishing between prohibited and 
permissible delegations, partly a product of the intrusiveness of any 
such judicial role, and partly a result of the frequent existence of good 
reasons for the delegation of discretionary power to regulatory agen-
cies.236 Through statutory construction, however, courts are some-
times able to vindicate the constitutional principle against delegation 
of legislative authority. They can do so, for example, by narrowly 
construing grants of policymaking power.237 
Various doctrines dealing with the degree of judicial deference to 
agency interpretations promote principles of nondelegation, account-
ability, and checks and balances. For example, the controversial 
proposition that courts should interpret congressional enactments on 
their own, without deferring to agency constructions, is intended to 
avoid the delegation problem that would arise if administrators could 
interpret the scope of their own authority. It is bad enough for 
administrators to have broad lawmaking power; the problem is ag-
gravated if administrators can judge the scope of whatever constraints 
Congress has imposed on them. As we have seen, courts should not 
permit foxes to guard henhouses.238 The exceptionally important idea 
that a delegation of power to an administrator implicitly permits 
presidential supervision and control similarly tries to promote political 
accountability.239 This idea promotes the constitutionally grounded 
2
^
s
 See, e g , A L A Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 U S 495, 529-42 0935). 
Panama Refining Co v Ryan, 293 U S 388, 421 0935) 
2 , 6
 See Mistretta v United States, 109 S Ct 647, 654-58 (1989) See generally Stewart, 
supra note 144, at 1693-97 (criticizing attempts to revive the nondelegation doctrine) 
237
 Cf Hampton v Mow Sun Wong, 426 U S 88 (1976) (holding as a matter of constitutional 
law that aliens could onl> be prevented from serving as federal employees by a decision of the 
President or the Congress but not the Civil Service Commission) In other cases, the Court has 
suggested that the Constitution permits certain disabilities to be imposed on groups only when 
an accountable actor has so decided The most celebrated example is Kent v Dulles, 357 U S 
116 (1958), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the Secretary of State may not deny a 
passport to a member of the Communist Party unless Congress clearly authorized him to do so 
Decisions of this sort impose a "clear statement" principle to the effect that important decisions 
are to be made by accountable actors and that only a clear statement to the contrary will rebut 
this presumption 
238
 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv v Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U S 421, 445~48 
(1987), see also Farina, supra note 146, at 502-11 (discussing how Congress and the President 
control agency discretion, and criticizing Chevron) 
2i9
 See, eg , Myers v United States, 272 U S 52, 63 (1926), Sierra Club v Costle, 657 
F 2d 298, 407 (D C Cir 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U S 680 (1983) 
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goals of a unitary executive branch: centralization, expedition, and 
accountability in law enforcement.240 
(d) The Rule of Law. — In interpreting statutes, courts employ a 
clear-statement principle in favor of the "rule of law": a system in 
which legal rules exist, are clear rather than vague, do not apply 
retroactively, operate in the world as they do in the books, and do 
not contradict each other.241 The due process clause provides a con-
stitutional basis for the rule of law ideal.242 The most celebrated 
aspect of this general idea is the rule of lenity, which leads courts to 
resolve ambiguities favorably to the criminal defendant.243 Courts 
also interpret statutes to minimize administrative discretion, to apply 
prospectively, and to require or permit rules. "[T]he law in general 
. . . does not interpret a grant of discretion to eliminate all 'categorical 
rules."'244 
(e) Political Deliberation; the Constitutional Antipathy to Naked 
Interest-Group Transfers. — Designed to ensure a kind of deliberative 
democracy, the constitutional system is hostile to measures that impose 
burdens or grant benefits merely because of the political power of 
private groups 24S Governmental actions require some public value.246 
This norm, firmly rooted in current law, has a number of implications 
for statutory interpretation. It suggests, for example, that courts 
should develop interpretive strategies that promote deliberation in 
government — by, for example, remanding issues involving constitu-
tionally sensitive interests or groups for reconsideration by the legis-
lature or by regulatory agencies when deliberation appears to have 
been absent. It also suggests that courts should narrowly construe 
statutes that embody mere interest-group deals.247 This principle does 
not authorize elaborate judicial review of legislative and administra-
tive processes, but it does require a clear statement before courts will 
construe statutes as amounting to naked wealth transfers or as in-
truding into constitutionally sensitive areas. 
240
 See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 
38 A D M I N L REV 181, 189-90(1986) 
241
 For a discussion of these values and how they fail, see L FULLER, T H E MORALITY OF 
LAW (rev ed 1969) 
242
 See, e g , Papachnstou v City of Jacksonville, 405 U S 156 (1972) 
24J
 See, e g , United States v Nofziger, 878 F 2d 442, 452 ( D C Cir 1989) 
244
 Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v Zipes, 109 S Ct 2732, 2746 (1989) (emphasis 
in original) (applying "traditional" balancing as a background rule) 
2 4 5
 See D E P S T E I N , T H E POLITICAL THEORY OF T H F FEDERALIST (1984), M MEYERS, 
Reflection and Choice Beyond the Sum of the Differences, an Introduction, in T H E M I N D OF 
THE FOUNDER SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON at xi (rev ed 1981), 
Bessette, Deliberative Democracy The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in How 
DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102 (R Goldwin & W Schambra eds 1980) 
246
 See supra note 154 
247
 On narrow construction, see pp 486-87 below Much of American administrative law 
is founded on these ideas See Sunstein, supra note 155, at 59-64 
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(f) Hearing Rights — One of the most important functions of the 
Constitution is to provide procedural safeguards by affording rights 
to a hearing and to judicial review in cases involving important 
interests 248 The precise extent of these safeguards is sharply disputed. 
It is unclear, for example, whether Congress has the constitutional 
power to eliminate hearing rights for those seeking regulatory benefits, 
or to provide that federal courts may not review certain claims 249 
In this area, courts often interpret statutes in the shadow of con-
stitutional hearing rights For this reason, courts narrowly interpret 
statutory provisions purporting to eliminate rights to a hearing and to 
judicial review.250 The ordinary presumption is that such rights are 
available, and that the constitutional issue therefore need not be re-
solved 
(g) Disadvantaged Groups. — Some of the most difficult questions 
in contemporary constitutional law involve the degree of protection 
afforded to disadvantaged groups by the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment. In many of the cases, courts have afforded 
less protection than they otherwise might have because of a desire to 
minimize interferences with the democratic branches of government. 
For example, in one of its most important and controversial de-
cisions since World War II, the Supreme Court held that to establish 
a violation of the equal protection clause, blacks, women, and others 
must show "discriminatory intent" on the part of the enacting legis-
lature 2S1 This requirement has furnished a significant barrier to con-
stitutional complainants 252 It is best understood at least partly as an 
outgrowth of institutional concerns. If courts held that a dispropor-
tionate effect sufficed to raise constitutional doubts, a wide variety of 
governmental policies would be seriously questioned — an extremely 
intrusive outcome that might be inappropriate in light of the properly 
limited role of the judiciary in American government 
Courts have also invoked institutional considerations to justify an 
interpretation of the Constitution that affords little protection to cer-
tain groups, including most notably the handicapped and gays and 
2
*
8
 See, e g , Goldberg v Kellv, ^97 U S 254 (1970) (affording hearing rights), Fallon, Of 
I egislativt Courts, Administrative Agenius, and Artnle III, 101 HARV L RLV 915, 974-89 
(19HH) (discussing when judicial review is necessary), Hart, liu Poivir oj Congress lo Limit the 
Jurisdiction of htdtral Coiats in Extrcise in Dialectic, 66 HAKV L RLV 11,62, 1^72 (1953) 
(suggesting that the due process clause generally requires judicial review) 
24<>
 See Fallon, supta note 2 ^8, at 974-91 
t^Sa, eg , Webster v Doc 108 S Ct 2047, 20<n (1988), Johnson v Robison, 415 U S 
<6i, 367 (1974) 
2SI
 Set Washington v Davis, 426 U S 229 (1976) 
2S
' See, eg, Personnel Aclm'r v Jreeney, 442 U S 256 (1979) See generally Strauss, 
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 54 U C m L REV 9^S , 1000-03 (1989) 
(criticizing beeney) 
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lesbians.2S3 In this light, statutes that provide protection for these 
groups, or against discriminatory effects, might well represent the 
legislature's response to its judicially underenforced constitutional re-
sponsibilities. Through statutory construction, courts can ensure that 
the relevant norms are vindicated. Aggressive construction of ambig-
uous statutes designed to protect disadvantaged groups provides a 
way for courts to protect the constitutional norm of equal protection 
in a less intrusive manner.254 
(h) Property and Contract Rights. — In the aftermath of the New 
Deal reformation, courts have been reluctant to use the Constitution's 
explicit protection of property and contracts in a way that would 
seriously interfere with social and economic regulation.255 To a large 
degree, the reluctance is a product of the Court's substantive belief 
that redistributive goals fall within the state's police power under these 
clauses — a large shift from the understanding of the founding gen-
eration. Part of the Court's reluctance, however, derives from its 
belief that in the post-New Deal period, regulatory interferences with 
private contract and private property have considerable democratic 
support, and the judiciary ought to intervene only in egregious cases. 
Whether or not the Court's unwillingness to provide more protec-
tion to rights of contract and property is justified,256 courts can vin-
dicate those rights less intrusively by narrowly construing regulatory 
statutes that raise serious constitutional doubts under the contracts 
and takings clauses. 
(i) Welfare Rights — In the 1960's and 1970's, a number of 
commentators urged the Supreme Court to give constitutional protec-
tion to the right to minimum levels of subsistence 257 These claims 
253
 See Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U S 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia sodomy statute over 
objections based on the right of privacy), City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc , 473 
U S 432, 439-47 (1985) (holding that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification, 
but that requiring a special-use permit for group homes for the mentally retarded nevertheless 
violated the equal protection clause) 
254
 The much-maligned decision in Griggs v Duke Power Co , 401 U S 424 (1971), raises 
related issues Under Griggs, a showing of disparate impact shifts to the defendant the burden 
of demonstrating business necessity See id at 432 In light of the fact that proof of "discrim-
inatory purpose" is exceptional^ difficult even when purpose exists, the Griggs framework seems 
appropriately to further the congressional command See Strauss, supra note 252, at 1012-14, 
see also infra pp 484-85 (discussing Griggs in light of other substantive norms) 
255
 See, e g , Hawaii Hous Auth v Midkiff, 467 U S 229 (1984) (finding no violation of 
the public use requirement), Energ> Reserves Group, Inc v Kansas Power & Light Co , 459 
U S 400 (1983) (contracts clause), Penn Cent Transp Co v New York City, 438 U S 104 
(1978) (takings clause), Home Bldg & Loan Ass'n v Blaisdell, 290 U S 398 (1934) (contracts 
clause) 
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 For an emphatic negative answer, see R EPSTEIN, TAKINGS PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE POWER OF E M I N E N T DOMAIN (1985) 
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 For the most prominent defense of welfare rights, see Michelman, The Supreme Court, 
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have plausible if not firm substantive roots in some of the most 
prominent theories of judicial review258 and in the New Deal refor-
mation of the constitutional structure.259 There are, however, for-
midable institutional objections to such a judicial role,260 which would 
involve careful monitoring of a massive national bureaucracy. For 
the Supreme Court to undertake to protect welfare rights entirely on 
its own would raise serious questions of democratic legitimacy and 
remedial competence. Perhaps a Court that saw substantive force in 
the claim for constitutional welfare rights would attempt to vindicate 
that claim, not through the Constitution itself, but through aggressive 
statutory construction to ensure against irrational or arbitrary depri-
vations of benefits. Such an approach would tend to produce even-
handedness in the distribution of funds to the poor in a democracy 
that has committed itself to a "social safety net " Statutory construc-
tion, requiring a clear statement before allowing selective exclusions, 
might produce many of the advantages of recognition of welfare rights 
without imposing nearly so severe a strain on the judiciary. 
2. Institutional Concerns. — A number of interpretive principles 
respond directly to institutional concerns and are designed to improve 
the performance of governmental entities. Most of these principles 
are straightforward and can be discussed quite briefly. 
(a) Appropriations Statutes. — Courts construe appropriations pro-
visions quite narrowly in light of judicial understandings about the 
character of the appropriations process, in which careful legislative 
deliberation is highly unlikely.261 Interest-group power is particularly 
likely to influence results in this context. 
(b) A Cautious Approach to Legislative History — As Justice 
Scalia has emphasized,262 legislative history is sometimes written by 
one side or another in a dispute over the content of the law, and the 
history will sometimes reflect a view that could not prevail in the 
processes of congressional deliberation.263 In any case, the history is 
not law. Courts should therefore adopt a firm principle of the priority 
1968 Term — Foreword On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV 
L REV 7 (1969), Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 W A S H 
U L Q 659 (hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights] 
258
 See Michelman, Wtljare Rights, supra note 257, at 684 (arguing that Dean Ely's theory 
of judicial review based on representation reinforcement makes a case for minimum welfare 
rights) 
259
 See Ackerman, Constitutional PohticslConstitutional Law, 99 YALE L J (forthcoming 
1990) (discussing the transformation of American law brought about by the New Deal's recog-
nition of affirmative duties on the part of national government) 
260
 See, e g , Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 
SUP C T REV 41 (challenging the proposed constitutional right to various goods) 
261
 See supra pp 456-57 
262
 See supra note 85 and accompanying text 
263
 See, e g , B ACKERMAN & W HASSLER, supra note 23, at 44~54 
1989] INTERPRETING STATUTES 475 
of statutory text to statutory history — a principle that does not call 
on courts entirely to disregard the history, but that gives the history 
limited weight in cases of conflict. 
(c) The Presumption Against Implied Repeals. — Courts do not 
lightly assume that one statute has implicitly repealed another.264 This 
principle is a product of a set of beliefs about the legislative process 
— in particular, a belief that Congress, focused as it usually is on a 
particular problem, should not be understood to have eliminated with-
out specific consideration another program that was likely the product 
of sustained attention. 
(d) Implied Exemptions from Taxation. — Courts do not infer 
exemptions from taxation.265 This principle derives partly from a 
desire to protect the Treasury; it also responds to the perception that 
Congress is highly attentive to tax matters; and it rests partly on a 
view that selective exemptions from taxation might represent a de-
parture from ordinary principles of equality and should therefore be 
disfavored. 
(e) The Question of Administrative Discretion — Courts defer to 
agency understandings of policy and fact in cases in which discretion 
has lawfully been conferred.266 This idea is based on a recognition 
of the superior democratic accountability and fact-finding capacity of 
the agency and the corresponding belief that courts ought to treat 
agency decisions with a fair degree of respect. Similarly, the rare 
judicial decisions finding agency action not subject to judicial review 
are based on perceptions that judicial intervention would likely be 
counterproductive in the circumstances.267 
if) The Presumption in Favor of Judicial Review. — By contrast, 
courts presume that the legislature has not precluded judicial review 
of agency decisions. This presumption is partly attributable to a belief 
— vindicated by recent experience268 — that regulatory agencies are 
susceptible to factionalism and self-interested representation. Judicial 
review operates as both an ex ante deterrent against dangers of this 
sort and an ex post corrective. If Congress is to eliminate judicial 
review, it must do so unambiguously. 
There is a tension between the goal of limiting administrative 
discretion and the desire to ensure that courts defer to the agency's 
264
 See 1A SUTHERLAND ON CONSTRUCTION, supra note 176, § 23 10, at 346 
265
 See, e g , United States v Wells Fargo Bank, 108 S Ct 1179, 1183 (1988) 
266
 See, e g , Baltimore Gas & Elec Co v National Resources Defense Council, Inc , 462 
U S 87, 97 (1983) 
267
 See Heckler v Chaney, 470 U S 821, 831 (1985), Hahn v Gottlieb, 430 F 2d 1243, 
1249-51 (1st Cir 1970) 
268
 See, e g , B ACKERMAN & W HASSLER, supra note 23, at 79-103, K SCHLOZMAN & 
J T I E R N E Y , ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 63-87 (1986), Stewart, supra 
note 144, at 1795-96 
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specialized fact-finding and policymaking competence. The best rec-
onciliation of these competing concerns would call for a principle 
requiring a clear legislative displacement of judicial review; for judi-
cial deference to agency decisions on facts, policy, and "mixed" ques-
tions having legal components; and for independent judicial review of 
pure questions of law except where Congress has delegated interpre-
tive power to the agency. 
(g) Ratification, Acquiescence, Stare Decisis, and Post-Enactment 
History. — Although Congress' post-enactment views do not have the 
authority of law, stare decisis and post-enactment history should play 
a limited role in interpretation.269 Post-enactment history deserves 
the least deference. Like other legislative history, it can provide a 
sense of context, but it has the normal difficulties of unenacted views; 
indeed, it is even worse than pre-enactment history in the sense that 
it is uninformative about the desires of the enacting Congress. On 
the other hand, evidence that part or all of Congress has endorsed a 
judicial construction or interpreted a statute in a particular way is 
important in furthering the goals of rationality, consistency, and co-
ordination in interpretation. Stare decisis principles have traditionally 
served the same function of ensuring rationality and consistency, even 
though the previous decision may not have accurately understood the 
original meaning of the statute.270 
j . Counteracting Statutory Failure. — I have suggested that a 
number of interpretive principles in current law are intended to coun-
teract failures in social and economic regulation.271 The general idea 
that statutory construction should combat characteristic pathologies in 
regulatory legislation is well-grounded in existing doctrine. In this 
section, I outline and defend a series of interpretive norms designed 
to promote this goal. Some of the particular norms have solid roots 
in current case law; others are implicit; still others find at best am-
biguous support and are proposed here for the first time. I indicate 
the relationship between the suggested norms and current law in the 
particular discussions. 
Courts should, I argue, try to avoid characteristic failures in reg-
ulation — caused, for example, by a failure to understand the systemic 
effects of regulation or to coordinate statutes regulating the same area. 
Courts should also be aware of the risks of overenforcement and 
underenforcement and therefore permit de minimis exceptions, assume 
proportionality in regulation, and generously construe statutes de-
269
 See, e.g., Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 21, at 1042-44. See generally Eskridge, 
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 M I C H . L. REV. 67, 90-108 (1988). 
270
 See Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989); R. DWORKIN, 
supra note 19, at 348-50; Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 269, at 108-
22. 
271
 See supra pp. 457-59-
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signed to protect traditionally disadvantaged groups and nonmarket 
values. 
Some of these ideas, depending for their support on views about 
regulatory failure, are of course products of contestable substantive 
claims. Notwithstanding their number and variety, moreover, the 
principles are united by certain general goals, which include, above 
all, the effort to promote accountability and deliberation in govern-
ment, to furnish surrogates when both are absent, to limit factionalism 
and self-interested representation, and to further political equality. 
All of the principles respond to an understanding of the various rea-
sons for statutes and of the various ways that statutes fail. 
(a) Promoting Political Accountability. — Courts should construe 
statutes so that those who are politically accountable and highly visible 
will make regulatory decisions. This norm finds its justification in 
constitutional and institutional considerations deriving from the basic 
premise of electoral accountability and also in a perception that reg-
ulatory failure is sometimes a product of factional power.272 As we 
have seen, a number of cases growing out of constitutional concerns 
recognize this basic principle.273 Reflecting judicial reluctance to allow 
agencies to exercise discretionary power that has not been clearly 
delegated, these cases often require accountable actors to make deci-
sions involving important rights and politically weak groups. Such 
decisions can also be understood as an effort to counteract regulatory 
failure that occurs from a lack of accountability. 
Other doctrines also draw from the goal of promoting political 
accountability. The principle that courts should defer to administra-
tive interpretations of statutes is an example.274 Indeed, in the most 
important recent case invoking that principle, the Supreme Court 
referred expressly to the greater accountability of the President in 
comparison to the judiciary.275 Because the President, unlike a judge, 
is elected, interpretation of statutes raising controversial questions of 
public policy should be made by the executive branch, at least where 
the legislature has granted the executive the power to construe am-
biguous statutes. As lawmaker, however, Congress is in a superior 
position to the President or the regulatory agency. In order to ensure 
compliance with legislative instructions, courts, not potentially self-
interested regulators, should resolve statutory ambiguities involving 
pure questions of law.276 But the principle of leaving decisions to 
electorally accountable officials is sound insofar as it recognizes that 
272
 See supra pp. 467-68. 
273
 See sources cited supra notes 234-40. 
274
 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 865-66 (1984). 
275
 See id. 
276
 See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 444-S2. 
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Congress may and often does delegate to regulatory agencies and the 
President the power to fill in statutory gaps.277 
(b) Taking Account of Collective Action Problems 27s — Regulatory 
statutes are sometimes subverted in the implementation process, often 
as a result of the diffuse character of the class of regulatory beneficia-
ries.279 In one common scenario, the beneficiaries of regulatory pro-
grams, though numerous and ordinarily disorganized, are able to 
mobilize to obtain protective legislation As the statute is imple-
mented, however, the group tends to dissipate, and well-organized 
members of the regulated class are able to exert continuing pressure 
on the agency. The regulatory program is skewed against effective 
implementation 28° Congress' words become purely symbolic, and 
inadequate implementation prevents the statute from accomplishing 
legislative goals. Judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutes that 
takes account of this phenomenon will promote fidelity to these goals. 
Many decisions appear to have reacted to the possibility that col-
lective action problems will undermine regulatory programs. The 
most conspicuous examples are decisions aggressively construing reg-
ulatory statutes in order to protect the environment.281 The context 
presents a classic setting for regulatory "failure" resulting from collec-
tive action problems (not to mention unrepresented future generations, 
which cannot wield political power) Other illustrations include ju-
dicial decisions taking a careful look at administrative decisions that 
jeopardize the interests of regulatory beneficiaries.282 These decisions 
also respond to a perception that poorly organized beneficiaries are at 
risk during implementation, and that as a result, legislative goals will 
not be carried out in the real world 
Cases responding to overzealous regulation may be motivated by 
a similar concern 283 In this context, a collective action problem or 
structural infirmity may incline the agency toward excessive intrusion 
277
 See Monaghan, supra note 142, at 25-28 
278
 See supra note 148 
279
 See Wilson, The Pohttcs of Regulation, in T H E POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 369-72 
(J Wilson ed 1980) 
280 This phenomenon has at times impaired national environmental policy in the United 
States See, e g , R M E L N I C K , supra note 65, at 195-238, D VOGEL, supra note 224, at 146-
52 
281
 See cases cited infra note 334 
282
 See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard Look Doi trine, 198 ^  Sur C T RFV 177, 189-
97 (discussing Motor Vehicles Mlrs Ass'n v State l'.irm Mut Ins Co , 463 U S 29 (1983)), 
see also Eskridge, Politics Without Romance Implications oj Publu Choice Iheory for Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 VA L REV 275, 330-34 (1988) (challenging the Court's conclusion because 
of a collective action problem in Block v Community Nutrition Inst , 467 U S 340 (1984)) 
283
 See, e g , Industrial Union Dep't, AFL CIO v American Petroleum Inst , 448 U S 607, 
639-52 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
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into the marketplace. Cases involving OSHA regulation284 and bank-
ing controls285 provide examples. 
(c) Promoting Consistency and Coherence Among Regulatory Pro-
grams. — The post-New Deal proliferation of regulatory programs 
has sometimes led to inconsistency and incoherence in the law For 
example, the standards for regulating carcinogens are notoriously var-
iable; they call for excessive controls in some areas and unduly weak 
regulation in others.286 Some carcinogens are thus regulated at a cost 
of $40 million per life saved, whereas others cost $400,000 or less.287 
The absence of centralization has led to regulatory failures — in the 
form of incoherent and even chaotic regulation — in numerous 
areas.288 
As a partial solution, courts should require a clear statement by 
Congress before allowing a statute to create significant inconsistency 
in the law. A judicial role of this sort has clear precedent in contem-
porary administrative law and in the old canon that statutes governing 
the same subject matter should be construed together 289 In light of 
the potentially chaotic pattern of social and economic regulation, ju-
dicial decisions limiting agency authority to impose huge costs for 
uncertain or speculative gains might be seen as part of an integration 
of statutory systems into a coherent whole.290 Similar considerations 
284
 See id , Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v EPA, 824 F 2d 1146, 1152-54 (D C 
Cir 1987) (en banc), Asbestos Information Ass'n v Occupational Safety & Health Admin ,727 
F 2d 415, 424-27 (5th Cir 1984), Aqua Slide 'n' Dive Corp v Consumer Prod Safety Comm'n, 
569 F 2d 831, 839-43 (5th Cir 1978) 
285
 See Langevoort, supra note 80, at 729-33 (concluding that when changing financial 
markets undermined the premises of the McFadden and Glass Steagall Acts courts began to 
construe regulations to accommodate this change) 
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REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE U N I T E D STATES GOVERNMENT 274-75 (1985), R LITAN & W 
NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 48, 77 n 26 (1983) See generally Graham & 
Vaupel, supra note 224, at 94 (pointing out large cost differences between types of life saving 
programs, in particular, noting that the OSHA regulations are normally hundreds of times more 
expensive per life saved than highway regulations) 
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 See J M E N D E L O F F , supra note 224, at 22 
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at 144-51, 188 (chronicling "uncertainty and vacillation"), Huber, Electricity and the Environ-
ment In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV L REV 1002, 1002 (1987) ("Current 
regulation of [the electric power industry] now promises both less electricity and more damage 
to health and the environment ") 
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 See Flint Ridge Dev Co v Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U S 776, 787-88 (1976), Estate of 
Sanford v Commissioner, 308 U S 19 (1939). Daigneault v Public Fin Corp , 562 b Supp 
194, 197 n 2 (D R I 1983), Preston State Bank v Ainsworth, SS2 F Supp 578, 580 (N D 
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help explain Bob Jones University v. United States.291 This decision 
might be understood as an effort to ensure that the IRS takes account 
of the widespread social antagonism toward racial discrimination, as 
part of the general thrust of contemporary "public policy." 
(d) Considering Systemic Effects. — Regulation is frequently un-
successful because of a failure to understand the complex systemic 
effects of governmental controls.292 Courts dealing with regulatory 
issues often act as if the decision will create only ex post winners and 
losers in the particular case This misunderstanding leads to statutory 
construction that is uninformed by the real-world impact of regulation. 
Examples include the Supreme Court's OSHA decisions,293 in which 
several members of the Court appeared to assume that greater pro-
tection for workers would automatically follow from more stringent 
statutory requirements.294 This assumption is false. By requiring 
government to regulate to the point of "feasibility" and forbidding 
balancing of benefits and costs, stringent statutory requirements have 
at times harmed workers themselves. Faced with such onerous re-
quirements,295 regulators have often underenforced the statute by fail-
ing to enforce the rules on the books or by refusing to issue rules at 
all.296 Interpreting an environmental or occupational health law as 
especially protective may ultimately decrease regulatory protection. 
The problem of unintended or perverse side-effects is pervasive. 
Courts should understand the sometimes counterintuitive systemic 
consequences of different interpretations of regulatory statutes. 
(e) Avoiding Private Law Principles. — As suggested above, courts 
cannot properly invoke common law principles of private autonomy 
as the backdrop for interpreting public law.297 Suppose, for example, 
that a statute allows employees to file workers' compensation claims, 
and that an employer attempts to discharge an employee for filing 
such a claim. In this setting, courts should not invoke the background 
rule of at-will employment in order to uphold the discharge, even if 
the legislature has not explicitly displaced that rule in this context.298 
29> 461 U S S74 (1983) 
292
 See Rose-Ackerman, Comment Progressive Law and Economics — and the New Admin-
istrative Law, 98 YALE L J H 1 . 164-67 (1988), see also Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming 
hnvironmtnlal Law, 37 STAN L REV n n d9«S) (advocating decentralized, cost effective 
environmental regulation) 
293
 See American Textile Mfrs Inst , Inc v Donovan, 452 U S 490 (1981) (refusing to 
apply cost benefit analysis to OSHA's cotton dust standard), American Petroleum, 448 U S 607 
(plurality opinion) 
294
 See, e g , American TextiU Mjrs , 452 U S at 499 
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at 3S5~58 
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The at-will rule would undermine the purpose of the workers' com-
pensation statute. When the legislature intends to transform the re-
lationships created by the common law, principles rooted in the com-
mon law do not provide an appropriate background rule. 
Private law principles are wrongly applied in several areas of 
modern law. In interpreting the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA),299 the Supreme Court has held that agency 
action is presumptively reviewable, but that agency inaction is pre-
sumptively unreviewable, in part because agency inaction is not "coer-
cive."300 This understanding depends on an outmoded conception that 
finds coercion only in cases in which government intrudes on common 
law rights. Under this view, for example, the failure to protect against 
environmental harms or discrimination is not coercive at all. But the 
New Deal reformation, and the existence of social and economic 
regulation in general, are largely based on an understanding that the 
market creates a kind of coercion against which government must 
guard. For this reason, it is quite troublesome to use common law 
principles of coercion as the basis for creating a presumption against 
review of inadequate regulatory protection.301 
On occasion, the Court's treatment of the standing provisions of 
the APA302 has likewise disserved the goals of the legislature in en-
acting regulatory statutes. In some cases construing the APA, the 
Court has barred regulatory beneficiaries from seeking relief because 
they lacked a common law injury.30^ In others, the Court has used 
a clear-statement principle in favor of continued judicial power to 
"balance the equities" in environmental cases and has thus decreased 
the likelihood of injunctive relief in such cases 304 In both of these 
contexts, the Court has used traditional private law principles in order 
to give content to modern public law; in both settings, the resulting 
doctrine disserves the goals of the legislature.,os 
299
 5 U S C § 702 (1988) 
300
 See Heckler v Chaney, 470 U S 821, 832 (1985) 
301
 See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler \ Chaney, 52 U C H I L REV 
653, 666-69 (1985) 
302
 See s U S C <> 701 (1988) 
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 See, e g , Allen v Wright, 468 U S 717, 756-61 (1984), Simon v Eastern Ky Welfare 
Rights Org , 426 U S 26, 40-46 (1976) For a discussion of the dependence of these holdings 
on private law principles, set Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 
COLUM L REV 14^2, 1461-69 (1988) 
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 See, e g , Amoco Prod Co v Village of Gambell, 480 U S 5*1, 541-46 (1987), Wein 
berger v Romero Barcelo, 4S6 U S 305 (1982) 
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 A similar error can be found in Independent Federation of Might Attendants v Zipes, 
109 S Ct 2732 (1989), in which the Court was asked to decide whether a successful plaintiff 
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(f) Avoiding Irrationality and Injustice. — A time-honored prin-
ciple in Anglo-American law is that statutes should be construed to 
avoid irrationality and injustice, even when the language of the statute 
seems to lead in that direction.306 The principle is controversial be-
cause there is no obvious basis for deciding whether an outcome is 
irrational, and because it is plausible to suggest that the correction 
for any such defect should come from the legislature rather than the 
courts. Because courts are able to focus upon the concrete and often 
unforeseeable effects of general statutory provisions, however, they 
are in a much better position to judge whether a particular provision 
produces peculiar consequences in a particular setting The judgment 
that the consequence is peculiar — and could not plausibly have been 
intended — is sometimes irresistible. On occasion the text, read lit-
erally, will appear to compel results that the legislature could not have 
anticipated and resolved in enacting a broad standard. It would be 
unrealistic to think that any legislature could or should correct every 
such problem 
In such circumstances, what might appear to be aggressive con-
struction is entirely legitimate307 — at least if the injustice or irra-
tionality is palpable and there is no affirmative evidence that the 
legislature intended the result. Usually the interpretive issue in such 
cases resembles Wittgenstein's game of dice.308 Here it is fully plau-
were wholl> frivolous, even if the intervenor had acted only after the defendant had agreed to 
settle See Zipes, 109 S Ct at 2736-39 The Court reasoned that the fee-award provision is 
subject to "the competing equities that Congress normally takes into account," and those equities 
called for a rule that would permit an intervenor — who was not a wrongdoer — to participate 
free from liability for fees See id at 2736 
1 he dissent argued that in light of the congressional effort to encourage civ il rights plaintiffs 
to bring suit and to settle as well, mtervenors should be liable for fees See id at 2741-46 
(Marshall, J , dissenting) Th t Court responded that "the essential difference" between the two 
sides had to do with whether title VII should be interpreted as reconciling "competing rights" 
in the traditional way, or instead as placing plaintiffs at the highest point of a hierarchy See 
109 S Ct at 2738 n 4 On this score, the Court's resolution depended on its assumption that 
the fee-shifting provisions of title VII should be interpreted against the backdrop of the rights 
possessed before the statute was enacted But the enactment of title VII in general and of the 
fee-shifting provision in particular probably should have been considered a repudiation of the 
more open ended equitable balancing that preceded it See id at 2742 46 (Marshall, J , dis-
senting) 
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O'Connor v United States, 479 U S 27, 31 (1986), Brock v Pierce County, 476 U S 253, 258-
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sible to interpret a statute so as not to apply notwithstanding its literal 
meaning. 
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,309 for example, the Court con-
fronted the issue of the notice requirements for class members in a 
class action in which the individual claims were extremely small. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires "the best notice practicable 
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all class mem-
bers who can be identified through reasonable effort."310 Interpreting 
the language literally, a unanimous Supreme Court held that identi-
fiable class members had to be notified of the suit.311 
The result of Eisen — which effectively bars small claim class 
actions in most settings — is exceedingly peculiar. The purpose of 
notice is to protect those who are to be notified; in a case in which 
those notified do not have individually viable claims, it seems odd to 
suggest that notice is required in deference to their interests. More-
over, it is utterly irrational on the one hand to allow balancing with 
respect to the costs of identifying class members, but on the other to 
impose a per se rule in favor of notice when the costs of identification 
are low and the costs of providing notice are extremely high. The 
drafters of the notice provision of rule 23 probably were not thinking 
about the problem of individually small but collectively large claims 
when they drafted the notice provision. As in Wittgenstein's game of 
dice, the literal language, read acontextually, leads to an absurd result. 
(g) Protecting Disadvantaged Groups; Civil Rights Questions. — 
Disadvantaged groups are especially at risk in the process of imple-
mentation. The same stereotypes and prejudices that afflict disadvan-
taged groups in the marketplace can also affect those responsible for 
implementing statutory protections Those in a position to enforce the 
law thus tend to do so inadequately Difficulties of organization and 
mobilization — including the costs, stigma, threat to future employ-
ment, and other burdens of bringing an enforcement action — under-
mine implementation as well.312 In the face of ambiguity, courts 
should resolve interpretive doubts in favor of disadvantaged groups 
so as to ensure that regulatory statutes are not defeated in the imple-
mentation process. 
This idea has roots in existing law, though the basic principle has 
rarely been explicitly recognized 313 The well-established idea that 
statutes should be interpreted in favor of Indian tribes is the most 
conspicuous example of this general idea.314 Likewise, the Supreme 
3 0 9 4 i 7 U S is6 (1974) 
310
 F E D R C I V P 23(c)(2) 
3 , 1
 See Eisen, 417 U S at 173-77 
312
 See supra pp 467-68 
313
 For an exception, see Eskndge, Public Values, cited above in note 21, at 1032-34 
314
 See id at 1047-48 
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Court's general hostility to the creation of implied rights of action 
finds an exception in the civil rights laws. In a number of cases, 
courts have created implied rights to protect disadvantaged groups in 
the face of an ambiguous text.315 A number of decisions reflect gen-
erous interpretations of statutes protecting the disabled.316 Respond-
ing to this rationale, courts have often aggressively construed statutes 
forbidding discrimination on the basis of race and sex317 — although 
recent cases suggest a movement in the opposite direction, perhaps 
rooted in a competing norm of private autonomy.318 
An example here is Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atonio,319 which 
involved the standards governing disparate-impact cases brought un-
der title VII.320 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co ,321 the Court held that 
once a plaintiff showed that an employment practice had a discrimi-
natory impact on members of a minority group, the burden shifted to 
the defendant to show that the practice was justified by "business 
necessity."322 In Wards Cove, the Court altered Griggs in two major 
ways First, it held that the defendant's burden is one of production, 
not of persuasion, and the plaintiff must carry the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of business justification.323 Second, and more fun-
damentally, the Court held that the defendant need not show that a 
challenged practice is "'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's 
business."324 Instead, the question is "whether a challenged practice 
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the 
employer."325 
The textual proscription of "discrimination" does not resolve the 
questions in Wards Cove. The text does not indicate whether discrim-
315
 See, e g , Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 U S 677, 687-717 (1979) (title IX), Allen 
v State Bd of Elections, 393 U S 544, 554-57 (1969) (Voting Rights Act) 
H 6
 See R kATZMAN, supra note 191, at 15^—87, see also School Bd v Arline, 480 U S 
273, 280-86 (1987) (interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to protect individuals with 
contagious diseases) 
317
 See, e g , United Steel workers v Weber, 443 U S 193 (1979) (holding that title VII allows 
voluntary affirmative action plans), Griggs v Duke Power Co , 401 U S 424 (1971) (holding 
that title VII prohibits facially neutral practices with disparate impact on minorities) 
5 ,8
 This tendency was especially pronounced in 1989 See, e g , Independent Fed'n of Flight 
Attendants v Zipes, 109 S Ct 2732 (1989), Jett v Dallas Indep School Dist , 109 S Ct 2702 
(1989), Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 109 S Ct 2363 (1989), Wards Cove Packing Co v 
Atomo, 109 S Ct 2115 (1989) 
319
 109 S Ct 2115 (1989) 
320
 42 U S C § 2oooe-2(a) (1982) 
321
 401 U S 424 (1971) 
322
 Id at 429-32 
323
 See Wards Cove, 109 S Ct at 2126 
524
 Id at 2125-26 
525
 Id at 2125 The burden of production seems, however, to have unusual substantive 
weight Although the defendant need not show a practice is "indispensable," it must serve 
legitimate goals "in a significant wiv " IH 
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inatory effects are in themselves troublesome or impermissible, or 
whether such effects might shift all the relevant burdens to the defen-
dant — not because they are objectionable in themselves, but in order 
to flush out a discriminatory purpose. Although the legislative history 
reveals that the legislators were thinking largely of obvious cases of 
racial nonneutrality, it does not indicate whether the statutory pros-
cription applies when the defendant adopts a practice, not justified 
by business necessity, that "'freezefs]' the status quo of prior discrim-
inatory practices,"326 or when the practice has a disproportionate effect 
on blacks that the employer would not be willing to tolerate if the 
burdened group consisted of whites.327 Wards Cove thus raises ques-
tions about gaps and implementing devices, questions that the text 
and history of the statute inform but do not answer.328 
To resolve the disagreement between the majority and the dissent, 
one must ask a value-laden question: what sorts of devices best im-
plement the nondiscrimination guarantee if it is properly character-
ized? The Wards Cove Court did not discuss this question at all; 
instead it acted as if the statute and relevant precedents largely dis-
posed of the question. Although the issue is complex, one might start 
by observing that discriminatory purpose is exceptionally difficult to 
show even when it exists A test that makes discriminatory effects 
probative of discriminatory purpose might invalidate some practices 
that should, given perfect implementing devices, be upheld. Wards 
Cove, however, will validate many practices that should, given such 
devices, be struck down. Moreover, discrimination exists when an 
employer has been nonneutral in the sense that it has adopted a 
practice having a discriminatory effect on blacks that it would not 
have adopted if the burden had been imposed on whites, Wards Cove 
will not reach this form of discrimination For these reasons, Wards 
Cove will produce substantial underenforcement of the law By con-
trast, systemic barriers to the implementation of antidiscrimination 
statutes^29 make any concern about overenforcement highly specula-
tive. No approach is perfect in this situation, but Griggs was probably 
a better method of implementing the statutory proscription 
(h) Protecting Nonmarket Values. — Statutes are frequently de-
signed to protect aspirations or other values that the market under-
326
 Griggs, 401 U S at 430 
327
 This conception of neutrality might well satisfy an intent requirement On this view, if 
the employer would not be willing to use the same test if the burdened and benefited groups 
were switched, he has discriminated This understanding of neutrality includes racially selective 
concern and indifference as well as conscious racial animus See Strauss, supra note 252, at 
956-59 
328
 For this reason, the decision must be regarded as a form of federal common law, akin 
to the implementation of the Sherman Act and § 1983 See supra pp 421-22 
329
 See supra DD 467-68 
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values.330 Those "nonmarket" values — reflected in laws regulating 
broadcasting and protecting the environment and endangered species 
— are often jeopardized in the post-enactment political "market," for 
the same reasons that nonmarket values are threatened by the will-
ingness-to-pay criterion of the economic marketplace. If this charac-
terization is accurate, an aggressive judicial role, combating a char-
acteristic form of regulatory failure, is an appropriate way to achieve 
legislative goals In many decisions interpreting the "public interest" 
standard of the Federal Communications Act,3M courts have prodded 
the FCC to promote diversity, local control, local participation, and 
high-quality programming, and to work against racism and sexism in 
broadcasting332 — all notwithstanding the fact that the market for 
broadcasting may fail to respect such norms. A similar solicitude for 
nonmarket values helps account for decisions taking a skeptical look 
at efforts to deregulate broadcasting333 and perhaps most notably for 
the aggressive judicial protection of the environment 334 
(i) Minimizing Interest-Group Transfers. — Courts should nar-
rowly construe statutes that serve no plausible public purpose, and 
amount merely to interest-group transfers. This idea is traceable to a 
basic constitutional norm335 and follows from the proportionality prin-
ciple considered below. The idea helps explain a number of decisions 
330
 See Stewart, supra note 152, at 1566-87, Sunstein, supra note 158, at 1133-38 
33
« 4 7 U S C §§ 151-610 (1982) 
332
 See Stewart, supra note 152, at 1582-87 (discussing the treatment of noncommodity 
values in the courts) 
333
 See, e g , Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v FCC, 779 F 2d 
702 (D C Cir 1985) (broadcast deregulation), Office of Communications of the United Church 
of Christ v FCC, 707 F 2d 1413 (D C Cir 1983) (same), see also Central Honda Enters , Inc 
v FCC, 598 F 2d 37 (D C Cir 1978) (public interest standard), cert dismissed, 441 U S 957 
(1979), Home Box Office, Inc v FCC, 567 F 2d 9, 26-43 ( D C Cir) (invalidating FCC 
regulations limiting "siphoning" of programming from broadcast to pay television as beyond the 
Commission's authority), cert denied, 434 U S 829 (1977), Pasadena Broadcasting Co v FCC, 
555 F 2d 1046 (D C Cir 1977), Citizens Comm To Save WEFM v FCC, 506 F 2d 246 (D C 
Cir 1974) (en banc), Friends of the Earth v FCC, 449 F 2d 1164 ( D C Cir 1971), Citizens 
Communications Center v FCC, 447 F 2d 1201 (D C Cir 1971), opinion clarified per curiam, 
463 F 2d 822 (1972) But see Telecommunications Research & Action Center v FCC, 801 F 2d 
501 (D C Cir 1986) (concluding that the fairness doctrine had not been codified), cert dented, 
482 U S 919 (1987) See generally Stewart, supra note 152 (using broadcast rights to exemplify 
noncommunity values) 
334
 See, e g , California Coastal Comm v Granite Rock Co , 480 U S 572 (1987), Citizens 
To Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 U S 402 (1971), Lead Indus Ass'n v EPA, 647 
h 2d 1130 (D C Cir) , cert dinted, 449 U S 1042 (1980), Seacoast Anti Pollution League v 
Costlc, s7-2 * 2d 872 (1st Cir) , tert denttd, 439 U S 824 (1978), Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc v Train, 545 F 2d 320 (2d Cir 1976), Environmental Defense Fund, Inc v 
Ruckelshaus, 439 F 2d 584 (D C Cir 1971), Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v Federal 
Power Comm'n, 354 F 2d 608 (2d Cir 1965), cert denied, 384 U S 941 (1966), Sierra Club v 
Ruckelshaus, 344 F Supp 253 (D D C 1972) (mem opinion) See generally R M E L N I C K , 
supra note 65 (discussing the Clean Air Act) 
335
 See supra pp 471-72, Macey, supra note 159, at 261-66 
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in areas of economic regulation, such as banking and agriculture.336 
It also informs the courts' approach to the Robinson-Patman Act337 
and their effort to understand the Sherman Act as an attempt to 
promote consumer welfare rather than as protection of small business 
as such.338 When a public purpose is palpably absent, this principle 
should be unexceptionable.339 
(j) Requiring Proportionality. — Another interpretive principle 
would understand statutes to impose benefits roughly commensurate 
with their costs, unless there is a clear legislative statement to the 
contrary. This proportionality norm, implicit in several recent 
cases,340 draws on an understanding of likely legislative purpose and 
on perceptions about regulatory failure. Statutes often fail because of 
excessive controls or inadequate implementation,341 and courts should 
generally assume that Congress wants to avoid those problems and 
therefore intends agencies to impose regulations after a balancing 
process 342 As we have seen, the absence of a proportionality principle 
336
 See, e g , Securities Indus Ass'n v Board of Governors of the Fed Reserve Sys , 821 
F 2d 810 (D C Cir 1987), cert denied, 483 U S 1005 (1988), Investment Co Inst v FDIC, 
815 F 2d 1540 (D C Cir 1987) (per curiam), cert denied, 484 U S 847 (1988), Securities Indus 
Ass'n v Board of Governors of the Fed Reserve Sys , 807 F 2d 1052 ( D C Cir 1986), cert 
denied, 483 U S 1005 (1987), Investment Co Inst v Conover, 790 F 2d 925 (D C Cir) , cert 
dented, 479 U S 939 (1986), Langevoort, supra note 80, at 701, 725-33 
3 3 7
 See R BORK, T H E ANTITRUST PARADOX A POLICY AT WAR W I T H I T S E L F 409-10 (1978) 
338
 See id at 72-89, Business Elecs Corp v Sharp Elecs Corp , 108 S Ct 1515, 1519-
24 (1988), Broadcast Music, Inc v CBS, 441 U S 1, 19-22 (1979), Continental TV, Inc v 
GTE Sylvania, Inc , 433 U S 36, 5i~59 d977) 
339
 This principle must not, however, be confused with the unjustifiable idea that statutes 
in derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed, it is not a license for grudging 
interpretation of statutes that promote noncommodity values or that embody public-spirited 
redistribution, as suggested in Easterbrook, cited above in note 13, at 539-43 This is also a 
problem with the otherwise excellent treatment in Macey, cited above in note 159 As the 
experience of the early part of this century reveals, it is not for courts — in the process of 
statutory construction — to take a side in the regulatory debate that runs in the face of a 
legislative judgment Courts should therefore attempt to discern a public regarding purpose and 
give the benefit of every doubt to the legislature But sometimes such purposes are not even 
plausibly at work Of course, some difficult line-drawing problems will exist 
340
 See, e g , Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Inst , 448 U S 607, 
652 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he mere possibility that some employee somewhere in the 
country may confront some risk of cancer is fnotj a sufficient basis for the exercise of the 
Secretary's power to require the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars to minimize that 
risk "), Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v Thomas, 824 F 2d 1146 ( D C Cir 1987) 
(en banc) (calling for consideration of feasibility) 
141
 See J M P N D L L O F F , supra note 224, at 1-12 
342
 Consider, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v EPA, 824 F 2d 1146 
(D C Cir 1987) In that case, the court concluded that § 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U S C 
§ 7412 (1982), which requires emissions standards that provide "an ample margin of safety," 
permits the Administrator to consider cost and technology despite the statute's failure to refer 
expressly to those factors The decision is best understood as founded on a background principle 
of proportionality, one that Congress may eliminate only through a clear statement 
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may produce harmful systemic consequences as well as overregulation. 
Ironically, it will also produce severe underregulation. Moreover, 
bureaucratic self-interest or factional pressures sometimes incline agen-
cies toward overzealous enforcement, which Congress is unable rou-
tinely to monitor or remedy. The proportionality norm is reinforced 
as well by interpretive norms calling for legislative deliberation. It 
leads to narrow construction of statutes enacted as a result of interest-
group pressure or as myopic or impulsive reactions to short-term 
problems 
The difficulty with this principle is that there is no uncontroversial 
metric with which to measure social costs and social benefits. If courts 
understand benefits and costs technically — as in the economic for-
mulation — and make the assessment turn on private willingness to 
pay, they will undervalue aspirations and nonmarket values and ul-
timately undermine statutory goals.343 The very decision to create a 
regulatory system often reflects a rejection of private willingness to 
pay as the criterion of social choice. Many statutes are designed to 
transform rather than to implement preferences, to redistribute re-
sources, or to reflect the outcome of a deliberative process about 
relevant public values.344 Moreover, a statute that protects (for ex-
ample) endangered species may have symbolic or aspirational benefits. 
The various values that are served by regulatory programs should be 
treated hospitably. 
For these reasons, the proportionality principle is most useful for 
cases of economic regulation It becomes most workable when it is 
clear, by reference to a widely held social consensus, that the social 
benefits are small in comparison to the social costs Even in cases of 
public aspirations or nonmarket values, the proportionality idea 
should be invoked when the disadvantages of regulation seem to dwarf 
the advantages, at least when the statute is ambiguous 345 
(k) Allowing de Minimis Exceptions — It follows from the pro-
portionality principle that regulatory statutes should ordinarily be 
understood to contain de minimis exceptions In such cases, the costs 
of regulation outweigh the benefits, which are by hypothesis insub-
stantial. Moreover, the failure to allow de minimis exceptions will 
343
 See, e g , Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 P H I L & PUB A F F 54 (1988), 
see also Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J LEGAL STUD 191, 206-12 (1980) (arguing that 
wealth maximization in itself is not a value) 
344
 1 hus, title VII is partly an effort to transform preferences, the minimum wage has 
redistnbutive purposes, the Clean Air Act is partly an outcome of a deliberative process On 
these and other regulatory functions, see C SUNSTEIN, cited above note *, chs 1-2 
345
 This principle casts in doubt the outcome in Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 U S 
153 (1978), which held that the Endangered Species Act blocked construction of a dam that 
would destroy the habitat of the snail darter See also R DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 347 
(concluding that Tennessee Valley Authority was wrongl) decided) 
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probably decrease rather than increase health and safety.346 Admin-
istrators should be allowed to refuse to impose costly regulations for 
highly speculative or minimal gains.347 Many courts have reached 
precisely this conclusion. Indeed, courts should probably require such 
exceptions in the absence of an explicit statutory text or plausible 
substantive justifications™8 to the contrary 
4. Examples. — Two important cases involving the meaning of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act illustrate the basic frame-
work. The pertinent language of the statute349 directs OSHA to 
promulgate the standard that "most adequately assures, to the extent 
feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of 
health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular ex-
posure to the hazard . . . for the period of his working life."350 The 
statute also contains a general definition of "occupational safety and 
health standard," which says that the term refers to measures that 
require "conditions . . reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide 
safe or healthful employment and places of employment."351 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum 
Institute,332 the Supreme Court invalidated an OSHA regulation of 
benzene. Although the precise consequences of the regulation were 
sharply contested, there was evidence that the regulation would im-
pose enormous costs in exchange for small or speculative gains. 
OSHA itself concluded that its regulation would require capital in-
vestments of $266 million, first-year operating costs of $187 to $205 
346
 See supra p 423 
34
* Courts have reached somewhat conflicting conclusions on this point The background 
rule, however, seems to be in favor of de minimis exceptions See Public Citizen v Young, 
831 F 2d 1108, 1118-22 ( D C Cir 1987) (rejecting "literalism" and endorsing the de minimis 
exception, but refusing to imply such an exception to the Delaney Clause), Gilhooley, Plain 
Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative Purpose The Interpretation of the Delaney Clause, 
40 ADMIN L REV 267 (1988) (advocating an "absurdity exception" that would be applied to 
the Delaney Clause), see also Alabama Power Co v Costle, 6^6 F 2d 323. 356-6i (D C O r 
1979) (Tljhc ability to exempt de minimis situations from a statutory command is not an 
ability to depart from the statute, but rather a tool to be used in implementing the legislative 
design "), Monsanto Co v Kennedy, 613 F 2d 947, 955~56 (D C Cir 1979) (inferring a de 
minimis exception from the Food and Drug Act's definition of "food additive"), cf Bowen v 
Yuckert, 482 U S 137 (1987) (upholding denial of a benefit based on an interpretation of 
"disability" to mean "severe impairment"), Mumpower, An Analysis of the de Minimis Strategy 
for Risk Management, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 437 (1982) (emphasizing the complexity of risk man-
agement) See generally Fiksel, Toward a de Minimis Policy in Risk Regulation, 5 RISK 
ANALYSIS 257 (1985) 
348
 These might include the high aggregate costs of making such exceptions See Latin, 
Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency Implementation of Uniform Standards and "hine-
Tuning" Regulation, 37 STAN L REV 1267, 1314-32 (1985) 
34<> 29 U S C § 655(b)(5) (1982) 
350
 I d 
351
 Id § 652(8) 
352
 448 U S 607 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
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million, and recurring annual costs of $34 million 3S3 Contemporary 
scientific knowledge appeared to preclude a clear prediction of signif-
icant benefits, which in the Courts view "may be relatively small."354 
A plurality of the Court concluded that the definitional clause 
required OSHA to establish a "significant risk" before regulating a 
toxic substance. The plurality justified its conclusion by referring to 
the Act's definition of occupational safety and health standards as 
those "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful 
employment "35S In the Court's view, a standard was not "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate" if OSHA was unable to demonstrate a sig-
nificant risk. 
There was, however, little direct basis in the text or history of the 
Act for the plurality's conclusion. Congress did not explicitly require 
OSHA to show a "significant risk." The plurality found that such a 
requirement was implicit in the definitional clause, but it is very 
unusual to read a definitional clause, ordinarily carrying no weight, 
as creating a substantive limitation on administrative power. The 
clause is more plausibly treated as having no substantive content, or 
as having substantive content defined by other provisions of the Act. 
It is even more unusual for the Court to look to a definitional clause 
when the definition, so interpreted, contradicts a far more specific 
substantive provision, which in this case says that toxic substance 
standards must ensure "to the extent feasible . . that no employee 
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity."356 
The reference to "no employee" seems to suggest that the statute 
forbids OSHA from permitting risks from toxic substances even if 
only one or a few workers would suffer "material impairment of 
health " The judicially created "significant risk" requirement, by con-
trast, forbids regulation unless enough workers will be affected to 
make the benefits of regulation significant Nothing in the legislative 
history supports the Court's interpretation of the definitional clause, 
and indeed the history argues against that interpretation.357 
Unable to point to a solid textual basis for its "significant risk" 
requirement, the plurality invoked a clear-statement principle* 
In the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to 
assume that Congress intended to give the Secretary the unprecedented 
power over American industry that would result from the Govern-
ment's view Expert testimony that a substance is probably a 
human carcinogen would justify the conclusion that the substance 
poses some risk of serious harm no matter how minute the exposure 
353
 See id at 628-29 
354 Id a t 630 
355
 Id at 638 (discussing 29 U S C $ 652(8)) 
356
 29 U S C § 655(b)(5) (1982) (emphasis added) 
357
 See American Petroleum, 448 U S at 708-13 (Marshall, J , dissenting) 
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and no matter how many experts testified that they regarded the risk 
as insignificant That conclusion would in turn justify pervasive reg-
ulation limited only by the constraint of feasibility . . . [T]he Gov-
ernment's theory would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs 
that might produce little, if any, discernable benefit 358 
The plurality further suggested that the government's interpreta-
tion would give the Secretary of Labor "open-ended" policymaking 
authority that might amount to an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative power.359 
The plurality's conclusion in American Petroleum is difficult to 
defend in either formalist or textualist terms. The "significant risk" 
requirement has no textual basis, at least not in any ordinary sense; 
it was a judicial creation. It would therefore be possible to caricature 
the result in the case as an impermissible judicial rewriting of the 
statute.360 But the conclusion in the case was nonetheless sound. A 
realistic interpretation of the statutory language would recognize that 
it was not addressed to the problem at hand It is simply a myth to 
suggest that the Congress that enacted OSHA focused on the question 
of imposing enormous expenditures to redress trivial risks — recall 
Wittgenstein's game of dice. Despite the broad language of the toxic 
substances provision, Congress simply did not deal with the problem 
In these circumstances, the plurality's opinion can be seen as in-
voking several of the substantive norms defended above The case 
provided an excellent setting for the application of the principle calling 
for de minimis exceptions to social and economic regulation. An 
exclusive focus on the one or two employees who suffer "material 
health impairment" as a result of a lifetime of exposure would in the 
long run produce less, not more, protection of workers.361 If OSHA 
must regulate to the point of feasibility in the face of trivial risk, the 
Department of Labor will be reluctant to embark on any regulation 
at all 
Moreover, the proportionality principle and the background norm 
counseling avoidance of irrationality both argue in favor of the plu-
rality's reading. The beneficiaries of OSHA regulation are well-or-
ganized and able to protect themselves in the implementation process. 
,S8
 American Pttroleum, 448 U S at 645 (plurality opinion) 
359
 See id at 651-52 In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell, advocating an interpretation 
of the Act that would call for cost-beneht balancing, suggested that "a standard setting process 
that ignored economic considerations would result in a serious misallocation of resources and a 
lower effective level of safety than could be achieved under standards set with reference to the 
comparative benefits available at a lower cost " Id at 670 (Powell, J , concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) 
360
 Similarly, a background principle in favor of interpreting words in accordance with their 
plain meaning would point toward acceptance of the government's position See id at 688 
(Marshall, J , dissenting) 
361
 See supra p 480 
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There was therefore a ready political corrective both to the plurality's 
conclusion, if it was contrary to public consensus, and to inadequate 
implementation in general. For all these reasons, the plurality cor-
rectly interpreted OSHA to require a showing of a significant risk as 
a predicate for regulation.*62 
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan,2*63 the 
Supreme Court decided a question left open in American Petroleum: 
whether the OSHA statute required cost-benefit analysis. In arguing 
that it did, the industry contended that the word "feasible" required 
OSHA not only to show a significant risk, but also to demonstrate 
that the benefits of regulation justified the costs. "Feasibility," in the 
industry's view, contemplated a balancing of costs and benefits. The 
government contended that once OSHA had shown a significant risk, 
it could regulate to the point where the survival of the regulated 
industry would be endangered by additional controls. For the gov-
ernment, the term "feasibility" did not connote cost-benefit balancing, 
but instead meant "possible."364 
In accepting the government's argument, the Court relied on the 
dictionary definition of "feasible" to conclude that the term meant 
"'capable of being done, executed, or effected,'" rather than justified 
by a balancing of costs and benefits.365 This literal approach to the 
statute was not entirely unreasonable. The structure of the toxic 
substances provision — consider the "no employee shall suffer" lan-
guage — is in considerable tension with the industry's construction. 
Moreover, Congress has sometimes used the term "feasible" as a self-
conscious alternative to "cost-benefit" balancing,366 and that fact ar-
gues against the view that the two terms have the same meaning. 
But the same principles that support the decision in American Petro-
leum cast serious doubt on American Textile Manufacturers 
Notwithstanding the statute's language, it is probably unrealistic 
to believe that Congress actually focused on, and resolved, the ques-
362
 A different result might be appropriate if the scientific evidence were uncertain If a 
significant risk were impossible to show because the data were unclear, perhaps employers, 
rather than workers, should bear the burden of medical uncertainty The plurality did not make 
clear how such considerations would bear on the problem of carcinogen regulation if they had 
been squaiel> confronted by OSHA 
363
 452 U S 490 (1981) 
364
 See id at 494-95 
3 6 5
 See id at 508-09 (quoting WEBSTER'S T H I R D N F W INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF 
THE E N G L I S H LANGUAGE 831 (1976)) 
^
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 In construing feasibility courts have not weighed the benefits of the practice against its 
costs but inquired instead whether the icfiliation would prevent the industry from functioning 
See National Cottonseed Prod Ass'n v Brock, 825 F 2d 482, 487 (D C O r 1987) ("[A] standard 
is economically feasible if the cost of compliance does not threaten the 'competitive structure or 
posture' of the industry " (quoting Industrial Union Dep't, AFL CIO v Hodgson, 499 F 2d 467, 
478 (D C Cir 1974))) 
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tion whether to favor the government's approach over some kind of 
balancing of costs and benefits. The question never arose during the 
debates. The general and more fundamental problem is the basic 
irrationality of a system in which OSHA is required to find a signifi-
cant risk, but is prohibited from undertaking cost-benefit analysis. 
Whether a risk is "significant" depends in large part on the costs of 
eliminating it. A relatively small risk might justify regulation if the 
costs are also small, but a larger risk might best be left unregulated 
if the costs are enormous. A rational system of regulation looks not 
at the magnitude of the risk alone, but assesses the risk in comparison 
to the costs. 
These considerations would deserve little weight if the statute 
unambiguously dictated a contrary result, but the word "feasible" is 
flexible enough to accommodate a proportionality requirement. By 
refusing to read the statute in this way, the Supreme Court has 
contributed to the irrationality of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act — an irrationality that has harmed workers, employers, consum-
ers, and the public at large.367 
C. Changed Circumstances or Obsolescence 
When circumstances change, statutory interpretation becomes es-
pecially difficult. Older statutes may 'depend on factual assumptions 
that no longer hold, pr may conflict with more recent statutes, thus 
producing inconsistency and incoherence in regulation This problem 
is complicated by the fact that the statutory term may have been clear 
when enacted, and at that time it may have been inappropriate to 
invoke controversial substantive norms to interpret it, but changed 
conditions can render a term ambiguous and thus make it appropriate 
to apply conspicuous or controversial norms Because it represents a 
recurring hard case for statutory interpretation, the confrontation be-
tween statutory terms and new or unforeseen contexts deserves sepa-
rate treatment. 
In cases of changed circumstances, statutory construction appears 
informed by an effort to ensure integrity and coherence in the law by 
"updating" obsolete statutes — or, to put it less contentiously and 
probably more accurately, by interpreting them in a way that takes 
account of changing conditions.368 Here courts reject the idea that 
the original understanding of its audience or authors exhausts the 
meaning of a statute. There are good reasons to permit courts to go 
beyond the original understanding in the face of dramatically changed 
367
 See Rose Ackerman, supra note 292, at 360-66 
368
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circumstances, at least when the statutory text is ambiguous.369 Such 
an approach is likely to produce greater coherence in the law; to 
reduce the problem, pervasive in modern government, of regulation 
by measures that are badly out of date; and to lead to a legal system 
that is both more rational and more consistent with democratic 
norms 37° It is tempting but inadequate to say that the legislature 
should respond to the problem of changed circumstances. The ques-
tion is what the statute means in those circumstances, and that ques-
tion must be answered by those who interpret it, including the courts. 
This claim does not, of course, mean that changed circumstances 
should be understood to authorize courts to amend or rewrite statutes, 
but it does mean that "meaning" is itself a function of those circum-
stances.371 
The problem of changed circumstances presents questions not only 
of statutory meaning in new settings, but also of implicit interpretive 
instructions: how would Congress have wanted courts to approach its 
enactments in the face of obsolescence or changed circumstances? 
There will rarely be a direct answer to this question. As in consti-
tutional law, the problem of changed circumstances requires courts to 
decide whether the content of legal rules should change when there 
have been changes in law, policy, and fact. At the very least, courts 
should answer in the affirmative372 when a statute contains an open-
ended term like "public policy" or "psychopathic"373 that invites in-
terpretations that change over time; when statutory language already 
contains an ambiguous term ("feasible") whose meaning depends on 
current conditions;374 or when the statute contains a phrase ("induce 
cancer") that has been rendered ambiguous because of changed cir-
cumstances.375 
Even when no clear interpretive instructions allow a judge to adapt 
statutory terms to new conditions, courts may do so when those 
conditions have rendered a statute ambiguous. This problem typically 
occurs in three ways. First, the factual assumptions underlying the 
369
 See Aleinikoff, supra note 64, at 56-61, Eskndge, supra note 368, at 1497-539, see also 
Israel, Gideon v Wainwnght The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SUP C T REV 2 11, 2 19-2 3 (noting 
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370
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original statute may no longer be valid. For example, statutes regu-
lating broadcasting were enacted with the understanding that because 
of the limitations of the spectrum, few broadcasting licenses would be 
available. In the face of new technology and the rise of cable tele-
vision, that assumption has become hopelessly unrealistic. 
Second, a statutory provision may no longer be consistent with 
widely held social norms. In such cases a court must ask whether 
this change so alters the landscape that a reading of the statute that 
does not accord with the original understanding of its authors is 
justified — a question the enacting legislature may well have intended 
courts to answer in the affirmative. 
Third, the legal background may have changed dramatically as a 
result of legislative and administrative innovations. A statute enacted 
in 1935 may have ignored environmental considerations widely rec-
ognized in statutes enacted after i960. The question is whether the 
change in the legal background has consequences for interpreting the 
1935 statute. 
Judicial responses to all three kinds of obsolescence are not difficult 
to find. The first kind has resulted in aggressive construction, partic-
ularly in banking and broadcasting.376 In light of the changed nature 
of the relevant markets, it is implausible to resolve ambiguities by 
examining Congress' intent at the time of enactment. Such an ap-
proach would be a recipe for absurdity, and absurdity would hardly 
promote legislative purposes. 
The second form of obsolescence is reflected in judicial construction 
of statutes of the 1920's and 1930's so as to require old-line agencies 
to take account of environmental concerns. In this context, the legal 
backdrop has changed so dramatically that seemingly straightforward 
interpretation of the old statutes would be undesirable.377 The same 
point helps to explain the courts' narrow construction of provisions of 
the UCC not anticipating the revolution in the law of products lia-
bility.378 The Court's decision in Bob Jones can be understood in 
similar terms. Changing legislative and judicial developments had 
made racial discrimination inconsistent with "public policy" in the 
1980's, even if no such inconsistency existed when the charitable 
deduction was first enacted. 
Decisions reading ambiguous statutes to require regulatory agencies 
to consider costs and benefits illustrate the third form of judicial 
response to obsolescence.379 The Court may also have been reflecting 
376
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377
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contemporary values in reading the Sherman Act as an effort to 
promote consumer welfare.380 The underlying argument would be 
that a welfare-based interpretive principle is the only basis for a 
judicially administrable standard, and that such a principle conforms 
best to current understandings about a well-functioning antitrust 
law.381 
Several substantive norms apply to cases of obsolescence. Obsolete 
statutes are by hypothesis inconsistent with other regulation or with 
the current legal framework. They may also have pernicious, if un-
intended, systemic effects. If the text allows, courts should attempt 
to harmonize such statutes with current circumstances. 
* * * 
We might explore the problem of obsolescence in more detail by 
examining the Delaney Clause. As noted above, the clause prohibits 
the sale of food additives that "induce cancer when ingested by man 
or animal" or are found "after tests which are appropriate for the 
evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man 
and animal "382 As we have seen, the drafters of the clause believed 
that few additives caused cancer, and that those that did so were 
extremely dangerous. By the 1980's, however, it was clear that many 
substances were carcinogenic, but that a number of them created 
exceptionally minor risks.383 
These developments severely undermined the assumptions of the 
Congress that enacted the Delaney Clause. Indeed the clause, read 
literally, appeared quite perverse in many of its applications because 
it banned substances that posed no real risk to health Having been 
forbidden to use food additives posing a de minimis risk of cancer, 
580
 5ee, e g , R BORK, supra note n 7 , at 72-89 A similar method was at work in King 
v Smith, 392 U S 309 (1968), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a state rule depriving 
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manufacturers instead used additives that caused more serious risks 
of other diseases — thus creating what was quite possibly a significant 
increase in illnesses and deaths from food additives. In response, the 
FDA — invoking background principles against obsolescence and in 
favor of rationality and de minimis exception — interpreted the clause 
to permit the exemption of trivial risks. The claim, in short, was that 
changed circumstances made the word "induce" ambiguous. The FDA 
said that it would approve food additives that posed a de minimis 
risk of cancer. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
held that the FDA's position was unlawful.384 In that court's view, 
the Delaney Clause was unambiguous on the point. Read in context, 
however, the statute's meaning was far from clear. Because Congress 
did not focus on the question of de minimis risks in its original 
enactment, a de minimis exception would not have defeated Congress' 
will The factual background against which the Delaney Clause was 
written was so different from the present circumstances that the sta-
tutory terms "induce cancer" must be treated as ambiguous. The word 
"induce" should be read in its setting: whether a substance "induces" 
cancer within the meaning of the clause might well be a function of 
the degree of risk that it poses. We have seen that where there has 
been no clear legislative statement, agencies should be free to create 
de minimis exceptions to regulation In these circumstances, interpre-
tation of the clause to permit such exceptions seems consistent with 
permissible understandings of statutory construction, and quite sen-
sible to boot. The D C. Circuit's decision to the contrary was there-
fore misguided. 
D Priority and Harmonization 
It will not have escaped notice that the interpretive principles I 
have proposed will sometimes conflict with one another For example, 
the principle favoring state authority might collide with the principle 
favoring disadvantaged groups, and the presumption against amend-
ment through the appropriations process might contradict the principle 
in favor of generous construction of statutes protecting nonmarket 
values. The examples could easily be multiplied The possibility of 
conflict renders the basic approach vulnerable to a neo-realist objec-
tion that, in practice, the interpretive norms will provide contradictory 
guidance for the judiciary. 
Principles of harmonization and priority can in fact be developed 
to resolve cases of conflict To make this claim is not, however, to 
say that the application of interpretive norms can be purely mechan-
384
 See Public Citizen v Young, 831 F 2d 1108 ( D C Cir 1987), cert denied, 108 S Ct 
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ical. Inevitably, statutory construction is an exercise of practical rea-
son, in which text, history, and purpose interact with background 
understandings in the legal culture.385 In light of the dependence of 
outcomes on particular contexts, a fully systematized approach to 
statutory construction would be unmanageable. But short of a com-
plete system, it is possible to develop some guidelines. 
1. Priority. — The first task is to develop principles by which to 
rank interpretive norms Although different judges and administrators 
will rank such norms in different ways, it should be possible to achieve 
a more precise understanding of statutory construction — both as a 
descriptive and as a normative matter — by generating a hierarchy 
of interpretive principles. 
In that hierarchy, the presumptions in favor of decisions by polit-
ically accountable actors and in favor of political deliberation should 
occupy the very highest place. The principle of political accountability 
has a clear foundation in article I of the Constitution, is an overriding 
structural commitment of the document, has roots in assessments of 
institutional performance,386 and is also designed to counteract char-
acteristic failures in the regulatory process.387 In this sense, the norm 
of political accountability draws on all three basic sources of interpre-
tive principles. 
The commitment to political deliberation belongs on the same 
plane. The belief in deliberative democracy is also a basic constitu-
tional commitment.388 Implicit in the systems of checks and balances 
and federalism, it draws on Madison's conception of political repre-
sentation. The absence of deliberation has also contributed to regu-
latory failure.389 In these ways, the belief in political deliberation and 
the belief in political accountability are closely allied. 
Other interpretive principles traceable to constitutional norms de-
serve great respect. They should occupy the next highest position in 
the hierarchy. This category would include the norms in favor of 
broad interpretation of statutes protecting disadvantaged groups, 
against delegations of legislative authority, in favor of state autonomy, 
and in favor of narrow construction of interest-group transfers. As 
we have seen, all of these principles have constitutional status but are 
underenforced as a result of the institutional position of the judi-
ciary. , 9° Moreover, it is possible to create a kind of hierarchy within 
constitutionally based interpretive principles Thus, for example, the 
385
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principle in favor of state autonomy should occupy a lower place than 
the principle in favor of protection of disadvantaged groups, which is 
the product of the fourteenth amendment, a self-conscious attempt to 
limit the scope of state power. The case law in fact reflects this 
hierarchy.391 
Finally, interpretive principles without constitutional status should 
occupy the lowest rung, precisely because the judgments they repre-
sent are not so closely connected with the foundational commitments 
of American constitutionalism. This category includes norms in favor 
of coordination and of proportionality, norms requiring consideration 
of systemic effects, norms against implied repeals, and norms against 
obsolescence. All these norms should play a less significant role in 
cases of conflict. Moreover, these principles might themselves be 
placed in lexical order. For example, the principles calling for de 
minimis exceptions and for proportionality, and for taking account of 
systemic effects, should occupy the highest position among nonconsti-
tutional principles. To use (for example) the principle calling for broad 
construction of statutes favoring nonmarket values as a reason to 
abandon proportionality would sacrifice those very values — because 
of the likelihood that stringent regulation that bars balancing will 
produce regulatory irrationality and, ultimately, underregulation. The 
background principles calling for proportionality and de minimis ex-
ceptions, and requiring consideration of systemic effects, should or-
dinarily apply unless a constitutional principle trumps them. 
2 Harmonization. — Principles of harmonization are designed not 
to rank interpretive norms but to minimize the number of conflicts 
among norms. For example, courts should apply the proportionality 
principle differently when nonmarket values are at stake. In cases of 
economic regulation, translating costs and benefits into dollars, mea-
sured in terms of private willingness to pay, is entirely sensible. In 
cases implicating nonmonetary values, the fact that monetized costs 
and benefits are disproportionate is not controlling. Reflecting a sim-
ilar understanding, the courts have interpreted statutes quite gener-
ously, and in a way that conspicuously departs from private willing-
ness to pay, when aspirations and noncommodity values are 
involved.392 
Another principle of harmonization would recognize that cases turn 
not simply on the applicability of interpretive norms, but also on the 
degree of their infringement. Thus, for example, an enormous grant 
of discretionary lawmaking power to a regulatory agency would argue 
more strongly in favor of an aggressive narrowing construction than 
a minor grant of such power. Moreover, if the norm in favor of 
391
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limited delegations conflicts with the norm in favor of coordination of 
regulatory policy, the degree of the infringement on both norms would 
be highly relevant to the decision 
3 An Illustration — Pennhurst — Pennhurst State School & 
Hospital v Halderman™3, illustrates the operation of principles of 
priority and harmonization In Pennhurst, a group of mentally re-
tarded people brought suit against a mental health facility that was 
found to contain dangerous conditions Many of the residents had 
been physically abused, brutally mistreated, or drugged, the facility 
was utterly inadequate for the t reatment of the retarded As the basis 
of their legal claim, the plaintiffs invoked the "bill of rights" in the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 3 9 4 The 
bill of rights contained a set of legislative findings, including the 
following 
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate 
treatment, services, and habihtation for such disabilities 
(2) The treatment, services, and habihtation for a person with devel-
opmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the develop-
mental potential of the person and should be provided in a setting 
that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty 
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation 
to assure that public funds are not provided to any institutionlj 
that[] does not provide treatment, services, and habihtation which is 
appropriate to the needs of such persons 395 
The question in Pennhurst was whether the bill of rights created 
legally enforceable rights, or whether it instead enacted a set of goals 
or aspirations that could not be vindicated in court The history of 
the Act supported an argument that Congress intended to create le-
gally cognizable rights 3 9 6 On the other hand, it was not unreasonable 
to suggest that the bill of rights should be taken, like some other 
prefaces to legislation, as a statement of goals and purposes that 
amounted to an essentially precatory statement of congressional aspi-
rations — a statement that would not permit the developmentally 
disabled to bring suit against a facility that failed to respect the bill 
of rights There was no affirmative indication that the "findings" were 
intended to give rise to legally enforceable rights, costing the state 
enormous sums Without a background interpretive principle, the 
case was probably impossible to resolve 
393
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In holding for the governmental defendant, the Supreme Court 
did not deny that the conventional sources of interpretation left the 
case in equipoise Instead it invoked a background principle "[I]f 
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, 
it must do so unambiguously By insisting that Congress speak with 
a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, 
cognizant of the consequences of their participation "397 The Court 
decided Pennhurst on the basis of an interpretive norm derived from 
the constitutional background, not from the statute at issue 
For reasons explored above, federalism principles are properly 
invoked, at least in ordinary settings, to require a clear statement 
from Congress for the imposition of significant duties on the states 
If the Court had held the bill of rights legally enforceable, the states 
would have faced an enormous financial burden — one that they had 
not, in view of the statute's ambiguity, necessarily expected to incur 
It is for this reason that the outcome in Pennhurst is a plausible one 
But two considerations suggest that Pennhurst was incorrectly de-
cided 
First, a constitutional norm calls for aggressive construction of 
statutes involving the developmentally disabled The Court has been 
extremely cautious in using the Constitution to protect the disabled, 
largely for institutional reasons 3 9 8 In holding that the equal protec-
tion clause does not entitle the mentally retarded to special judicial 
protection, for example, the Court stressed that federal and state 
legislatures have responded to the pervasive mistreatment of the re-
tarded, and that unelected judges should be reluctant to intrude so 
dramatically into democratic processes 3 9 9 In these circumstances, the 
best substantive theory of the equal protection clause accords special 
protection to the disabled, and when other branches give such pro 
tection, they are fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities 
Second, federalism principles have much less force in cases in 
which Congress attempts to protect a traditionally disadvantaged 
group from state political processes The ordinary presumption in 
favor of state autonomy is countered by the fourteenth amendment 
— a self conscious limitation on state power Invocation of principles 
of state autonomy in the context of a socially subordinated group — 
to justify a narrow reading of a statute enacted on its behalf — is 
positively perverse in light of constitutional structure and history 4 0° 
397
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398
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It follows that when Congress has taken steps to provide safe-
guards for that group, the Court should take into account the four-
teenth amendment and the underenforced character of the equality 
norm in order to give statutes involving the disabled a hospitable 
rather than a grudging interpretation.401 The Pennhurst Court should 
not have relied on a background norm in favor of federalism in order 
to render meaningless a statutory provision involving a group and a 
right safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment.402 
E. A Concluding Note: The Post-Canonical Universe 
What would the universe of statutory interpretation be like if all 
of these proposals were accepted? In one sense, it would not be 
dramatically different from the one we inhabit. All of the principles 
suggested here have some foundations in current law. A system of 
interpretation without interpretive norms, even substantive and insti-
tutional ones, would be inconceivable. On the other hand, a legal 
system that adopted such principles self-consciously would have a far 
greater degree of uniformity and coherence. It would be especially 
responsive to constitutional norms, to institutional considerations, and 
to an informed understanding of the functions and failures of the 
modern regulatory state. Above all, the system would rely on norms 
that promote the goals and that improve the performance of statutory 
regimes, and it would use the process of statutory construction as a 
corrective against some of the pervasive weaknesses, injustices, and 
irrationalities of modern regulation 
In all likelihood, a set of explicitly articulated interpretive norms 
would elicit administrative and legislative responses. In time, mem-
bers of Congress, and others involved in the lawmaking process, 
would become aware of those norms and would enact statutes in the 
shadow of such norms Some statutes would look quite different, for 
Congress would know that courts would, in the face of statutory 
silence or ambiguity, press legislation in one direction rather than 
another.403 Judicial adoption of interpretive norms of this sort would 
and made necessary the very statute at issue in Pennhurst See Minow, When Difference Has 
Its Home Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of 
Difference, 22 HARV C R C L L REV H I , 144-52 (1987) 
401
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ultimately shift the burden of legislative inertia — giving rationality 
of various sorts the benefit of the doubt, and raising the costs of 
absurdity or injustice — and at the same time would offer legislators 
and others a clear rather than murky background against which to 
do their work. 
The interpretive norms suggested here would convert some hard 
cases into easy ones, by providing principles with which to decide 
cases that might otherwise be in equipoise. Examples include cases 
like American Petroleum, which involved the operation of the pro-
portionality principle, and cases involving allegations of preemption, 
which implicate the principle in favor of state autonomy. But the 
norms would also make some easy cases into hard ones, by shifting 
the legal backdrop and requiring clear legislative instructions before 
certain results could be reached. For this reason, a legal framework 
pervaded by explicit background norms of the sort outlined here would 
in some settings create rather than diminish legal uncertainty.404 This 
cost, however, is a small price to pay for increased clarity in a variety 
of contexts, and, much more fundamentally, an improvement in the 
performance of regulatory law, an increase in rationality, and a greater 
sensitivity to the constitutional backdrop, statutory function, and reg-
ulatory failure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The traditional understandings of statutory construction are inad-
equate. They fail to describe existing practice or to set out an ap-
proach that deserves support. Under the approach suggested here, 
the statutory text is the foundation for interpretation, but structure, 
purpose, intent, history, and "reasonableness" all play legitimate roles 
It is possible, moreover, to distinguish among those roles, and thus to 
produce a system in which dictionary definitions of statutory terms 
ordinarily suffice, but are subject to various forms of contextual qual-
ification. 
As complete theories of interpretation, however, all of the tradi-
tional sources depend on fictions or leave large interpretive gaps. 
Efforts to approach statutes as "deals," or to justify a general back-
ground rule in favor of either administrative interpretation or "private 
ordering,"405 cannot be defended, for they produce indeterminacy, lead 
404
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to an inferior system of law, or depend on values that were repudiated 
by the decision to create the regulatory regime in the first instance. 
Because language "by itself" lacks meaning, and in light of the 
existence of gaps or ambiguities in hard cases, interpretive principles 
of various sorts are desirable and in any case inevitable. Interpreta-
tion cannot occur without background principles that fill gaps in the 
face of legislative silence and provide the backdrop against which to 
read linguistic commands. In easy cases, the text, in conjunction with 
generally held interpretive principles, is enough to solve interpretive 
disputes; in other cases, also relatively easy, a resort to purpose, 
context — including legislative history — or reasonableness will be 
proper, necessary, and sufficient. In many cases, however, courts 
must invoke interpretive principles that appear controversial. 
Some such principles aid courts in discerning the meaning of par-
ticular statutes, or help to implement Congress' actual or likely in-
terpretive instructions. Others are rooted in constitutional concerns; 
others derive from assessments of institutional performance; still others 
attempt to respond to characteristic failings of regulatory legislation. 
Because statutory meaning is a function of interpretive principles and 
cannot exist without them, something like "canons" of construction, 
far from being obsolete, must occupy a prominent place in the theory 
and practice of statutory interpretation. 
In these circumstances, it is especially important to avoid thiee 
common errors. The first is to treat interpretive principles as the 
illegitimate intrusion of discretionary policy judgments into "ordinary" 
interpretation; as we have seen, there is no such thing. The second 
is to think that the existence of competing, and value-laden, principles 
is a reason to give up on the enterprise of statutory construction 
altogether, and in hard cases to resort to a sometimes fictional "plain 
language," to treat interpretation as inevitably indeterminate, or to 
rest content with the conclusion that statutes turn out to mean what 
people in authority say that they mean. Even in hard cases, it is 
possible to mediate among competing principles and to assess them in 
terms of their sensitivity to constitutional structure, to institutional 
arrangements, and to regulatory function and failure. The third error 
is to use traditional principles of private law — carried over from 
anachronistic conceptions of the relationship between the citizen and 
the state — to resolve disputes about the meaning of modern enact-
ments 
The interpretive principles suggested here are intended for the 
President, regulatory agencies, and Congress, as well as for the courts 
Even more fundamentally, they provide a basis for understanding the 
ideas that underlie the fabric of the modern regulatory state Indeed, 
it is in disputes over background norms of interpretation that one 
finds principles that organize and divide understandings not only of 
the New Deal reformation, but of American constitutionalism and 
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The ultimate task is to develop a set of interpretive norms — 
sensitive to constitutional structure, institutional design, the New Deal 
reformation, and the diverse functions and failings of governmental 
actors and statutory regimes406 — with which to approach social and 
economic regulation in a system that has largely abandoned common 
law categories. It is possible to generate a series of interpretive prin-
ciples, all with support in current law, that can promote the goals of 
deliberative government in the post-New Deal period. In this way, 
statutory construction can serve as an ally of other, more ambitious 
strategies designed to promote some of the original constitutional goals 
in a dramatically changed legal environment It is far too much to 
expect statutory construction to respond to all of the failings of the 
modern regulatory state. But it is not too much to expect that the 
process of interpretation can make the situation better rather than 
worse. 
406
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APPENDIX: INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES, O L D AND N E W 
I. EXISTING OR DEFUNCT PRINCIPLES: A TYPOLOGY 
A. Principles Designed To Reveal Statutory Meaning in Particular 
Cases 
i. Plain meaning (questionable). 
2. Understanding words in context of statutory structure. 
3. Understanding specific provisions to overcome general pro-
visions. 
4. Expressio unius (questionable). 
5. Construing statutes in context of and harmoniously with 
other statutes. 
6. Ejusdem generis. 
B. Principles Designed To Reflect Congress' Actual or Likely In-
terpretive Instructions 
1. 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-6. 
2. Narrow construction of appropriations statutes. 
3. Construing statutes so as to avoid constitutional invalidity. 
4. Presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative 
decisions. 
5. Accounting for changed circumstances. 
C. Principles Designed To Promote Institutional Goals or To Im-
prove Lawmaking 
1. Plain meaning (questionable). 
2. Narrow construction of appropriations statutes. 
3. Narrow construction of exemptions from taxation. 
4. Deferring to agency interpretations of law, or to agency 
decisions where discretion has been conferred. 
5. Construing statutes so as to limit administrative discretion 
and force decision by politically accountable persons. 
6. Presumption in favor of judicial review of agency decisions. 
7. Interpreting congressional refusal to disrupt longstanding 
judicial or administrative interpretations of statutes as ac-
quiescence or ratification. 
D. Principles Designed To Promote Substantive Goals 
1. Presumption against preemption of state law (questionable 
when discrimination is at issue). 
2. Presumption against implied repeals. 
3. Construing statutes so as to harmonize with one another. 
4. Narrow construction of statutes in derogation of common 
law (obsolete). 
5. Nar row construction of statutes abrogating sovereign im-
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6. Construing statutes in favor of Indian tribes. 
7. Presumption against implied causes of action (questionable). 
8. Presumption against judicial review of agency inaction 
(questionable). 
9. Rule of lenity in criminal cases. 
10. Presumption that laws apply only within territory of United 
States. 
11. Presumption against standing for "regulatory harms" (ques-
tionable). 
12. Broad construction of remedial statutes (indefensible except 
as a corrective to 4 above). 
13. Presumption against retroactivity. 
14. Presumption against interference with traditional powers 
of the President and federal courts. 
II. PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR THE REGULATORY STATE 
A. Constitutional Principles 
1. Avoiding constitutional invalidity and constitutional doubts. 
2. Federalism. 
3. Political accountability; the nondelegation principle. 
4. Political deliberation; checks and balances; the constitutional 
antipathy to naked interest-group transfers. 
5. Disadvantaged groups. 
6. Hearing rights. 
7. Property and contract rights. 
8. Welfare rights. 
9. Rule of law. 
B. Institutional Concerns 
1. Narrow construction of appropriations statutes. 
2. Presumption in favor of judicial review. 
3. Presumption against implied exemptions from taxation. 
4. Presumption against implied repeals. 
5. Question of administrative discretion. 
6. Cautious approach to legislative history. 
7. Ratification, acquiescence, stare decisis and post-enactment 
history. 
C. Counteracting Statutory Failure 
1. Presumption in favor of political accountability. 
2. Presumption against subversion of statute through collective 
action problems. 
3. Presumption in favor of coordination and consistency. 
4. Presumption against obsolescence. 
5. Narrow construction of procedural qualifications of substan-
tive rierhts. 
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6. Understanding systemic effects of regulatory controls. 
7. Presumption against irrationality and injustice. 
8. Proportionality (to counteract overzealous implementation). 
9. De minimis exceptions (same). 
10. Narrow construction of statutes embodying interest-group 
transfers (to counteract "deals"). 
11. Broad construction of statutes protecting disadvantaged 
groups. 
12. Broad construction of statutes protecting nonmarket val-
ues. 
13. Avoiding private law principles. 
III. PRIORITY AND HARMONIZATION 
A. Political Accountability and Political Deliberation As Meta-
Principles 
B. Principles with Constitutional Foundations (e.g., protect dis-
advantaged groups, prevent interest-group deals, ensure against 
procedural unfairness) 
C. Proportionality; Systemic Effects; de Minimis Exceptions 
D. Other Nonconstitutional Principles 
